Very interesting article in last week's New Yorker about 3rd BDE, 101st ABN in Iraq in 2005-2006. It focuses on Operation Iron Triangle in May 2006, but also deals with the commander, COL Michael Steele, and the command climate he established. The article falls short in not exploring this element of the story in enough detail, but still provides us with some noteworthy insights. Unfortunately, the article is not yet available to those who do not have a subscription to the New Yorker, but hopefully you all will find a way to read it.
Many elements of the article are worthy of discussion, but as the argument against killing detainees is pretty well tread ground, I'll look to something a little more thoughprovoking.
If the name Michael Steele rings a bell it is because he was the Ranger company commander in Mark Bowden's book, Black Hawk Down. The author of the article comments more than once about the effect that losing 18 men that day in Mogadishu had on Steele. Perhaps this is just armchair psychology, but there does seem to be a basis in the author's interviews with and observations of Steele.
Which brings me to my point. In war, people die. It is the nature of the business. It doesn't make it any easier to lose a friend, colleague, or loved one, but it is a fact, and we ought to expect it to occur. This obviously does not mean we should be reckless with Soldier's lives, but we must remember that our job as Army leaders is to accomplish the mission. If the Army's mission was to aviod casualties, then we shouldn't even get out of bed. COL Steele seemed to become so preoccupied with avoiding casualties that it had a significant negative impact on mission accomplishment.
11 July, 2009
08 July, 2009
Look back at McNamara and Vietnam
McNamara's death brings to the forefront the legacy our involvement in Vietnam. The issue is especially relevant considering the debate over what we should do in Afghanistan today. Check out this Washington Post oped.
There has been a lot written about the mistakes we made in Vietnam. Those don't need to be rehashed here, but it is heartening to note how different the debate is. Talking to people who were alive then, they note that there was much less knowledge and debate about potential strategies for dealing with the situation. All of the debate was about whether we should stay or not. Today, there is a lot of constructive debate about Afghanistan and ways to deal with it.
The other important thing to consider about McNamara's legacy is his later stated belief that the war was unwinnable but he still continued to send troops there. I could never accept anyone doing something like that. You are putting other men and women in harms way because of a lack of political courage.
The same issue arises for Afghanistan. The Administrations plan for dealing with it is-on the whole-nothing too new but it is a good plan and gives me courage that the administration believes they can succeed and is sending us there for good reason. I have heard some talk of reducing our objective in Afghanistan to more just kill capture to take out senior Al-Qaeda leadership so that there can be some plausible success. It would be a huge mistake to do so, because it would not solve the problem and would only strengthen the hardcore Islamic militant leadership of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. This solution is mostly political in my mind, and would be akin to McNamara's sending soldiers to Vietnam even when he knew the war was unwinnable for political reasons. For me, if I am standing in front of my men in a year explaining to them why I am dragging them across the world away from their loved one to possibly die, I want to have confidence it is for the right reasons.
There has been a lot written about the mistakes we made in Vietnam. Those don't need to be rehashed here, but it is heartening to note how different the debate is. Talking to people who were alive then, they note that there was much less knowledge and debate about potential strategies for dealing with the situation. All of the debate was about whether we should stay or not. Today, there is a lot of constructive debate about Afghanistan and ways to deal with it.
The other important thing to consider about McNamara's legacy is his later stated belief that the war was unwinnable but he still continued to send troops there. I could never accept anyone doing something like that. You are putting other men and women in harms way because of a lack of political courage.
The same issue arises for Afghanistan. The Administrations plan for dealing with it is-on the whole-nothing too new but it is a good plan and gives me courage that the administration believes they can succeed and is sending us there for good reason. I have heard some talk of reducing our objective in Afghanistan to more just kill capture to take out senior Al-Qaeda leadership so that there can be some plausible success. It would be a huge mistake to do so, because it would not solve the problem and would only strengthen the hardcore Islamic militant leadership of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. This solution is mostly political in my mind, and would be akin to McNamara's sending soldiers to Vietnam even when he knew the war was unwinnable for political reasons. For me, if I am standing in front of my men in a year explaining to them why I am dragging them across the world away from their loved one to possibly die, I want to have confidence it is for the right reasons.
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