This article from the NY Times is an informative read from a Army officer whose experience in Afghanistan was marked by the dismal effects the ever-growing military bureaucracy has on initiative in combat operations. Essentially, this captain argues that many opportunities to capture or kill key AAF leaders were lost because of the numerous levels of red taped that must be fought before the actual fight ever begins. By the time approval was gained for the operations, the target had long departed. Consequently, the local populace and Afghan forces were frustrated at the military’s lack of action on convenient targets.
I would guess that the origin of this bureaucratic nonsense (aside from being typical of any large governmental organization) is in another tenant of counterinsurgency: minimize civilian casualties. But in this quest (which I am by no means denigrating) to avoid civilian casualties, the level of approval for combat operations had climbed higher and higher, to the point where initiative is completely squelched. The ever-increasing technology available to commanders further allows micromanagement of troops on the ground, a mishandling of an asset intended to enable initiative.
Many a counterinsurgency expert (such as Kilcullen in his “28 Articles”) has emphasized the importance of initiative at the company level and below. This should not be a new concept to anyone even remotely familiar with COIN. But the military has forgotten to balance the avoidance of civilian casualties with encouraging initiative in lower level commanders. Pursuing extreme measures in support of one counterinsurgency guideline (ie. avoid civilian casualties) will not create success if it is only at the expense of other COIN lessons learned.
The discussion up until now is only scratching the surface of what is a deeper – and more complex – problem. Clearly, Commanders at BCT, DIV and above believe that BN and CO level commanders are not fit to make these types of decisions. Why is that? Is it the “fog of war”? The additional knowledge that is available at the TOC (Rivet Joint feed, UAS Feed etc) but not to those on the ground? Is the education level of CO Commanders simply incomplete?
If this cumbersome decision making process is not streamlined and decision making returned to BN and CO levels, the benefits available from the recently-announced troop increases may be limited at best.
09 December, 2009
16 September, 2009
Esquire Article
This article in Esquire was recommended to me by my Uncle and I diligently read it on a recent airplane trip. A few things jumped out at me. A reinforced Infantry company conducts a sweep of a ridgeline, searching for arms caches and insurgents. They tramp up and then down the ridgeline for two days, through dense underbrush, find no insurgents or weapons caches, but sustain a handful of injuries from exhaustion, dehydration, and sprained ankles. Am I describing a mission in Afghanistan or Vietnam?
Next:
Finally, the role of Haji Matin in the insurgency was what really confounded me. His sawmill was idled by a government decree that prohibited most logging. This left Matin, his mill workers, and the loggers out of jobs and pushed them into the arms of the insurgency. The author points out that the desire to expel the American invaders from their valley was also a motivating factor for the insurgency, but the Afghan governments logging prohibition is important for two reasons.
First, it presents an opportunity for the Afghan government and the American forces to disaggregate the insurgency. Let them log! If we can peel off even some of the insurgents by allowing them to resume their former occupations with a simple concession like allowing them to log then why not?
Second, this smacks of the US inserting itself on one side in a minor, perhaps ethnically motivated, conflict. This results in American forces becoming part of the conflict, and unable to function as a neutral arbiter working to resolve the problem. Yes, American forces need to support the Afghan government. But if they are seen as the Karzai faction's attack dog, we will never be able to effectively promote the reconciliation required to achieve a long term solution in Afghanistan.
Next:
One of the organizing ideas behind [the operation] had been to get the Afghan army, which has been improving in skill in recent years, to search an important village and try to trip up, or even catch, Haji Matin [a local insurgent leader], the owner of the valley's idled sawmill.
...[the operation] was meant to disrupt these locals by placing an American company on the insurgents' ridge and simultaneously placing an Afghan company in position to sweep a village Haji Matin frequented. The battalion had planned it this way, and briefed it this way, and then, the day before the mission began, word came from Kabul that the village search was canceled.And yet the mission went ahead. This strikes me as sticking to a plan, even when the facts on the ground have changed.
Finally, the role of Haji Matin in the insurgency was what really confounded me. His sawmill was idled by a government decree that prohibited most logging. This left Matin, his mill workers, and the loggers out of jobs and pushed them into the arms of the insurgency. The author points out that the desire to expel the American invaders from their valley was also a motivating factor for the insurgency, but the Afghan governments logging prohibition is important for two reasons.
First, it presents an opportunity for the Afghan government and the American forces to disaggregate the insurgency. Let them log! If we can peel off even some of the insurgents by allowing them to resume their former occupations with a simple concession like allowing them to log then why not?
Second, this smacks of the US inserting itself on one side in a minor, perhaps ethnically motivated, conflict. This results in American forces becoming part of the conflict, and unable to function as a neutral arbiter working to resolve the problem. Yes, American forces need to support the Afghan government. But if they are seen as the Karzai faction's attack dog, we will never be able to effectively promote the reconciliation required to achieve a long term solution in Afghanistan.
06 September, 2009
Undermining the "Strategic Corporal"
I've never spent much time pondering the NCO promotion system, and why should I? It had never affected me before. But now, as a PL, one of my responsibilities is promoting talented Soldiers, or preventing promotions, as the case may be.
My PSG and I sent an E5 to the E6 board last month. This E5 is everything one could ask for in a young NCO and more. Anything I ask for will be done to the utmost of his ability. He is conscientious about developing his Soldiers, he is impressively knowledgeable about Afghanistan, he is tactically and technically competent, he spends his personal time thinking about the mission at hand and how to accomplish it, ultimately, he is the most competent person in my platoon. He is one of those NCOs that our Cadre were talking about when they said to naive Cadets "Don't worry, your NCOs will teach you all that you need to know." (Unfortunately, they never mentioned the 50% of NCOs that don't know enough - and don't care to - square a young officer away, but I digress). If any NCO should make E6, this is the one.
But I misjudged - and failed to understand - the NCO promotion system. Professional competency doesn't seem to really matter. Development of subordinates, not too important, personal development towards understanding Afghanistan - overrated. 1SGs and CSMs really only care to promote NCOs who remember an insignificant detail of the morning news, who have spent time memorizing the minutia of Drill and Ceremony (time that could have been spent on the Pashtunwali).
Yes, NCOs are responsible for studying for the board. But in the case of this NCO, he transferred over from the Navy less than 2 years ago. Some of the regulation-based knowledge that Soldiers pick up along the way was lost upon him. Because he wasn't well schooled in nonsense that is easily looked up, he failed to make E6.
Much as been made of the "strategic corporal" or the importance of decentralized decisions made by junior NCOs on the ground. However, the NCO promotion boards must be redirected from the simple memorization of regulation minutia - metric that absolutely fails at indicating leadership potential, and refocused on questions regarding technical competency, knowledge of the deployment AO and situational leadership challenges. Furthermore, boards should not be the determining promotion factor, and should be subjugated to evaluations written by the NCOs chain of command. Only when the NCO promotion system has been altered to reflect this new focus will the Army see the greatest gains from the "strategic corporal."
My PSG and I sent an E5 to the E6 board last month. This E5 is everything one could ask for in a young NCO and more. Anything I ask for will be done to the utmost of his ability. He is conscientious about developing his Soldiers, he is impressively knowledgeable about Afghanistan, he is tactically and technically competent, he spends his personal time thinking about the mission at hand and how to accomplish it, ultimately, he is the most competent person in my platoon. He is one of those NCOs that our Cadre were talking about when they said to naive Cadets "Don't worry, your NCOs will teach you all that you need to know." (Unfortunately, they never mentioned the 50% of NCOs that don't know enough - and don't care to - square a young officer away, but I digress). If any NCO should make E6, this is the one.
But I misjudged - and failed to understand - the NCO promotion system. Professional competency doesn't seem to really matter. Development of subordinates, not too important, personal development towards understanding Afghanistan - overrated. 1SGs and CSMs really only care to promote NCOs who remember an insignificant detail of the morning news, who have spent time memorizing the minutia of Drill and Ceremony (time that could have been spent on the Pashtunwali).
Yes, NCOs are responsible for studying for the board. But in the case of this NCO, he transferred over from the Navy less than 2 years ago. Some of the regulation-based knowledge that Soldiers pick up along the way was lost upon him. Because he wasn't well schooled in nonsense that is easily looked up, he failed to make E6.
Much as been made of the "strategic corporal" or the importance of decentralized decisions made by junior NCOs on the ground. However, the NCO promotion boards must be redirected from the simple memorization of regulation minutia - metric that absolutely fails at indicating leadership potential, and refocused on questions regarding technical competency, knowledge of the deployment AO and situational leadership challenges. Furthermore, boards should not be the determining promotion factor, and should be subjugated to evaluations written by the NCOs chain of command. Only when the NCO promotion system has been altered to reflect this new focus will the Army see the greatest gains from the "strategic corporal."
01 September, 2009
Infantry Basic Officer Leadership, good prep?
Infantry Basic Officer Leadership Course (IBOLC) is over. Overall, it was a good course at giving me technical tools but it was not a good course for creating a good mindset.
The Turkish international student in our platoon, Ferhat, was named the international honor graduate and had some especially cogent criticisms. He said that the situations we face were mostly canned and did not correlate to what we will be facing when we deploy. Every time we do a mission we go in knowing the exact enemy situation. We know where he is, what he will do, and how many people he has. He behaved like a conventional opponent every time. Whenever we attacked he would stay and fight when an irregular opponent would have broken contact. Also, we initiated almost all of our engagements, whereas in reality the insurgent initiates the vast majority.
He did say our training was very good on the whole. I did learn a lot about things like how to think about security in all environments and how to employ machine guns well. I also got good feedback from the cadre on how to communicate orders better and delegate to make my life easier.
At the same time, his criticisms were definitely valid. IBOLC did not help prepare us for the ambiguity that we will face having to react to a daring an crafty enemy who hits us at our weakest points. Also, it was very process oriented. We went into a situation we knew and had faced before, and just had to follow a process to get the job done. If they had taught the classes in a way that asked more questions and put us in unfamiliar situations we would have had a different experience.
The Turkish international student in our platoon, Ferhat, was named the international honor graduate and had some especially cogent criticisms. He said that the situations we face were mostly canned and did not correlate to what we will be facing when we deploy. Every time we do a mission we go in knowing the exact enemy situation. We know where he is, what he will do, and how many people he has. He behaved like a conventional opponent every time. Whenever we attacked he would stay and fight when an irregular opponent would have broken contact. Also, we initiated almost all of our engagements, whereas in reality the insurgent initiates the vast majority.
He did say our training was very good on the whole. I did learn a lot about things like how to think about security in all environments and how to employ machine guns well. I also got good feedback from the cadre on how to communicate orders better and delegate to make my life easier.
At the same time, his criticisms were definitely valid. IBOLC did not help prepare us for the ambiguity that we will face having to react to a daring an crafty enemy who hits us at our weakest points. Also, it was very process oriented. We went into a situation we knew and had faced before, and just had to follow a process to get the job done. If they had taught the classes in a way that asked more questions and put us in unfamiliar situations we would have had a different experience.
21 August, 2009
Podcast Source
Some good podcasts here at at the Pritzker Military Library in my home of Chicago. The podcast with Kilcullen in June was fantastic as was the one with Steve Coll (although the later was a little out of date).
11 July, 2009
Fall of the Warrior King part II?
Very interesting article in last week's New Yorker about 3rd BDE, 101st ABN in Iraq in 2005-2006. It focuses on Operation Iron Triangle in May 2006, but also deals with the commander, COL Michael Steele, and the command climate he established. The article falls short in not exploring this element of the story in enough detail, but still provides us with some noteworthy insights. Unfortunately, the article is not yet available to those who do not have a subscription to the New Yorker, but hopefully you all will find a way to read it.
Many elements of the article are worthy of discussion, but as the argument against killing detainees is pretty well tread ground, I'll look to something a little more thoughprovoking.
If the name Michael Steele rings a bell it is because he was the Ranger company commander in Mark Bowden's book, Black Hawk Down. The author of the article comments more than once about the effect that losing 18 men that day in Mogadishu had on Steele. Perhaps this is just armchair psychology, but there does seem to be a basis in the author's interviews with and observations of Steele.
Which brings me to my point. In war, people die. It is the nature of the business. It doesn't make it any easier to lose a friend, colleague, or loved one, but it is a fact, and we ought to expect it to occur. This obviously does not mean we should be reckless with Soldier's lives, but we must remember that our job as Army leaders is to accomplish the mission. If the Army's mission was to aviod casualties, then we shouldn't even get out of bed. COL Steele seemed to become so preoccupied with avoiding casualties that it had a significant negative impact on mission accomplishment.
Many elements of the article are worthy of discussion, but as the argument against killing detainees is pretty well tread ground, I'll look to something a little more thoughprovoking.
If the name Michael Steele rings a bell it is because he was the Ranger company commander in Mark Bowden's book, Black Hawk Down. The author of the article comments more than once about the effect that losing 18 men that day in Mogadishu had on Steele. Perhaps this is just armchair psychology, but there does seem to be a basis in the author's interviews with and observations of Steele.
Which brings me to my point. In war, people die. It is the nature of the business. It doesn't make it any easier to lose a friend, colleague, or loved one, but it is a fact, and we ought to expect it to occur. This obviously does not mean we should be reckless with Soldier's lives, but we must remember that our job as Army leaders is to accomplish the mission. If the Army's mission was to aviod casualties, then we shouldn't even get out of bed. COL Steele seemed to become so preoccupied with avoiding casualties that it had a significant negative impact on mission accomplishment.
08 July, 2009
Look back at McNamara and Vietnam
McNamara's death brings to the forefront the legacy our involvement in Vietnam. The issue is especially relevant considering the debate over what we should do in Afghanistan today. Check out this Washington Post oped.
There has been a lot written about the mistakes we made in Vietnam. Those don't need to be rehashed here, but it is heartening to note how different the debate is. Talking to people who were alive then, they note that there was much less knowledge and debate about potential strategies for dealing with the situation. All of the debate was about whether we should stay or not. Today, there is a lot of constructive debate about Afghanistan and ways to deal with it.
The other important thing to consider about McNamara's legacy is his later stated belief that the war was unwinnable but he still continued to send troops there. I could never accept anyone doing something like that. You are putting other men and women in harms way because of a lack of political courage.
The same issue arises for Afghanistan. The Administrations plan for dealing with it is-on the whole-nothing too new but it is a good plan and gives me courage that the administration believes they can succeed and is sending us there for good reason. I have heard some talk of reducing our objective in Afghanistan to more just kill capture to take out senior Al-Qaeda leadership so that there can be some plausible success. It would be a huge mistake to do so, because it would not solve the problem and would only strengthen the hardcore Islamic militant leadership of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. This solution is mostly political in my mind, and would be akin to McNamara's sending soldiers to Vietnam even when he knew the war was unwinnable for political reasons. For me, if I am standing in front of my men in a year explaining to them why I am dragging them across the world away from their loved one to possibly die, I want to have confidence it is for the right reasons.
There has been a lot written about the mistakes we made in Vietnam. Those don't need to be rehashed here, but it is heartening to note how different the debate is. Talking to people who were alive then, they note that there was much less knowledge and debate about potential strategies for dealing with the situation. All of the debate was about whether we should stay or not. Today, there is a lot of constructive debate about Afghanistan and ways to deal with it.
The other important thing to consider about McNamara's legacy is his later stated belief that the war was unwinnable but he still continued to send troops there. I could never accept anyone doing something like that. You are putting other men and women in harms way because of a lack of political courage.
The same issue arises for Afghanistan. The Administrations plan for dealing with it is-on the whole-nothing too new but it is a good plan and gives me courage that the administration believes they can succeed and is sending us there for good reason. I have heard some talk of reducing our objective in Afghanistan to more just kill capture to take out senior Al-Qaeda leadership so that there can be some plausible success. It would be a huge mistake to do so, because it would not solve the problem and would only strengthen the hardcore Islamic militant leadership of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. This solution is mostly political in my mind, and would be akin to McNamara's sending soldiers to Vietnam even when he knew the war was unwinnable for political reasons. For me, if I am standing in front of my men in a year explaining to them why I am dragging them across the world away from their loved one to possibly die, I want to have confidence it is for the right reasons.
21 June, 2009
The "Weaker" Sex: A Unique Role in COIN?
Foreign Policy writes:
"In light of the Lionesses success, perhaps the Pentagon should consider forming large all-female infantry units to support its counterinsurgency campaigns."
"In light of the Lionesses success, perhaps the Pentagon should consider forming large all-female infantry units to support its counterinsurgency campaigns."
10 June, 2009
Nature vs. Nurture, COIN-style!
Just finished reading The Village. Great story with useful and interesting details on small unit COIN. The CAP seemed to have very successfully countered the Viet Cong's efforts to control Binh Nghia and use it to logistically support their efforts in the greater area.
But there was a very interesting paragraph--almost a throw-away paragraph--about half-way through the book:
But there was a very interesting paragraph--almost a throw-away paragraph--about half-way through the book:
Luong offered a partial explanation for Binh Nghia's lukewarm attitude towards the Viet Cong. The local Communist movement, he said, had originated across the river in the Phu Longs, and hostility between the Phu Longs and Binh Nghia was generations old, focused on a feud over fishing rights.
The first thing I thought of was the parallel to Malaya. Similar to Binh Nghia, the ethnic Malay population had never been very close with the ethnic Chinese insurgents. In terms of animosity, it was more ethnic Chinese towards ethnic Malays (as opposed to mutual) because of British preferential treatment for the Malays, but nonetheless, the Malay majority had little reason to support the Chinese insurgents.
What does this say about our ability to succeed in COIN? Is the fundamental "nature" (pun intended) of the conflict the deciding factor? Are we as counterinsurgents largely at the mercy of the circumstances we are thrust into? In short, can we only succeed when the deck is stacked in our favor?
What does this say about our ability to succeed in COIN? Is the fundamental "nature" (pun intended) of the conflict the deciding factor? Are we as counterinsurgents largely at the mercy of the circumstances we are thrust into? In short, can we only succeed when the deck is stacked in our favor?
If it is possible to "nurture" a dislike of the insurgents in the population, then the example of Binh Nghia is a reminder of the famous Tip O'Neil quote, "All politics is local." We can also put another check in Dave Kilcullen's column. As he argued in his 2005 article, "Countering Global Insurgency," disaggregating insurgents is our best hope for success. The case of Binh Nghia seems to suggest that disaggregation is possible and effective even on the micro level.
Let's just hope it's not a question of nature after all.
Let's just hope it's not a question of nature after all.
05 June, 2009
New Blog - Check it Out
I discovered this blog on lessons learned in Afghanistan (it is not affiliated with CALL). I haven't read as much as I would like, but it seemed like something that y'all would enjoy.
31 May, 2009
Torture Continued
The recent posts on torture have had me thinking about the subject lately. In particular, this sentence, in the historical context of 20th century wars has been on my mind:
Racism can be a lens through which Soldiers view the war they are facing. Their level of racism - or lack thereof - is a huge factor is the likelihood of abuse, torture and war crimes. At its most "innocuous" level, racism is little more than calling Iraqis or Afghans "hadjis." This is extremely common among all the Soldiers I have encountered, no one thinks anything about it. Yet is it also the insidious underpinning upon which a My Lai or Abu Graib can be built. This sounds like an overly harsh statement, and I do not mean that anyone who uses the pejorative "hadji" likely to commit a war crime. But a racism dehumanizes the enemy, and in its most extreme cases, provides the transformation that can allow a Soldier to commit abuses.
A cursory overview of wars in the 20th century supports the racism - abuse link. What allowed Soldiers fighting in Europe to converse, even play football with the enemy, during lulls in combat? This would have been unthinkable on the Pacific front, or in Vietnam. While the nature of these wars were different (especially with regards to the guerrilla aspect of Viet Nam) and the brutality of the enemy was certainly a factor, race, ethnicity and the resulting lack of a common humanity were a significant factor. Enemy combatants in Europe looked like Americans, there were cultural similarities due to America's immigrant population. It is hard to dehumanize the enemy when he looks a lot like you. There were no such limitations in Asia/the Pacific. When the enemy has a different skin color, when he is rice farmer in Vietman, or a Pashto herdsman, when the common humanity is not as obvious, racism comes easier. And racism, if encouraged or unchecked can ultimately contribute to the war crimes that stain the military's history.
The use of racial and ethnic epithets--to include the most common term, hadji--must be banned by junior leaders and that ban must be enforced and its rationale explained. Furthermore, junior leaders must emphasize the common humanity between soldiers and the people of Iraq and Afghanistan
Racism can be a lens through which Soldiers view the war they are facing. Their level of racism - or lack thereof - is a huge factor is the likelihood of abuse, torture and war crimes. At its most "innocuous" level, racism is little more than calling Iraqis or Afghans "hadjis." This is extremely common among all the Soldiers I have encountered, no one thinks anything about it. Yet is it also the insidious underpinning upon which a My Lai or Abu Graib can be built. This sounds like an overly harsh statement, and I do not mean that anyone who uses the pejorative "hadji" likely to commit a war crime. But a racism dehumanizes the enemy, and in its most extreme cases, provides the transformation that can allow a Soldier to commit abuses.
A cursory overview of wars in the 20th century supports the racism - abuse link. What allowed Soldiers fighting in Europe to converse, even play football with the enemy, during lulls in combat? This would have been unthinkable on the Pacific front, or in Vietnam. While the nature of these wars were different (especially with regards to the guerrilla aspect of Viet Nam) and the brutality of the enemy was certainly a factor, race, ethnicity and the resulting lack of a common humanity were a significant factor. Enemy combatants in Europe looked like Americans, there were cultural similarities due to America's immigrant population. It is hard to dehumanize the enemy when he looks a lot like you. There were no such limitations in Asia/the Pacific. When the enemy has a different skin color, when he is rice farmer in Vietman, or a Pashto herdsman, when the common humanity is not as obvious, racism comes easier. And racism, if encouraged or unchecked can ultimately contribute to the war crimes that stain the military's history.
30 May, 2009
What the Army is Doing Right Now ...
As a spin of on the post below, I want to talk about what the Army, or at least my Soldiers, have been doing of late.
First there was the post cleanup week. Now keep in mind that there are constantly details fielded from a rotation of units cleaning up the post. But some high ranking person somewhere probably saw one piece of litter and a number of Soldiers from every unit were pulled to wander around post and devote their time to cigarette butts.
The following week. Fort Campbell makes the national news for leading all Army posts in number of suicides. We've had 11-14 this year, depending on the source. The entire post is smacked with a mandatory suicide safety stand down day. Units are pulled in from the field. Training is canned. My Soldiers are pulled out of a civilian taught class they are required to attend before deployment. Suicide is indeed a tragedy, and I can understand that the number of deaths here at Fort Campbell warranted a response, but I don't know that sidelining valuable training for a day of standing on a parade field, waiting for the commanding General to arrive and tell us that "Screaming Eagles don't quit" is the appropriate response.
Let's not forget that the "Week of the Eagle" is fast approaching. I can't plan any training during this time, and despite the fact that it takes place a mere 2 weeks before we are to leave for JRTC, my Soldiers and I will probably spend the week contributing to a clean post, standing on parade fields, "enjoying" the mandatory fun, and going on BDE or DIV runs.
This article that I linked to below, contains a segment towards the end about distractors and enablers. I find myself thinking of it often as I seek to work around the numerous distractors there are in the Army
First there was the post cleanup week. Now keep in mind that there are constantly details fielded from a rotation of units cleaning up the post. But some high ranking person somewhere probably saw one piece of litter and a number of Soldiers from every unit were pulled to wander around post and devote their time to cigarette butts.
The following week. Fort Campbell makes the national news for leading all Army posts in number of suicides. We've had 11-14 this year, depending on the source. The entire post is smacked with a mandatory suicide safety stand down day. Units are pulled in from the field. Training is canned. My Soldiers are pulled out of a civilian taught class they are required to attend before deployment. Suicide is indeed a tragedy, and I can understand that the number of deaths here at Fort Campbell warranted a response, but I don't know that sidelining valuable training for a day of standing on a parade field, waiting for the commanding General to arrive and tell us that "Screaming Eagles don't quit" is the appropriate response.
Let's not forget that the "Week of the Eagle" is fast approaching. I can't plan any training during this time, and despite the fact that it takes place a mere 2 weeks before we are to leave for JRTC, my Soldiers and I will probably spend the week contributing to a clean post, standing on parade fields, "enjoying" the mandatory fun, and going on BDE or DIV runs.
This article that I linked to below, contains a segment towards the end about distractors and enablers. I find myself thinking of it often as I seek to work around the numerous distractors there are in the Army
27 May, 2009
What is the Taliban doing right now...
This is something I've spent some time pondering over the last three weeks I spent in the field. While sitting on my ruck awaiting my turn on the range, or when a day is spent waiting for something to happen that never materializes, I wonder, are my peers and I wasting time lost in the bureaucracy while somewhere in the mountains of Afghanistan/Pakistan Taliban fighters are becoming more lethal? What is the Taliban doing right now at this very moment? I suspect this sort of down time (wasted time?) is universal among all military forces, but somewhere in the back of my mind I fear I am wrong.
And more philosophically, does my air conditioned house, comfortable mattress, hot food, clean clothes, etc., make me soft? Or does it make me smarter because I go to the fight more rested and with better morale? Or does the harshness of sleeping in the mountains, at the mercy of the elements, with only the supplies that can scrounged make the Taliban even harder and more lethal? Hmm... Thoughts?
And more philosophically, does my air conditioned house, comfortable mattress, hot food, clean clothes, etc., make me soft? Or does it make me smarter because I go to the fight more rested and with better morale? Or does the harshness of sleeping in the mountains, at the mercy of the elements, with only the supplies that can scrounged make the Taliban even harder and more lethal? Hmm... Thoughts?
26 May, 2009
The case against torture
I wanted to build off Johnson’s great post. Torture is something that still needs to be addressed despite the scandal at Abu Ghraib and the subsequent fall out.
In my view, torture is both unethical and impractical in almost every instance. Many people have this notion of torture being used in Jack Bauer type 24 situations where you know someone knows where a WMD is that could kill many people, you know by torturing him you will find it and thus avert many deaths. In this case, it would be an ethical imperative to torture him because the psychological damage to you and him and the potential media fallout is worth saving all the lives you would save. However, this kind of situation never happens in real life. There is simply never that kind of certainty.
One of the lessons of history, especially from the French experience in Algeria I read about in the excellent Alastair Horne’s A Savage War of Peace, is that torture is always counterproductive. It may create some gains in the short term intelligence. It’s clear that the French were able to win the battle of Algiers and deal a devastating tactical defeat to the FLN through the use of torture despite the fact they got some bad intelligence from people lying to end the torture. However, in the long run it had several important strategic effects that made its use counterproductive.
The first long term strategic effect is that the local population turned against the French. The perception of the French continued to shift towards that of occupiers oppressing the Arabs. People will tend to not view a government as legitimate if it torture’s its people in order to maintain security. Even in cultures where there is little notion of human rights the impact is significant. In those cultures, kinship tends to be very important so people will loose confidence in their government if a member of their family, tribe or even ethnic group is tortured.
The second long term important effect was that it undermined domestic political support for the war. Guerillas use politics to shift the balance of forces. That means building up their forces while weakening the enemies through political means. In this case, the French helped them because the resulting domestic political fallout seriously hampered the French state’s ability to cope with the crisis. Thanks to torture and other factors, the political fight became so terrible it tore the 4th republic apart in a military coup, leading to a new constitution and a new leader. Even after deGaulle restored order with the 5th republic, there was another military coup and a French terrorist group formed called the OAS. The OAS was made up largely of ex-French soldiers dedicated to keeping Algeria French. They ended up killing more people than FLN.
A third important consideration that is relevant to our “global contingency operations” (David Kilcullen has some excellent discussion on what its true name should be) is that our use of torture further undermines our allies as documented in Ahmed Rashid’s Descent into Chaos. When countries like Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics see use using torture it encourages them to step up their own human rights violations, not just against takfiris (Al-Qaeda and their associates) but also against domestic political opponents. As a result, it further undermines legitimacy in those already unstable countries. The use of torture was one thing that led to Musharraf’s downfall because it led to further erosion of support for him among the upper classes as Pakistani society.
The Armed Forces and the US government as a whole should ensure all soldiers and operatives understand this.
In my view, torture is both unethical and impractical in almost every instance. Many people have this notion of torture being used in Jack Bauer type 24 situations where you know someone knows where a WMD is that could kill many people, you know by torturing him you will find it and thus avert many deaths. In this case, it would be an ethical imperative to torture him because the psychological damage to you and him and the potential media fallout is worth saving all the lives you would save. However, this kind of situation never happens in real life. There is simply never that kind of certainty.
One of the lessons of history, especially from the French experience in Algeria I read about in the excellent Alastair Horne’s A Savage War of Peace, is that torture is always counterproductive. It may create some gains in the short term intelligence. It’s clear that the French were able to win the battle of Algiers and deal a devastating tactical defeat to the FLN through the use of torture despite the fact they got some bad intelligence from people lying to end the torture. However, in the long run it had several important strategic effects that made its use counterproductive.
The first long term strategic effect is that the local population turned against the French. The perception of the French continued to shift towards that of occupiers oppressing the Arabs. People will tend to not view a government as legitimate if it torture’s its people in order to maintain security. Even in cultures where there is little notion of human rights the impact is significant. In those cultures, kinship tends to be very important so people will loose confidence in their government if a member of their family, tribe or even ethnic group is tortured.
The second long term important effect was that it undermined domestic political support for the war. Guerillas use politics to shift the balance of forces. That means building up their forces while weakening the enemies through political means. In this case, the French helped them because the resulting domestic political fallout seriously hampered the French state’s ability to cope with the crisis. Thanks to torture and other factors, the political fight became so terrible it tore the 4th republic apart in a military coup, leading to a new constitution and a new leader. Even after deGaulle restored order with the 5th republic, there was another military coup and a French terrorist group formed called the OAS. The OAS was made up largely of ex-French soldiers dedicated to keeping Algeria French. They ended up killing more people than FLN.
A third important consideration that is relevant to our “global contingency operations” (David Kilcullen has some excellent discussion on what its true name should be) is that our use of torture further undermines our allies as documented in Ahmed Rashid’s Descent into Chaos. When countries like Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics see use using torture it encourages them to step up their own human rights violations, not just against takfiris (Al-Qaeda and their associates) but also against domestic political opponents. As a result, it further undermines legitimacy in those already unstable countries. The use of torture was one thing that led to Musharraf’s downfall because it led to further erosion of support for him among the upper classes as Pakistani society.
The Armed Forces and the US government as a whole should ensure all soldiers and operatives understand this.
11 May, 2009
Read Cosmo, not Kilcullen
Today I learned that the Army would prefer that I read Cosmo magazine that a book on counterinsurgency or the culture in Afghanistan.
On my lunch break I ambled over to the COL Sink (think Band of Brothers) Memorial Library to see what they had to offer. I searched the library catalog for a couple specific books, to include "The Accidental Guerrilla." Nothing. After multiple unsuccessful searches for books that are not obscure and are featured on many a commanders reading list, I gave up. I decided to search using the keyword "Afghanistan," assuming I would just have to sort through all the returns.
Apparently the Fort Campbell Library has 2 books on Afghanistan, both published before I was born.
I then searched for "counterinsurgency." 5 results, none related to the insurgencies a Soldier at Fort Campbell will encounter.
Frustrated, I wondered over to the periodicals shelves, where I discovered a variety of magazines essential to every squared-away infantryman: Cosmopolitan, Glamour, Oprah, Marie Claire ... the list could go on.
Take away message: the Army will spend money on frivolous magazines, but not books that will better Soldiers, help them understand the conflict and the culture in which they will be fighting. The proclivity to undervalue the intellectual side of war will undermine the Army as it forges its way ahead and faces increasingly complex - and intellectual - challenges.
On my lunch break I ambled over to the COL Sink (think Band of Brothers) Memorial Library to see what they had to offer. I searched the library catalog for a couple specific books, to include "The Accidental Guerrilla." Nothing. After multiple unsuccessful searches for books that are not obscure and are featured on many a commanders reading list, I gave up. I decided to search using the keyword "Afghanistan," assuming I would just have to sort through all the returns.
Apparently the Fort Campbell Library has 2 books on Afghanistan, both published before I was born.
I then searched for "counterinsurgency." 5 results, none related to the insurgencies a Soldier at Fort Campbell will encounter.
Frustrated, I wondered over to the periodicals shelves, where I discovered a variety of magazines essential to every squared-away infantryman: Cosmopolitan, Glamour, Oprah, Marie Claire ... the list could go on.
Take away message: the Army will spend money on frivolous magazines, but not books that will better Soldiers, help them understand the conflict and the culture in which they will be fighting. The proclivity to undervalue the intellectual side of war will undermine the Army as it forges its way ahead and faces increasingly complex - and intellectual - challenges.
Understanding Afghanistan
Check out this excellent article on winning in Afghanistan that my roommate emailed me today. It long, but worth the time. The final section regarding enables and distracters, is especially good.
10 May, 2009
Global Insurgency?
Admiral Olson, Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, wrote this piece in the Journal of International Security this week. I'm not going to write a long criticism here, simply because I'm lazy and just wanted to link to it, because I thought y'all might find it interesting.
But I am going to throw one comment out there: Admiral Olson, in his intro, lumps all the terrorism and insurgencies the United States is facing under the broad term of a "global insurgency." This is a mischaracterization of the nature of the threat. There is no global conspiracy between terrorist and insurgents everywhere to bring down the United States, as Admiral Olson would have it sound. The insurgencies we are facing in Iraq and Afghanistan are the consequences of the counter-terrorism course we chose to pursue in the wake of September 11, 2001.
But I am going to throw one comment out there: Admiral Olson, in his intro, lumps all the terrorism and insurgencies the United States is facing under the broad term of a "global insurgency." This is a mischaracterization of the nature of the threat. There is no global conspiracy between terrorist and insurgents everywhere to bring down the United States, as Admiral Olson would have it sound. The insurgencies we are facing in Iraq and Afghanistan are the consequences of the counter-terrorism course we chose to pursue in the wake of September 11, 2001.
Torture and Ethics
A couple recent incidents at the Infantry School have caused me to think more about torture in particular, and ethics among Army officers in general. Ethical vignettes are a (small) part of the curriculum at Infantry BOLC. These include the now familiar "Fall of the Warrior King," and the less familiar decision by a SEAL team in Afghanistan to not kill some goatherds that stumbled upon their position in the mountains during Operation Redwing.
The first incident was the discussion of "Fall of the Warrior King." What troubled me was that COL Sassaman's decision to lie to his superiors was the only action that was universally regarded as immoral. I don't see much value in rehashing this very well documented and much discussed event, but the lack of recognition by many of my classmates of the moral issues of throwing detainees off a bridge was disturbing, as were the, 'Fadhil probably faked his death for propaganda reasons,' and 'had the soldiers simply shot the cousins no one would have said anything' excuses.
Then there was the story that one of our NCOs told us while sitting around the proverbial campfire of what could cheritibly be described as questionable treatment of an Iraqi detainee. Again, the only thing worse than the story itself was the reaction of my peers, which could generally be characterized as 'Haha, got that (insert racial epithet here) good.'
I don't think there's much new or original I can add to the does-torture-work debate. The Atlantic has a number of pieces that are very good and accessible summaries of much of the debate. But the moral question surrounding torture is not nearly so ambiguous. Torture is wrong and it ought to have no place in American policy. Defining torture is not nearly so simple, but at a most basic level, inflicting physical pain to compel someone to reveal something undoubtably counts.
But torture is not what this post is about. What can we do to better instill good ethical judgement in American soldiers and officers? The stories of Colonel Sassaman and Abu Gharib were repulsive and damaging to America's reputation and interests, and it is frankly disturbing to imagine how many similar incidents have gone undiscovered or unreported.
As a firm believer in the 'it starts with me' approach, I think there is much that can be done at the company and platoon level. The use of racial and ethnic epithets--to include the most common term, hadji--must be banned by junior leaders and that ban must be enforced and its rationale explained. Furthermore, junior leaders must emphasize the common humanity between soldiers and the people of Iraq and Afghanistan, and live and represent that value at all times themselves.
What can be done at an Army-wide level? I think incorporating ethical vignettes into professional development courses starting with initial entry training is a start. But I think that weaving ethical dilemmas into all facets of training would make the lessons more effective. Put soldiers and leaders into situations where they are faced with an ethical dilemma, preferably without overtly presenting it as such. This would likely create far more poignent teachable moments than a discussion in a lecture hall ever could.
Ultimately though, can the Army reprogram in days, weeks, or even months, the values and moral compass that a person has already developed over years? That is what I find most unsettling.
The first incident was the discussion of "Fall of the Warrior King." What troubled me was that COL Sassaman's decision to lie to his superiors was the only action that was universally regarded as immoral. I don't see much value in rehashing this very well documented and much discussed event, but the lack of recognition by many of my classmates of the moral issues of throwing detainees off a bridge was disturbing, as were the, 'Fadhil probably faked his death for propaganda reasons,' and 'had the soldiers simply shot the cousins no one would have said anything' excuses.
Then there was the story that one of our NCOs told us while sitting around the proverbial campfire of what could cheritibly be described as questionable treatment of an Iraqi detainee. Again, the only thing worse than the story itself was the reaction of my peers, which could generally be characterized as 'Haha, got that (insert racial epithet here) good.'
I don't think there's much new or original I can add to the does-torture-work debate. The Atlantic has a number of pieces that are very good and accessible summaries of much of the debate. But the moral question surrounding torture is not nearly so ambiguous. Torture is wrong and it ought to have no place in American policy. Defining torture is not nearly so simple, but at a most basic level, inflicting physical pain to compel someone to reveal something undoubtably counts.
But torture is not what this post is about. What can we do to better instill good ethical judgement in American soldiers and officers? The stories of Colonel Sassaman and Abu Gharib were repulsive and damaging to America's reputation and interests, and it is frankly disturbing to imagine how many similar incidents have gone undiscovered or unreported.
As a firm believer in the 'it starts with me' approach, I think there is much that can be done at the company and platoon level. The use of racial and ethnic epithets--to include the most common term, hadji--must be banned by junior leaders and that ban must be enforced and its rationale explained. Furthermore, junior leaders must emphasize the common humanity between soldiers and the people of Iraq and Afghanistan, and live and represent that value at all times themselves.
What can be done at an Army-wide level? I think incorporating ethical vignettes into professional development courses starting with initial entry training is a start. But I think that weaving ethical dilemmas into all facets of training would make the lessons more effective. Put soldiers and leaders into situations where they are faced with an ethical dilemma, preferably without overtly presenting it as such. This would likely create far more poignent teachable moments than a discussion in a lecture hall ever could.
Ultimately though, can the Army reprogram in days, weeks, or even months, the values and moral compass that a person has already developed over years? That is what I find most unsettling.
09 May, 2009
Criticism of the Officer Corps
A former professor of mine, Dr. Richard Kohn, published this piece in the World Affairs Journal this week. Already I've noticed that it has spawned a lot of debate across the Army-oriented blogosphere, particularly on Small Wars Journal's forum. I can understand, to a certain extent, why people are upset, after all, it is a criticism of military officers (although aimed at people that far outrank lowly peons like myself).
However, I think Dr. Kohn raises some valid points. He breaks his criticism down into three arguments: the lack of an coherent strategy, and overly political Officer Corp and an Officer Corps lacking in moral fiber
Lack of Strategy: this is probably Kohn's strongest argument, but it needs to be remembered that while some criticism is warranted, strategy is also greatly affected by the military's civilian masters. Overall, though, there are some solid points in this section.
Politicized Officer Corps: I agree with Kohn's criticism of General Officers taking sides in elections, however, as unacceptable as this traditionally is, a have fewer issues with Officers speaking out when they believe the US is pursuing a strategy that is destined for failure. If the strategy is already in effect, then yes, Officers should not be criticizing what those on the ground are implementing. But I have fewer issues with Officers criticizing that which is only being proposed, for example, a military engagement with Iran.
Lack or moral integrity among Officers: Maybe this is the least warranted criticism, or maybe I'm just defending the institution of which I am a part. Yes, there have been any number of moral errors over the past few years, but to a certain extent, this in unavoidable in any organization, it is simply human nature. I am not trying to defend the tragedies of Abu Graib or Gitmo, but these issues are far more complex than simply a lack of moral courage among the officer corps. Kohn is very critical off the lack of punishment directed towards General Officers over some of these mistakes, but is that fair? How far up the Chain of Command must you go, meting out punishment, to people who reasonably could have no knowledge of the situation on the ground?
The article concludes with recommendations, several of which are stale at best. "Cadets should learn a foreign language, become familiar with other cultures." This is less than a novel idea and Cadet Command is already encouraging this through incentive pay. One idea was fresh, or at least to me: "Fitness for promotion—and particularly the characteristics recommended here—requires assessment by peers and subordinates as well as supervisors and commanders." I strongly agree with this. It is much easier to pull the wool over your superiors eyes than your subordinates and I believe that a more inclusive officer evaluation will improve the quality of officers that are being promoted.
However, I think Dr. Kohn raises some valid points. He breaks his criticism down into three arguments: the lack of an coherent strategy, and overly political Officer Corp and an Officer Corps lacking in moral fiber
Lack of Strategy: this is probably Kohn's strongest argument, but it needs to be remembered that while some criticism is warranted, strategy is also greatly affected by the military's civilian masters. Overall, though, there are some solid points in this section.
Politicized Officer Corps: I agree with Kohn's criticism of General Officers taking sides in elections, however, as unacceptable as this traditionally is, a have fewer issues with Officers speaking out when they believe the US is pursuing a strategy that is destined for failure. If the strategy is already in effect, then yes, Officers should not be criticizing what those on the ground are implementing. But I have fewer issues with Officers criticizing that which is only being proposed, for example, a military engagement with Iran.
Lack or moral integrity among Officers: Maybe this is the least warranted criticism, or maybe I'm just defending the institution of which I am a part. Yes, there have been any number of moral errors over the past few years, but to a certain extent, this in unavoidable in any organization, it is simply human nature. I am not trying to defend the tragedies of Abu Graib or Gitmo, but these issues are far more complex than simply a lack of moral courage among the officer corps. Kohn is very critical off the lack of punishment directed towards General Officers over some of these mistakes, but is that fair? How far up the Chain of Command must you go, meting out punishment, to people who reasonably could have no knowledge of the situation on the ground?
The article concludes with recommendations, several of which are stale at best. "Cadets should learn a foreign language, become familiar with other cultures." This is less than a novel idea and Cadet Command is already encouraging this through incentive pay. One idea was fresh, or at least to me: "Fitness for promotion—and particularly the characteristics recommended here—requires assessment by peers and subordinates as well as supervisors and commanders." I strongly agree with this. It is much easier to pull the wool over your superiors eyes than your subordinates and I believe that a more inclusive officer evaluation will improve the quality of officers that are being promoted.
03 May, 2009
Changing the army structure for the hybrid warfare fight
Two ideas have come to me recently on how to change some the Army's organizational structure for fighting hybrid wars. The first is to train civil affairs personnel to embed in units down to the company level as political officers and the second is to embed MI personnel into companies as well. Neither is particularly original, but the discussion on the is important. Both were discussed some in David Kilcullen's 27 articles.
The first idea came about after reading an article in Small Wars journal about how civil affairs guys have become contract management officers for conventional units because of encroachment of the rest of the army into what they do and conventional guys not knowing what to do with them.
The solution in my mind is to make civil affairs guys political officers, preferably at the company level. Train them in cultural anthropology, some information operations and some counterinsurgency theory. Then, they could be a huge asset for a company commander running his AO (Area of Operations). As a political officer there job would be to develop, maintain, and push a narrative for their AO. A narrative is a story that explains why we are doing what we are doing and why the enemy is doing what he is doing. A narrative is very important because it sets the stage for the political battle and thus determines whose side the population supports. Insurgents develop a narrative and then carry out attacks and non-kinetic methods to support it. A political officer would be in charge of determining what narrative has the most appeal in his AO first and foremost. This should ideally be done at the company level since AOs vary so much. Next, he should assist the commander in developing full spectrum operations to further it, and develop and information operations campaign to set the basis for it.
The second idea, to embed MI personnel at the company level, is important because in hybrid war, intel comes from the lowest level generally and drives operations at the company level. A company commander is not told nowadays to simply "attack in that direction" but must develop his own picture of his AO. They way we are currently set up is that battalion S-2s get intel from people they don't know or trust like company patrols or technical assets, guess what these tell them, and then feed that information down to people that don't trust them. Having intel guys at the company level will ensure that the companies intel is synthesized and tracked by someone who the leadership knows, trusts, and is right there with them.
The biggest problem with both of these ideas is that many of us combat arms types think like baboons and just want to be told which direction to attack in. I tend to think like that way on Mondays and Thursdays but otherwise no. However, the current debate about COIN and experiences when deployed should have changed most of our attitudes. I get the sense that many people come back from in theater thinking it would have been nice to have dedicated intel and political guys and might have set aside some of their own guys for the job.
The first idea came about after reading an article in Small Wars journal about how civil affairs guys have become contract management officers for conventional units because of encroachment of the rest of the army into what they do and conventional guys not knowing what to do with them.
The solution in my mind is to make civil affairs guys political officers, preferably at the company level. Train them in cultural anthropology, some information operations and some counterinsurgency theory. Then, they could be a huge asset for a company commander running his AO (Area of Operations). As a political officer there job would be to develop, maintain, and push a narrative for their AO. A narrative is a story that explains why we are doing what we are doing and why the enemy is doing what he is doing. A narrative is very important because it sets the stage for the political battle and thus determines whose side the population supports. Insurgents develop a narrative and then carry out attacks and non-kinetic methods to support it. A political officer would be in charge of determining what narrative has the most appeal in his AO first and foremost. This should ideally be done at the company level since AOs vary so much. Next, he should assist the commander in developing full spectrum operations to further it, and develop and information operations campaign to set the basis for it.
The second idea, to embed MI personnel at the company level, is important because in hybrid war, intel comes from the lowest level generally and drives operations at the company level. A company commander is not told nowadays to simply "attack in that direction" but must develop his own picture of his AO. They way we are currently set up is that battalion S-2s get intel from people they don't know or trust like company patrols or technical assets, guess what these tell them, and then feed that information down to people that don't trust them. Having intel guys at the company level will ensure that the companies intel is synthesized and tracked by someone who the leadership knows, trusts, and is right there with them.
The biggest problem with both of these ideas is that many of us combat arms types think like baboons and just want to be told which direction to attack in. I tend to think like that way on Mondays and Thursdays but otherwise no. However, the current debate about COIN and experiences when deployed should have changed most of our attitudes. I get the sense that many people come back from in theater thinking it would have been nice to have dedicated intel and political guys and might have set aside some of their own guys for the job.
07 April, 2009
The Gentile-Nagl Debate, Part II
I began responding to the post below in the comments section, but it quickly became so long that I decided that I would write a post of my own in response:
I like the fact that Gentile is willing to engage with the people that counter him. I've seen a lot of his comments and such on SWJ and Abu Muqawama. But I agree with you, Alex, in that his arguments are flawed.
I think the issue of troop vulnerability and exposure to danger is hard wired into the heads of many an older officer who grew accustom to the relative safety of the 1990's and are unwilling to take the risks demanded in a COIN environment. I actually blogged on that very issue here
The argument that killing is necessary for Soldier's morale raises many questions, and if it is true (and I would argue that it is not) it sets a very dangerous precedent and raises numerous questions about the ways in which Soldiers are conditioned and trained. How are Commanders building espirit de corps and morale if killing is necessary? Furthermore, many units have been conducting tradition COIN operations without the emphasis on killing and I have not seen any reports on the resulting lack of morale.
The idea of relying on more air power and non HUMINT intel in a COIN environment is so illogical, so laughable, I don't even know how to respond.
One of Gentile's other arguments that you did not touch on below is the effect that this new concentration on COIN ops is having on our traditional capabilities. This, I believe, is actually his strongest argument. From conversations I have has with those in the artillery/armor world, we have greatly neglected these very technical skills in our focus on COIN and stability and support ops. This is cause for concern. While there is reason to believe that we will continue to fight in low intensity conflicts in the years to come (See Sec. Gates article in Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2009 for a good article on expectations for the early 21st century) we can never know what the future will hold. On Sept 10, 2001, no one would have foreseen the invasion of Afghanistan in the near future. With the increasing aggression from North Korea and Iran (which would, admittedly, not fight an altogether traditional war) there is merit to Gentile's insistence that our traditional military capabilities cannot be completely forgotten.
But there will never be enough time or money for the Military to train for 2 very different types of war. Many units are understrength and are facing an incredible fast operations tempo as it is. While I understand Gentile's argument, we cannot ignore training for the current and definite conflict in order to train for something that may happen in the future.
There is, however, a partial solution. The Army must recognize the ever changing face of warfare and instill innovation and initiative within it's officers and NCOs. Those in the Army may well face a war unlike the one for which they trained. But if the Army alters and expands its training focus to emphasize innovation and initiative to leaders, especially junior leader, it will be well on it's way to being prepared, no matter the type of war it is facing.
I like the fact that Gentile is willing to engage with the people that counter him. I've seen a lot of his comments and such on SWJ and Abu Muqawama. But I agree with you, Alex, in that his arguments are flawed.
I think the issue of troop vulnerability and exposure to danger is hard wired into the heads of many an older officer who grew accustom to the relative safety of the 1990's and are unwilling to take the risks demanded in a COIN environment. I actually blogged on that very issue here
The argument that killing is necessary for Soldier's morale raises many questions, and if it is true (and I would argue that it is not) it sets a very dangerous precedent and raises numerous questions about the ways in which Soldiers are conditioned and trained. How are Commanders building espirit de corps and morale if killing is necessary? Furthermore, many units have been conducting tradition COIN operations without the emphasis on killing and I have not seen any reports on the resulting lack of morale.
The idea of relying on more air power and non HUMINT intel in a COIN environment is so illogical, so laughable, I don't even know how to respond.
One of Gentile's other arguments that you did not touch on below is the effect that this new concentration on COIN ops is having on our traditional capabilities. This, I believe, is actually his strongest argument. From conversations I have has with those in the artillery/armor world, we have greatly neglected these very technical skills in our focus on COIN and stability and support ops. This is cause for concern. While there is reason to believe that we will continue to fight in low intensity conflicts in the years to come (See Sec. Gates article in Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2009 for a good article on expectations for the early 21st century) we can never know what the future will hold. On Sept 10, 2001, no one would have foreseen the invasion of Afghanistan in the near future. With the increasing aggression from North Korea and Iran (which would, admittedly, not fight an altogether traditional war) there is merit to Gentile's insistence that our traditional military capabilities cannot be completely forgotten.
But there will never be enough time or money for the Military to train for 2 very different types of war. Many units are understrength and are facing an incredible fast operations tempo as it is. While I understand Gentile's argument, we cannot ignore training for the current and definite conflict in order to train for something that may happen in the future.
There is, however, a partial solution. The Army must recognize the ever changing face of warfare and instill innovation and initiative within it's officers and NCOs. Those in the Army may well face a war unlike the one for which they trained. But if the Army alters and expands its training focus to emphasize innovation and initiative to leaders, especially junior leader, it will be well on it's way to being prepared, no matter the type of war it is facing.
30 March, 2009
The Gentile-Nagl debate
Lately I have been reading more of Gentile’s writings and pieces he has endorsed. I have become more and more convinced that the debate between him and Nagl has not been framed well and that Gentile’s arguments are much weaker than they are portrayed.
His central debate with Nagl is about the effectiveness of population centric COIN versus enemy centric. His reasoning seems to be that when you kill the enemy, you maintain the initiative. Once you build up enough momentum, you can virtually destroy the enemy so he is no longer effective. He also says here that killing the enemy is very important for soldier morale: “Putting a bullet through the head of an insurgent emplacing an IED indicates fundamental success to the combat soldier.”
Moreover, securing the population is too dangerous without a huge troop commitment. When you shift forces out into isolated combat outposts, they become more vulnerable. The supply route to these outposts also becomes very vulnerable. With the current amount of soldier the US can deploy, we will never be able to effectively secure the population.
Finally, he argues that a population centric approach COIN does not necessarily address the fundamental problems we face. He says: “Arguably, our current operational approach is too little and too late. It does not take into account the reality of conditions on the ground in Baghdad, the fact that there is civil war occurring, and those 25,000 additional combat troops simply are not enough to solve militarily what is essentially a political problem.”
A piece he endorsed written by an Air Force general took the argument further. MGN Dunlap argued that because ground forces sometimes cause a significant amount of collateral damage and Iraqis have an inherent distrust of us, we should have a more hands off approach with our ground forces and rely more on precise airpower. He also argued that human intelligence is not as important as that derived from technical means. To me this argument is akin to saying since 99% of accidents happen on the road we should drive on the sidewalk.
Gentile uses various evidence to support his arguments. He claims that the drop in violence that followed the surge was mostly due to the Sunni Awakening and Sadr’s decision to have a cease fire. He also says that what Petraeus and Odierno implemented was not that new and American forces had been applying sound COIN principles before they took charge.
I have many problems with Gentile’s arguments and many people have pointed out holes in it. The biggest one is that an enemy centric focus does not actually solve the problem and my even create more. David Killcullen’s Accidental Guerilla has an excellent discussion about how people become co-opted into insurgencies. When you commute to the battle and focus on seeking out engagements with the insurgents, then the population will tend to develop a view of you as an aggressor who is not helping them and not effectively dealing with the insurgency. Many people will then join the insurgency for defensive reasons.
The second big flaw with his argument which Thomas Ricks also shares in his new book is he takes too narrow a view of the surge and how it changed things. His critiques are mostly aimed at the tactical and operational levels, but the strategic level is very important to. The strategic level is where the political problems are identified, metrics to read the environment and measure its change are developed, actions are prioritized, and resources expenditure is decided upon. In the case of Iraq, Petraeus strategic assessment team identified Sunni insurgency against the new order, inter-communal conflict, and trans-national terrorism as the three important dynamics. He then developed a strategy that shaped the tactical and operational changes, some of which Odierno had already implemented. Population centric security was just one tactical and operational method to achieve a desired political result. The strategy developed by Petraeus also helped to encourage a Sunni uprising and marginalize Sadr. Thus, the two other factors Gentile mentions in the reduction of violence should not be considered as independent of the Surge strategy.
There are many other flaws I can see but these I think are the most important. One other one that deserves a lot of attention is his argument that killing the enemy leads to good morale. I would think a soldier feels better about what he did if the population cheers him and sings songs about him when he leaves rather than throwing him hateful looks.
His central debate with Nagl is about the effectiveness of population centric COIN versus enemy centric. His reasoning seems to be that when you kill the enemy, you maintain the initiative. Once you build up enough momentum, you can virtually destroy the enemy so he is no longer effective. He also says here that killing the enemy is very important for soldier morale: “Putting a bullet through the head of an insurgent emplacing an IED indicates fundamental success to the combat soldier.”
Moreover, securing the population is too dangerous without a huge troop commitment. When you shift forces out into isolated combat outposts, they become more vulnerable. The supply route to these outposts also becomes very vulnerable. With the current amount of soldier the US can deploy, we will never be able to effectively secure the population.
Finally, he argues that a population centric approach COIN does not necessarily address the fundamental problems we face. He says: “Arguably, our current operational approach is too little and too late. It does not take into account the reality of conditions on the ground in Baghdad, the fact that there is civil war occurring, and those 25,000 additional combat troops simply are not enough to solve militarily what is essentially a political problem.”
A piece he endorsed written by an Air Force general took the argument further. MGN Dunlap argued that because ground forces sometimes cause a significant amount of collateral damage and Iraqis have an inherent distrust of us, we should have a more hands off approach with our ground forces and rely more on precise airpower. He also argued that human intelligence is not as important as that derived from technical means. To me this argument is akin to saying since 99% of accidents happen on the road we should drive on the sidewalk.
Gentile uses various evidence to support his arguments. He claims that the drop in violence that followed the surge was mostly due to the Sunni Awakening and Sadr’s decision to have a cease fire. He also says that what Petraeus and Odierno implemented was not that new and American forces had been applying sound COIN principles before they took charge.
I have many problems with Gentile’s arguments and many people have pointed out holes in it. The biggest one is that an enemy centric focus does not actually solve the problem and my even create more. David Killcullen’s Accidental Guerilla has an excellent discussion about how people become co-opted into insurgencies. When you commute to the battle and focus on seeking out engagements with the insurgents, then the population will tend to develop a view of you as an aggressor who is not helping them and not effectively dealing with the insurgency. Many people will then join the insurgency for defensive reasons.
The second big flaw with his argument which Thomas Ricks also shares in his new book is he takes too narrow a view of the surge and how it changed things. His critiques are mostly aimed at the tactical and operational levels, but the strategic level is very important to. The strategic level is where the political problems are identified, metrics to read the environment and measure its change are developed, actions are prioritized, and resources expenditure is decided upon. In the case of Iraq, Petraeus strategic assessment team identified Sunni insurgency against the new order, inter-communal conflict, and trans-national terrorism as the three important dynamics. He then developed a strategy that shaped the tactical and operational changes, some of which Odierno had already implemented. Population centric security was just one tactical and operational method to achieve a desired political result. The strategy developed by Petraeus also helped to encourage a Sunni uprising and marginalize Sadr. Thus, the two other factors Gentile mentions in the reduction of violence should not be considered as independent of the Surge strategy.
There are many other flaws I can see but these I think are the most important. One other one that deserves a lot of attention is his argument that killing the enemy leads to good morale. I would think a soldier feels better about what he did if the population cheers him and sings songs about him when he leaves rather than throwing him hateful looks.
22 February, 2009
How broad based is the Taliban
I have been tracking the debate about what we should do in Afghanistan recently. There are very strong arguments that the conflict is intractable and unwinnable. Obama’s NSC team seemed to come to that conclusion. I recently had a e-mail exchange with George Friedman, the founder of Stratfor who had come to the same conclusion. On the other side of the debate, some have been arguing for a shift in strategy focused on building local governance. A recent article in Small Wars Journal laid out that strategy very well. Following that path will require time and patience, given the amount of resources we are able to commit, and is certainly not worth following without a significant hope of success. I apologize in advance for the length of this post, but it is a very complex issue and this is my only post for the month.
The central issue in the debate in my view is the extent to which the Taliban has a broad base of support. It will be next to impossible to build local governance if the Taliban have a strong base in an area because once we empower the locals and arm them they will simply subvert us and work with the Taliban. That happened in Iraq to some extent because we empowered the Iraqis without addressing the fundamental political issues driving the conflict and as a result the security forces in many areas subverted our actions by aiding the insurgency or degenerating into sectarian death squads.
The argument of those who think Afghanistan is intractable can be summed up by what George Friedman said in an e-mail to me:
“Remember, they won the civil war in the 1990s against all comers. There was a reason for that, and that was because they really did have support. I am not comfortable with the assessments on Taliban support I hear, because they rarely take into account why such a marginal group should have won the civil war.”
From various readings, I get the impression that Afghani politics are in large part driven by personalities than by an actual coherent structure. The only level where any kind of structures exist is at the most basic community level where individuals live in close proximity and know one another. Anything above that and coalitions tend to be driven by a personalities such as Massoud, Doustum, or one of the other warlords. Thus, relations between these factions will be anarchic, only mildly influenced by ideology or ethnicity, and based on impulsive personal gain. Leaders are constantly striving for heroic status, power, glory, and revenge. They accomplish this by aligning with power and taking what they want when they want it.
The Taliban presented an immense departure from this form of politics when it first emerged because it imposed a rigid system of laws and represented something other than just the people in it. Its foot soldiers felt they were fighting for something rather than just for a person. Afghans I have talked to reminisce about the Taliban because even if it was brutal, it brought stability. It represented something cohesive rather than arbitrary. You might get shot or your hand chopped off because you violated some consistent rule rather than arbitrarily, as would happen under rule from a warlord.
That gave it a tremendous amount of strength during the anarchic civil war. Because Afghan politics is mostly ego driven, once the Taliban gained a certain amount of momentum, there were mass defections to its side. The various personal Afghan factions and groups realized that their interests were best served by siding with these new powerful forces that brought with them a completely different political structure. The Taliban succeeded in taking much of Afghanistan as a result.
The subsequent American success can almost be described in the same terms. The Americans came with Special Operations Forces soldiers and air power, and after a small amount of momentum, the various factions realized their interests were best served by siding with the new powerful force and their were mass defections and a huge swing in momentum. There were parts of the Taliban that melted away in order to start a guerilla war, but these elements were only a small fraction. They were unable to influence events initially because of their lack in strength.
The parallel between the American success and Taliban success demonstrates that the fundamental nature of Afghan national politics has not changed significantly. Communal feelings only existed at a very low level and not at the national level. The Taliban never succeeded in creating a strong political base. The politics in Afghanistan remained driven by opportunism and personality rather than any belief in the national system the Taliban created.
The resurgence in the insurgency has occurred recently because the Karzai government has proven itself ineffectual. There is widespread corruption and cynicism amongst Afghans about its ability to govern and retain power. The national police pushed out from Kabul are often corrupt and ineffectual. As a result, Afghans have started to lend support to the Taliban primarily out of opportunism. They view the Karzai government as ineffectual and the Taliban as more likely to win. The foreign invaders will one day leave just as every foreign invader has.
Recent polling data in Afghanistan supports this view. Data from the polls shows that Afghans are losing confidence in the Karzai government. When queried about whom they would like to see running Afghanistan, however, only 4% said they would like to see the Taliban back in power. Admittedly, the polling data is probably flawed since the pollsters would not have access to areas were Taliban support was greatest, but the dearth of support for the Taliban in still significant.
Since the Taliban does not have a broad base, a strategy of building governance from the bottom up should prove effective. That kind of counter-insurgent strategy attacks the political situation at the only level where any kind of communal feeling exists. Thus, it is the only way to fundamentally alter the Afghan political landscape.
The central issue in the debate in my view is the extent to which the Taliban has a broad base of support. It will be next to impossible to build local governance if the Taliban have a strong base in an area because once we empower the locals and arm them they will simply subvert us and work with the Taliban. That happened in Iraq to some extent because we empowered the Iraqis without addressing the fundamental political issues driving the conflict and as a result the security forces in many areas subverted our actions by aiding the insurgency or degenerating into sectarian death squads.
The argument of those who think Afghanistan is intractable can be summed up by what George Friedman said in an e-mail to me:
“Remember, they won the civil war in the 1990s against all comers. There was a reason for that, and that was because they really did have support. I am not comfortable with the assessments on Taliban support I hear, because they rarely take into account why such a marginal group should have won the civil war.”
From various readings, I get the impression that Afghani politics are in large part driven by personalities than by an actual coherent structure. The only level where any kind of structures exist is at the most basic community level where individuals live in close proximity and know one another. Anything above that and coalitions tend to be driven by a personalities such as Massoud, Doustum, or one of the other warlords. Thus, relations between these factions will be anarchic, only mildly influenced by ideology or ethnicity, and based on impulsive personal gain. Leaders are constantly striving for heroic status, power, glory, and revenge. They accomplish this by aligning with power and taking what they want when they want it.
The Taliban presented an immense departure from this form of politics when it first emerged because it imposed a rigid system of laws and represented something other than just the people in it. Its foot soldiers felt they were fighting for something rather than just for a person. Afghans I have talked to reminisce about the Taliban because even if it was brutal, it brought stability. It represented something cohesive rather than arbitrary. You might get shot or your hand chopped off because you violated some consistent rule rather than arbitrarily, as would happen under rule from a warlord.
That gave it a tremendous amount of strength during the anarchic civil war. Because Afghan politics is mostly ego driven, once the Taliban gained a certain amount of momentum, there were mass defections to its side. The various personal Afghan factions and groups realized that their interests were best served by siding with these new powerful forces that brought with them a completely different political structure. The Taliban succeeded in taking much of Afghanistan as a result.
The subsequent American success can almost be described in the same terms. The Americans came with Special Operations Forces soldiers and air power, and after a small amount of momentum, the various factions realized their interests were best served by siding with the new powerful force and their were mass defections and a huge swing in momentum. There were parts of the Taliban that melted away in order to start a guerilla war, but these elements were only a small fraction. They were unable to influence events initially because of their lack in strength.
The parallel between the American success and Taliban success demonstrates that the fundamental nature of Afghan national politics has not changed significantly. Communal feelings only existed at a very low level and not at the national level. The Taliban never succeeded in creating a strong political base. The politics in Afghanistan remained driven by opportunism and personality rather than any belief in the national system the Taliban created.
The resurgence in the insurgency has occurred recently because the Karzai government has proven itself ineffectual. There is widespread corruption and cynicism amongst Afghans about its ability to govern and retain power. The national police pushed out from Kabul are often corrupt and ineffectual. As a result, Afghans have started to lend support to the Taliban primarily out of opportunism. They view the Karzai government as ineffectual and the Taliban as more likely to win. The foreign invaders will one day leave just as every foreign invader has.
Recent polling data in Afghanistan supports this view. Data from the polls shows that Afghans are losing confidence in the Karzai government. When queried about whom they would like to see running Afghanistan, however, only 4% said they would like to see the Taliban back in power. Admittedly, the polling data is probably flawed since the pollsters would not have access to areas were Taliban support was greatest, but the dearth of support for the Taliban in still significant.
Since the Taliban does not have a broad base, a strategy of building governance from the bottom up should prove effective. That kind of counter-insurgent strategy attacks the political situation at the only level where any kind of communal feeling exists. Thus, it is the only way to fundamentally alter the Afghan political landscape.
21 February, 2009
War Poetry
I stumbled across this poem the other day and found it hauntingly poignant. Thought I would share:
If you are able,
save them a place
inside of you
and save one backward glance
when you are leaving
for the places they can
no longer go.
Be not ashamed to say
you loved them,
though you may
or may not have always.
Take what they have left
and what they have taught you
with their dying
and keep it with your own.
And in that time
when men decide and feel safe
to call the war insane,
take one moment to embrace
those gentle heroes
you left behind.
Major Michael Davis O'Donnell
1 January 1970
Dak To, Vietnam
If you are able,
save them a place
inside of you
and save one backward glance
when you are leaving
for the places they can
no longer go.
Be not ashamed to say
you loved them,
though you may
or may not have always.
Take what they have left
and what they have taught you
with their dying
and keep it with your own.
And in that time
when men decide and feel safe
to call the war insane,
take one moment to embrace
those gentle heroes
you left behind.
Major Michael Davis O'Donnell
1 January 1970
Dak To, Vietnam
14 February, 2009
Nagl Criticized at MIBOLC
My class here at MIBOLC was assigned to read several chapters of "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife" as part of our COIN curriculum. While I think it would have behooved us to read the entire book (easy for me to say, since I've already read it)I have overall been impressed with the importance places on COIN/Stability and Support/Low Intensity Conflict throughout this course.
But the chapters they assigned us to read were not really about COIN, they focused on the organization culture of the American and British Armies during the insurgencies in Malaya and Vietnam (Chapters 8-9). Valid information, of course, but not as COIN oriented as one would expect in a module on COIN.
After reading the chapters, we were expected to have a class discussion on the concepts. The instructor began the discussion by claiming that Nagl is inherently unfair to the U.S. Army throughout the book by comparing it to the British Army. This, in my opinion, is a grave error that undermines all that there is to be learned from the book.
Nagl does not claim that the two conflict were similar - that would be an unfair conjecture as there are vast difference between Malaya and Vietnam that contributed to the success of the UK and lack thereof by the US. But to compare the two organization cultures that contributed to success or failure in two COIN situations is not illegitimate. My instructor's argument was that the UK had a history of colonialism that contributed to its success in limited wars with political goals and the United States did not, thus it was unfair to compare the two.
This focus on "fairness" misses the point of Nagl's study and such an attitude hinders learning from the lessons of history. Yes, the UK did have an organizational advantage over the United States, but a refusal to learn from the UK's success simply because our histories were dissimilar is a grave mistake born of an narrow minded ideal of the supremacy of the U.S. Armed forces. A humble willingness to learn from other nation's success would behoove the U.S. Army, scrambling to excuse our mistakes due to historical differences will not.
But the chapters they assigned us to read were not really about COIN, they focused on the organization culture of the American and British Armies during the insurgencies in Malaya and Vietnam (Chapters 8-9). Valid information, of course, but not as COIN oriented as one would expect in a module on COIN.
After reading the chapters, we were expected to have a class discussion on the concepts. The instructor began the discussion by claiming that Nagl is inherently unfair to the U.S. Army throughout the book by comparing it to the British Army. This, in my opinion, is a grave error that undermines all that there is to be learned from the book.
Nagl does not claim that the two conflict were similar - that would be an unfair conjecture as there are vast difference between Malaya and Vietnam that contributed to the success of the UK and lack thereof by the US. But to compare the two organization cultures that contributed to success or failure in two COIN situations is not illegitimate. My instructor's argument was that the UK had a history of colonialism that contributed to its success in limited wars with political goals and the United States did not, thus it was unfair to compare the two.
This focus on "fairness" misses the point of Nagl's study and such an attitude hinders learning from the lessons of history. Yes, the UK did have an organizational advantage over the United States, but a refusal to learn from the UK's success simply because our histories were dissimilar is a grave mistake born of an narrow minded ideal of the supremacy of the U.S. Armed forces. A humble willingness to learn from other nation's success would behoove the U.S. Army, scrambling to excuse our mistakes due to historical differences will not.
Quote of the Week
Historian Brian Linn weighs in on the waging debate between COIN proponent John Nagl and the more traditionalist Gian Gentile in an article here.
Linn's take on the Army's doctrine, be it traditional or COIN oriented was particularly insightful and gives clarity to the doctrinal debate the Army is facing:
Ultimately Linn arrives at this conclusion:
Linn's take on the Army's doctrine, be it traditional or COIN oriented was particularly insightful and gives clarity to the doctrinal debate the Army is facing:
I think there is a danger of seeing doctrine as an end to itself. That is, doctrine is the foundation, i.e. the first place to look for not only how an Army intends to fight but also its central concepts ... But doctrine should be seen as an ideal–it may not accurately reflect how military forces actually conduct operations.
Ultimately Linn arrives at this conclusion:
The Army is unlikely to win a particular war, much less all wars, unless it starts thinking a lot more seriously about war and a little less about process and procedure.
14 January, 2009
Violence in Iraq and and army to focused on COIN?
I just finished reading Linda Robinson's Tell me how this Ends about Petraeus in Iraq. I also just read an interesting question and answer with COL Gentile. He makes several interesting arguments. The first is the the military is overly focused on COIN, the second is what Petraeus implemented wasn't actually that much different than what was happening before and thus other factors that led to the drop in violence. He also claims achieving victory in Afghanistan is impossible.
His first argument holds some water with me but the truth far more nuanced than that. The military probably is too focused on COIN training and most junior and mid level officers know it best. The important thing for the Army as a whole is not whether we are focused on fighting COIN or conventional, but whether we have the flexibility to learn and adapt quickly to whatever kind of war our civilian masters and the enemy throw at us. We usually start with an army ill suited for fighting the war we find ourselves in. Once we have reduced our presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, we should definitely build up our conventional capacity since we are unlikely to be fighting any large scale counterinsurgencies.
After reading Linda Robinson's book, I am certain his argument that Petraeus didn't change much is weak. Most of the military early on had the belief that not enough of the Sunni officer corp and Ba'ath party had been taken care of in the initial invasion. As such, no one addressed the fundamental political problems driving the insurgency. The most significant one was the Sunnis feeling like they had no place in the new Iraq.
What Petraeus did with Crocker was to craft a strategy that addressed the fundamental political issues. Petraeus focused on creating reconciliation from the bottom up while Crocker with Petraeus help promoted reconciliation from the top down. Reconciliation meant providing security for the population against sectarian attacks, getting reconcilables to stop fighting or switch sides, and then marginalizing the irreconcilables. This included both Sadr's men and the Sunni insurgency.
His third argument holds some water but at the same time, he seems to be thinking to narrowly. He says:
"Does anybody really think that Afghanistan, a ravaged, ethnically divided country of 25 million with 72 percent illiteracy and little history of centralized rule, can be turned into a real state any time soon, on a budget that US. taxpayers can support?"
The first criticism I have is that Afghanistan's ethnic divisions are not nearly as significant as those in Iraq. There isn't as much of I'm going to kill you because you are different. Second, he is setting the bar to high when he says "real state." Victory in counterinsurgency usually means reducing levels of violence to acceptable societal levels on terms favorable to security forces. In Afghanistan, it is clear we are not going to create a Jeffersonian democracy, Afghan standards are not very high. As one of my friends jokingly said "As long as they have fire they're well off." Thus, as long as we are able to create local security with a central government only strong enough to prevent ethnic or tribal conflicts, we can go home.
His first argument holds some water with me but the truth far more nuanced than that. The military probably is too focused on COIN training and most junior and mid level officers know it best. The important thing for the Army as a whole is not whether we are focused on fighting COIN or conventional, but whether we have the flexibility to learn and adapt quickly to whatever kind of war our civilian masters and the enemy throw at us. We usually start with an army ill suited for fighting the war we find ourselves in. Once we have reduced our presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, we should definitely build up our conventional capacity since we are unlikely to be fighting any large scale counterinsurgencies.
After reading Linda Robinson's book, I am certain his argument that Petraeus didn't change much is weak. Most of the military early on had the belief that not enough of the Sunni officer corp and Ba'ath party had been taken care of in the initial invasion. As such, no one addressed the fundamental political problems driving the insurgency. The most significant one was the Sunnis feeling like they had no place in the new Iraq.
What Petraeus did with Crocker was to craft a strategy that addressed the fundamental political issues. Petraeus focused on creating reconciliation from the bottom up while Crocker with Petraeus help promoted reconciliation from the top down. Reconciliation meant providing security for the population against sectarian attacks, getting reconcilables to stop fighting or switch sides, and then marginalizing the irreconcilables. This included both Sadr's men and the Sunni insurgency.
His third argument holds some water but at the same time, he seems to be thinking to narrowly. He says:
"Does anybody really think that Afghanistan, a ravaged, ethnically divided country of 25 million with 72 percent illiteracy and little history of centralized rule, can be turned into a real state any time soon, on a budget that US. taxpayers can support?"
The first criticism I have is that Afghanistan's ethnic divisions are not nearly as significant as those in Iraq. There isn't as much of I'm going to kill you because you are different. Second, he is setting the bar to high when he says "real state." Victory in counterinsurgency usually means reducing levels of violence to acceptable societal levels on terms favorable to security forces. In Afghanistan, it is clear we are not going to create a Jeffersonian democracy, Afghan standards are not very high. As one of my friends jokingly said "As long as they have fire they're well off." Thus, as long as we are able to create local security with a central government only strong enough to prevent ethnic or tribal conflicts, we can go home.
03 January, 2009
The Battle of Algiers
I recently watched the movie “The Battle of Algiers” after seeing it mentioned frequently on COIN reading lists and the like. The movie offers many insights into insurgencies and is worth watching. The DVD also contains interviews with many of the insurgents and a discussion of insurgency and revolutionary tactics with a SF operator and a State Department counter terrorism expert. If you watch the movie, it is important to take advantage of the extra interviews.
It is important to watch the movie in the context of international affairs. At the time of the uprising in
The most significant lesson to take away form this movie is the importance of politics in an insurgency. Clausewitz is famous for his claim that warfare is but the continuation of politics by different means, and often people turn to war, specifically insurgent type warfare, when they have no political means through which to address their problems. Such was the case in
The tactics used by the French are heinous and brutal at best and the movie depicts the torture the used to gain information and decimate the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) cells. These techniques, in the short term were effective and allowed the French to decimate the movement within the city of
The French tactics, utilizing police work, intelligence and interrogations through torture, were a success in exterminating the insurgents in Casbah. But the French committed a fatal mistake: they failed to consider or solve for the reason behind the insurgent movement. Alternatively stated, the French addressed the problem militarily but not politically. Without solving for the political problems that were driving the insurgency, the French could not win.
The movie and interviews also touch on several other important points: One of the key FLN leaders, Ali la Pointe, originally became involved with the FLN while in jail, where he came to know and identify with others involved in the insurgency. The lack of French forethought when housing and compartmentalizing prisoners assisted the FLN in their recruitment attempts.
The FLN was deliberate in their use of terrorism early in the campaign to provoke retribution from the French police. The French reactionary methods, further alienated the Muslim population and caused many to identify with or join the resistance movement out of revenge. Had the French better restrained their response and isolated the parties responsible for the terrorism, they may well have prevented the growth of the FLN.
An tnterview after the movie note that the resistance movement had started in rural
You should watch the movie!
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