Esquire Article

This article in Esquire was recommended to me by my Uncle and I diligently read it on a recent airplane trip. A few things jumped out at me. A reinforced Infantry company conducts a sweep of a ridgeline, searching for arms caches and insurgents. They tramp up and then down the ridgeline for two days, through dense underbrush, find no insurgents or weapons caches, but sustain a handful of injuries from exhaustion, dehydration, and sprained ankles. Am I describing a mission in Afghanistan or Vietnam?
Next:

One of the organizing ideas behind [the operation] had been to get the Afghan army, which has been improving in skill in recent years, to search an important village and try to trip up, or even catch, Haji Matin [a local insurgent leader], the owner of the valley's idled sawmill.

...[the operation] was meant to disrupt these locals by placing an American company on the insurgents' ridge and simultaneously placing an Afghan company in position to sweep a village Haji Matin frequented. The battalion had planned it this way, and briefed it this way, and then, the day before the mission began, word came from Kabul that the village search was canceled.

And yet the mission went ahead. This strikes me as sticking to a plan, even when the facts on the ground have changed.
Finally, the role of Haji Matin in the insurgency was what really confounded me. His sawmill was idled by a government decree that prohibited most logging. This left Matin, his mill workers, and the loggers out of jobs and pushed them into the arms of the insurgency. The author points out that the desire to expel the American invaders from their valley was also a motivating factor for the insurgency, but the Afghan governments logging prohibition is important for two reasons.
First, it presents an opportunity for the Afghan government and the American forces to disaggregate the insurgency. Let them log! If we can peel off even some of the insurgents by allowing them to resume their former occupations with a simple concession like allowing them to log then why not?
Second, this smacks of the US inserting itself on one side in a minor, perhaps ethnically motivated, conflict. This results in American forces becoming part of the conflict, and unable to function as a neutral arbiter working to resolve the problem. Yes, American forces need to support the Afghan government. But if they are seen as the Karzai faction's attack dog, we will never be able to effectively promote the reconciliation required to achieve a long term solution in Afghanistan.

Nature vs. Nurture, COIN-style!

Just finished reading The Village. Great story with useful and interesting details on small unit COIN. The CAP seemed to have very successfully countered the Viet Cong's efforts to control Binh Nghia and use it to logistically support their efforts in the greater area.
But there was a very interesting paragraph--almost a throw-away paragraph--about half-way through the book:

Luong offered a partial explanation for Binh Nghia's lukewarm attitude towards the Viet Cong. The local Communist movement, he said, had originated across the river in the Phu Longs, and hostility between the Phu Longs and Binh Nghia was generations old, focused on a feud over fishing rights.

The first thing I thought of was the parallel to Malaya. Similar to Binh Nghia, the ethnic Malay population had never been very close with the ethnic Chinese insurgents. In terms of animosity, it was more ethnic Chinese towards ethnic Malays (as opposed to mutual) because of British preferential treatment for the Malays, but nonetheless, the Malay majority had little reason to support the Chinese insurgents.
What does this say about our ability to succeed in COIN? Is the fundamental "nature" (pun intended) of the conflict the deciding factor? Are we as counterinsurgents largely at the mercy of the circumstances we are thrust into? In short, can we only succeed when the deck is stacked in our favor?

If it is possible to "nurture" a dislike of the insurgents in the population, then the example of Binh Nghia is a reminder of the famous Tip O'Neil quote, "All politics is local." We can also put another check in Dave Kilcullen's column. As he argued in his 2005 article, "Countering Global Insurgency," disaggregating insurgents is our best hope for success. The case of Binh Nghia seems to suggest that disaggregation is possible and effective even on the micro level.
Let's just hope it's not a question of nature after all.

The Gentile-Nagl Debate, Part II

I began responding to the post below in the comments section, but it quickly became so long that I decided that I would write a post of my own in response:

I like the fact that Gentile is willing to engage with the people that counter him. I've seen a lot of his comments and such on SWJ and Abu Muqawama. But I agree with you, Alex, in that his arguments are flawed.

I think the issue of troop vulnerability and exposure to danger is hard wired into the heads of many an older officer who grew accustom to the relative safety of the 1990's and are unwilling to take the risks demanded in a COIN environment. I actually blogged on that very issue here

The argument that killing is necessary for Soldier's morale raises many questions, and if it is true (and I would argue that it is not) it sets a very dangerous precedent and raises numerous questions about the ways in which Soldiers are conditioned and trained. How are Commanders building espirit de corps and morale if killing is necessary? Furthermore, many units have been conducting tradition COIN operations without the emphasis on killing and I have not seen any reports on the resulting lack of morale.

The idea of relying on more air power and non HUMINT intel in a COIN environment is so illogical, so laughable, I don't even know how to respond.

One of Gentile's other arguments that you did not touch on below is the effect that this new concentration on COIN ops is having on our traditional capabilities. This, I believe, is actually his strongest argument. From conversations I have has with those in the artillery/armor world, we have greatly neglected these very technical skills in our focus on COIN and stability and support ops. This is cause for concern. While there is reason to believe that we will continue to fight in low intensity conflicts in the years to come (See Sec. Gates article in Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2009 for a good article on expectations for the early 21st century) we can never know what the future will hold. On Sept 10, 2001, no one would have foreseen the invasion of Afghanistan in the near future. With the increasing aggression from North Korea and Iran (which would, admittedly, not fight an altogether traditional war) there is merit to Gentile's insistence that our traditional military capabilities cannot be completely forgotten.

But there will never be enough time or money for the Military to train for 2 very different types of war. Many units are understrength and are facing an incredible fast operations tempo as it is. While I understand Gentile's argument, we cannot ignore training for the current and definite conflict in order to train for something that may happen in the future.

There is, however, a partial solution. The Army must recognize the ever changing face of warfare and instill innovation and initiative within it's officers and NCOs. Those in the Army may well face a war unlike the one for which they trained. But if the Army alters and expands its training focus to emphasize innovation and initiative to leaders, especially junior leader, it will be well on it's way to being prepared, no matter the type of war it is facing.

The Gentile-Nagl debate

Lately I have been reading more of Gentile’s writings and pieces he has endorsed. I have become more and more convinced that the debate between him and Nagl has not been framed well and that Gentile’s arguments are much weaker than they are portrayed.

His central debate with Nagl is about the effectiveness of population centric COIN versus enemy centric. His reasoning seems to be that when you kill the enemy, you maintain the initiative. Once you build up enough momentum, you can virtually destroy the enemy so he is no longer effective. He also says here that killing the enemy is very important for soldier morale: “Putting a bullet through the head of an insurgent emplacing an IED indicates fundamental success to the combat soldier.”

Moreover, securing the population is too dangerous without a huge troop commitment. When you shift forces out into isolated combat outposts, they become more vulnerable. The supply route to these outposts also becomes very vulnerable. With the current amount of soldier the US can deploy, we will never be able to effectively secure the population.

Finally, he argues that a population centric approach COIN does not necessarily address the fundamental problems we face. He says: “Arguably, our current operational approach is too little and too late. It does not take into account the reality of conditions on the ground in Baghdad, the fact that there is civil war occurring, and those 25,000 additional combat troops simply are not enough to solve militarily what is essentially a political problem.”

A piece he endorsed written by an Air Force general took the argument further. MGN Dunlap argued that because ground forces sometimes cause a significant amount of collateral damage and Iraqis have an inherent distrust of us, we should have a more hands off approach with our ground forces and rely more on precise airpower. He also argued that human intelligence is not as important as that derived from technical means. To me this argument is akin to saying since 99% of accidents happen on the road we should drive on the sidewalk.

Gentile uses various evidence to support his arguments. He claims that the drop in violence that followed the surge was mostly due to the Sunni Awakening and Sadr’s decision to have a cease fire. He also says that what Petraeus and Odierno implemented was not that new and American forces had been applying sound COIN principles before they took charge.

I have many problems with Gentile’s arguments and many people have pointed out holes in it. The biggest one is that an enemy centric focus does not actually solve the problem and my even create more. David Killcullen’s Accidental Guerilla has an excellent discussion about how people become co-opted into insurgencies. When you commute to the battle and focus on seeking out engagements with the insurgents, then the population will tend to develop a view of you as an aggressor who is not helping them and not effectively dealing with the insurgency. Many people will then join the insurgency for defensive reasons.

The second big flaw with his argument which Thomas Ricks also shares in his new book is he takes too narrow a view of the surge and how it changed things. His critiques are mostly aimed at the tactical and operational levels, but the strategic level is very important to. The strategic level is where the political problems are identified, metrics to read the environment and measure its change are developed, actions are prioritized, and resources expenditure is decided upon. In the case of Iraq, Petraeus strategic assessment team identified Sunni insurgency against the new order, inter-communal conflict, and trans-national terrorism as the three important dynamics. He then developed a strategy that shaped the tactical and operational changes, some of which Odierno had already implemented. Population centric security was just one tactical and operational method to achieve a desired political result. The strategy developed by Petraeus also helped to encourage a Sunni uprising and marginalize Sadr. Thus, the two other factors Gentile mentions in the reduction of violence should not be considered as independent of the Surge strategy.

There are many other flaws I can see but these I think are the most important. One other one that deserves a lot of attention is his argument that killing the enemy leads to good morale. I would think a soldier feels better about what he did if the population cheers him and sings songs about him when he leaves rather than throwing him hateful looks.

Nagl Criticized at MIBOLC

My class here at MIBOLC was assigned to read several chapters of "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife" as part of our COIN curriculum. While I think it would have behooved us to read the entire book (easy for me to say, since I've already read it)I have overall been impressed with the importance places on COIN/Stability and Support/Low Intensity Conflict throughout this course.

But the chapters they assigned us to read were not really about COIN, they focused on the organization culture of the American and British Armies during the insurgencies in Malaya and Vietnam (Chapters 8-9). Valid information, of course, but not as COIN oriented as one would expect in a module on COIN.

After reading the chapters, we were expected to have a class discussion on the concepts. The instructor began the discussion by claiming that Nagl is inherently unfair to the U.S. Army throughout the book by comparing it to the British Army. This, in my opinion, is a grave error that undermines all that there is to be learned from the book.

Nagl does not claim that the two conflict were similar - that would be an unfair conjecture as there are vast difference between Malaya and Vietnam that contributed to the success of the UK and lack thereof by the US. But to compare the two organization cultures that contributed to success or failure in two COIN situations is not illegitimate. My instructor's argument was that the UK had a history of colonialism that contributed to its success in limited wars with political goals and the United States did not, thus it was unfair to compare the two.

This focus on "fairness" misses the point of Nagl's study and such an attitude hinders learning from the lessons of history. Yes, the UK did have an organizational advantage over the United States, but a refusal to learn from the UK's success simply because our histories were dissimilar is a grave mistake born of an narrow minded ideal of the supremacy of the U.S. Armed forces. A humble willingness to learn from other nation's success would behoove the U.S. Army, scrambling to excuse our mistakes due to historical differences will not.

Quote of the Week

Historian Brian Linn weighs in on the waging debate between COIN proponent John Nagl and the more traditionalist Gian Gentile in an article here.

Linn's take on the Army's doctrine, be it traditional or COIN oriented was particularly insightful and gives clarity to the doctrinal debate the Army is facing:

I think there is a danger of seeing doctrine as an end to itself. That is, doctrine is the foundation, i.e. the first place to look for not only how an Army intends to fight but also its central concepts ... But doctrine should be seen as an ideal–it may not accurately reflect how military forces actually conduct operations.

Ultimately Linn arrives at this conclusion:

The Army is unlikely to win a particular war, much less all wars, unless it starts thinking a lot more seriously about war and a little less about process and procedure.

Violence in Iraq and and army to focused on COIN?

I just finished reading Linda Robinson's Tell me how this Ends about Petraeus in Iraq. I also just read an interesting question and answer with COL Gentile. He makes several interesting arguments. The first is the the military is overly focused on COIN, the second is what Petraeus implemented wasn't actually that much different than what was happening before and thus other factors that led to the drop in violence. He also claims achieving victory in Afghanistan is impossible.

His first argument holds some water with me but the truth far more nuanced than that. The military probably is too focused on COIN training and most junior and mid level officers know it best. The important thing for the Army as a whole is not whether we are focused on fighting COIN or conventional, but whether we have the flexibility to learn and adapt quickly to whatever kind of war our civilian masters and the enemy throw at us. We usually start with an army ill suited for fighting the war we find ourselves in. Once we have reduced our presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, we should definitely build up our conventional capacity since we are unlikely to be fighting any large scale counterinsurgencies.

After reading Linda Robinson's book, I am certain his argument that Petraeus didn't change much is weak. Most of the military early on had the belief that not enough of the Sunni officer corp and Ba'ath party had been taken care of in the initial invasion. As such, no one addressed the fundamental political problems driving the insurgency. The most significant one was the Sunnis feeling like they had no place in the new Iraq.

What Petraeus did with Crocker was to craft a strategy that addressed the fundamental political issues. Petraeus focused on creating reconciliation from the bottom up while Crocker with Petraeus help promoted reconciliation from the top down. Reconciliation meant providing security for the population against sectarian attacks, getting reconcilables to stop fighting or switch sides, and then marginalizing the irreconcilables. This included both Sadr's men and the Sunni insurgency.

His third argument holds some water but at the same time, he seems to be thinking to narrowly. He says:

"Does anybody really think that Afghanistan, a ravaged, ethnically divided country of 25 million with 72 percent illiteracy and little history of centralized rule, can be turned into a real state any time soon, on a budget that US. taxpayers can support?"

The first criticism I have is that Afghanistan's ethnic divisions are not nearly as significant as those in Iraq. There isn't as much of I'm going to kill you because you are different. Second, he is setting the bar to high when he says "real state." Victory in counterinsurgency usually means reducing levels of violence to acceptable societal levels on terms favorable to security forces. In Afghanistan, it is clear we are not going to create a Jeffersonian democracy, Afghan standards are not very high. As one of my friends jokingly said "As long as they have fire they're well off." Thus, as long as we are able to create local security with a central government only strong enough to prevent ethnic or tribal conflicts, we can go home.

People are Key Terrain - How to Treat them as Such?

In reading Mao, Galula and the like, it is easy to become well versed in COIN theory and lose sight of the practical applications on the ground. In addition to this off-kilter perspective, it can be very difficult to determine just what the practical applications should be.

This article, written by CPT Coppock, who deployed as rifle PL, outlines a variety of TTP's for proactively addressing an insurgency at the SQ and PL level. His in-depth advice regarding the use of interpreters, familiarization with Arabic street names and important details that should be gathered about the AO and the people within serve to simplify what is a daunting task.

Dispersion of Troops: Is the Army too Risk Adverse?

The Atlantic has been running some great pieces lately. The most recent discusses the continued problems in Afghanistan and the dispersion of troops - or lack thereof - throughout the country. To summarize the problem:

Large numbers of U.S. and NATO troops are now heavily concentrated in Kabul, Kandahar, and other major cities. Thousands of U.S. personnel are stationed at Bagram Air Force Base, for instance, which is complete with Burger King, Dairy Queen, and a shopping center, but is hundreds of miles from the heart of the insurgency. Meanwhile, the military’s contact with villagers in remote areas where the Taliban operate is rare, typically brief, and almost always limited to daylight hours.

The article goes on to recommend that the U.S. and NATO build compounds throughout the problematic districts of the country and emplace small numbers of troops there. The tactic of dispersing forces through out the host country allows Soldiers to get to know the culture better so that they can work within - not against - it, gain better intel from interactions with the people, and most importantly, provide security for the people. As the article points out, the people are not predisposed towards the Taliban, but they will not assist America at the risk of having a family member killed or losing their livelihood. This is 101 level COIN tactics and it begs the question, when any historical or theoretical work on COIN would list dispersing the troops to live among the population as a key part to fighting an insurgency, why has the U.S. not adopted this approach?

There are probably many reasonable answers to this question. Dispersion would be logistically difficult, there are a troops from a variety of different countries and they all do not agree on the appropriate steps to take in this situation, the list goes on. But I would argue that the most important contributing factor to the reticence for a widespread dispersion of troops is that the Army has become too risk adverse and is unwilling to take the risks that may be necessary for success in an insurgency.

I was not in the Army in the 1990's so I have little experience with the pre-9/11 Army (for that matter, I have little experience with the post-9/11 Army) but from what I have read and been told, the Army became highly risk adverse in the 1990's, especially after the Somalia debacle. Combined with the success of the first Gulf War, in which few lives were lost, and the Powell Doctrine which sought to continue in that mold, the Army began to increasingly deny it's ability to face risky situations.

For example, look at the historical measures of success in combat: During World Wars I and II, one of the most important measures of success was defined in land gained. With this goal as the backdrop, Soldiers and their leaders went into combat with the knowledge that some, even many of them, depending on the campaign, would not return. There were a variety of measures of success in Vietnam, and the criticism thereof could be another post, but one thing remains the same, there existed the knowledge that Soldiers would be killed. But how do many of today's leaders, especially at the company level and below define mission success? For many, it is returning from deployment without any WIA or KIA. A valid goal, no doubt, but will that goal produce success in an insurgency?

Upon this (oversimplified) background, the Army finds itself facing an insurgency. There are many paradoxes in fighting an insurgency, one of them being that you must face great short term risks in order to pursue long terms gains. Living in a super-FOB with an McDonald's within walking distance will prevent American Soldiers from getting killed. But at what cost? In the long term, will the risk adverse mindset result in a net loss if the situation in Afghanistan steadily grows worse, if combat operations are required for years? Ultimately, it may be better to accept the short terms risks, and better disperse troops throughout Afghanistan, than to continue in a half-hearted - but safer - solution that will only leave the Army facing the same problems for the foreseeable future.