I began responding to the post below in the comments section, but it quickly became so long that I decided that I would write a post of my own in response:
I like the fact that Gentile is willing to engage with the people that counter him. I've seen a lot of his comments and such on SWJ and Abu Muqawama. But I agree with you, Alex, in that his arguments are flawed.
I think the issue of troop vulnerability and exposure to danger is hard wired into the heads of many an older officer who grew accustom to the relative safety of the 1990's and are unwilling to take the risks demanded in a COIN environment. I actually blogged on that very issue here
The argument that killing is necessary for Soldier's morale raises many questions, and if it is true (and I would argue that it is not) it sets a very dangerous precedent and raises numerous questions about the ways in which Soldiers are conditioned and trained. How are Commanders building espirit de corps and morale if killing is necessary? Furthermore, many units have been conducting tradition COIN operations without the emphasis on killing and I have not seen any reports on the resulting lack of morale.
The idea of relying on more air power and non HUMINT intel in a COIN environment is so illogical, so laughable, I don't even know how to respond.
One of Gentile's other arguments that you did not touch on below is the effect that this new concentration on COIN ops is having on our traditional capabilities. This, I believe, is actually his strongest argument. From conversations I have has with those in the artillery/armor world, we have greatly neglected these very technical skills in our focus on COIN and stability and support ops. This is cause for concern. While there is reason to believe that we will continue to fight in low intensity conflicts in the years to come (See Sec. Gates article in Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2009 for a good article on expectations for the early 21st century) we can never know what the future will hold. On Sept 10, 2001, no one would have foreseen the invasion of Afghanistan in the near future. With the increasing aggression from North Korea and Iran (which would, admittedly, not fight an altogether traditional war) there is merit to Gentile's insistence that our traditional military capabilities cannot be completely forgotten.
But there will never be enough time or money for the Military to train for 2 very different types of war. Many units are understrength and are facing an incredible fast operations tempo as it is. While I understand Gentile's argument, we cannot ignore training for the current and definite conflict in order to train for something that may happen in the future.
There is, however, a partial solution. The Army must recognize the ever changing face of warfare and instill innovation and initiative within it's officers and NCOs. Those in the Army may well face a war unlike the one for which they trained. But if the Army alters and expands its training focus to emphasize innovation and initiative to leaders, especially junior leader, it will be well on it's way to being prepared, no matter the type of war it is facing.
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
1 comment:
That is a very good point argument. I think it would take a book to truly address all the dimensions so I left most of them out. I think that the debate should really be about our intellectual culture. We should have an institution that isn't so hardened to fight a specific kind of war. That means encouraging and promoting people that tend to think more off the wall and less according to whatever convention is pushed at the time. Would TE Lawrence have been promoted in the US Army of the 1990s? He should be in the US Army of the 2010s.
Post a Comment