09 December, 2009

The Death of Initiative

This article from the NY Times is an informative read from a Army officer whose experience in Afghanistan was marked by the dismal effects the ever-growing military bureaucracy has on initiative in combat operations. Essentially, this captain argues that many opportunities to capture or kill key AAF leaders were lost because of the numerous levels of red taped that must be fought before the actual fight ever begins. By the time approval was gained for the operations, the target had long departed. Consequently, the local populace and Afghan forces were frustrated at the military’s lack of action on convenient targets.

I would guess that the origin of this bureaucratic nonsense (aside from being typical of any large governmental organization) is in another tenant of counterinsurgency: minimize civilian casualties. But in this quest (which I am by no means denigrating) to avoid civilian casualties, the level of approval for combat operations had climbed higher and higher, to the point where initiative is completely squelched. The ever-increasing technology available to commanders further allows micromanagement of troops on the ground, a mishandling of an asset intended to enable initiative.

Many a counterinsurgency expert (such as Kilcullen in his “28 Articles”) has emphasized the importance of initiative at the company level and below. This should not be a new concept to anyone even remotely familiar with COIN. But the military has forgotten to balance the avoidance of civilian casualties with encouraging initiative in lower level commanders. Pursuing extreme measures in support of one counterinsurgency guideline (ie. avoid civilian casualties) will not create success if it is only at the expense of other COIN lessons learned.

The discussion up until now is only scratching the surface of what is a deeper – and more complex – problem. Clearly, Commanders at BCT, DIV and above believe that BN and CO level commanders are not fit to make these types of decisions. Why is that? Is it the “fog of war”? The additional knowledge that is available at the TOC (Rivet Joint feed, UAS Feed etc) but not to those on the ground? Is the education level of CO Commanders simply incomplete?

If this cumbersome decision making process is not streamlined and decision making returned to BN and CO levels, the benefits available from the recently-announced troop increases may be limited at best.

2 comments:

Johnson said...

Frank and I were discussing Future Combat Systems in a similar context the other night and he raised an interesting point. The allure of technology like FCS, FBCB2, etc., creates the illusion of perfect information on the battlefield. As a result, higher and higher echelons of command believe that they can see the fight better than company level leaders can. As a result, they attempt to substitute technology for providing good guidance and trusting subordinate leaders. Frank can probably elucidate the point better than I can, but I believe it is certainly an important source of the problem.

Alex Frank said...

Excellent post Merkel. The Sling and the Stone talks a lot about how the meshing of our personnel system and new technologies has led to a tendency for less decentralization rather than more as they claim. By having short assignments and constant personnel flux there is little time to build effective trust. FCS was in the words of it's creator "hijacked by people who thought you could have certainty in war." Put the two together and you get a situation where commanders use the technology to exert more control rather than allowing decentralization.