I am reading an excellent paper written by a foreign service officer about how to be a good adviser in the Islamic world. It is available here.
There was one story in particular that illustrated one of our key mistakes that we have only now reversed in Afghanistan.
“An American Commander in Afghanistan made an unannounced visit to a remote district of Heart Province. They traveled in a large convoy of more than 20 vehicles filled with well-armed American and Afghan soldiers, about 100 in all as a display meant to cow the district officials. The district administrator was summoned to appear before the colonel and subjected to a long public speech by the American about the necessity of collecting all the weapons held by the district residents. The Afghan administrator waited until the colonel was finished, and then said simply: “There are more than 200 villages in this district, and every house has a weapon. We have almost no police enforcement here. If you promise me that every time a village family has a problem you will come immediately from the capital to solve it, I will happily collect all the weapons. But Colonel, come unarmed and not with all these soldiers. You shouldn’t tell us to get rid of all our weapons unless you are brave enough to come alone and unarmed to talk about it.”
The most evident lesson from this story is the importance of providing local security to the population. It is clear the district officials did not trust the central government and the Americans to provide him with security and so their policy was doomed.
However, the more important question this raises is whether or not to work with local power structures or supplant them. By taking away weapons from the people, the Americans were trying to strengthen the hand of the central government and increase it's ability to rule its people. Central government as a power structure has never really existed in Afghanistan in a constructive way. Instead, power tends to be held at the local level.
I think that rather than trying to supplant these local power structures, we should try and coopt them to our cause. It is naive to think we can turn into Afghanistan into a country like the US. Victory there means reducing violence to culturally acceptable levels and it will probably never have a very effective central government. So, rather than exclusively building the central government, forming local militias to help fight the Taliban is the best method. We have only just started to do so. Progress will be slow and there are some downsides, but the strategy represents the best hope for Afghanistan.
29 December, 2008
15 December, 2008
Fighting Terror and Looking Good
This is beyond trivial, but seeing photos of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ADM Mullen in the news forces me to ask, how many uniforms does the Navy have? There's the blues, and the whites of course, but there's also long sleeved mandarin collar whites, a dressed down tan, a utility uniform, and (the uniform that prompted this post) a more formal tan. I will refrain from Navy jokes, but seriously, is all this really necessary? Let's expend some brain power to get to the bottom of this most important question.
08 December, 2008
How to do Company Level COIN
Here is another excellent account of COIN done right on a low level. Part 1 is here and Part 2 is here. An account written by one of the Platoon leaders can also be found on pages 12-22 of the PLs in OIF handbook from platoonleader.army.mil.
This unit did almost everything right. They faced a tough enemy and were able to "win." One thing that jumped out at me was the sense of accomplishment and purpose that the soldiers clearly felt. In any counter-insurgency, if you fight the enemy using mostly search and destroy than its not easy to see the purpose of what you are doing. You are killing the bad guys but what are you really accomplishing. In this account, his company had a sector that it owned and the CO delegated a lot of the key tasks as far down as he could. The contrast is also evident in the Village, where the Marines had a hamlet they owned and were responsible for. The leadership climate was much better as a result. The soldiers put peer pressure on one another to get the job done and functioned more as a team.
Another thing I got from the PLs account was a better of understanding of what David Killculen meant when he wrote "Fight the enemy’s strategy, not his forces" in his 28 fundamentals of Counter-insurgency. Here is one application of that:
"On one occasion, when the rift between AQI and locals was greatest, my Platoon Sergeant’s patrol was engaged with insurgents despite heavy civilian presence. A round had struck a child, and instead of returning fire, risking further local casualties and delaying her treatment time, my Platoon Sergeant grabbed her and evacuated her to the hospital in the green zone. An informant later reported the incident as a large turning point towards winning the people of our neighborhood."
Thus, Al-Qaeda's strategy was to diminish civilian support by getting to Americans to accidentally shoot civilians. By treating the girl rather than killing the enemy, the Americans attacked their strategy.
This unit did almost everything right. They faced a tough enemy and were able to "win." One thing that jumped out at me was the sense of accomplishment and purpose that the soldiers clearly felt. In any counter-insurgency, if you fight the enemy using mostly search and destroy than its not easy to see the purpose of what you are doing. You are killing the bad guys but what are you really accomplishing. In this account, his company had a sector that it owned and the CO delegated a lot of the key tasks as far down as he could. The contrast is also evident in the Village, where the Marines had a hamlet they owned and were responsible for. The leadership climate was much better as a result. The soldiers put peer pressure on one another to get the job done and functioned more as a team.
Another thing I got from the PLs account was a better of understanding of what David Killculen meant when he wrote "Fight the enemy’s strategy, not his forces" in his 28 fundamentals of Counter-insurgency. Here is one application of that:
"On one occasion, when the rift between AQI and locals was greatest, my Platoon Sergeant’s patrol was engaged with insurgents despite heavy civilian presence. A round had struck a child, and instead of returning fire, risking further local casualties and delaying her treatment time, my Platoon Sergeant grabbed her and evacuated her to the hospital in the green zone. An informant later reported the incident as a large turning point towards winning the people of our neighborhood."
Thus, Al-Qaeda's strategy was to diminish civilian support by getting to Americans to accidentally shoot civilians. By treating the girl rather than killing the enemy, the Americans attacked their strategy.
03 December, 2008
Recent Lessons of History, Anyone?
In response to the recent violence in India, most likely perpetrated by Pakistani terrorist, Robert Kagan argues that an international force should invade the Kashmir/Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) to halt the terrorist problems in the region. But this argument reflects a deliberate avoidance of the lessons of the last seven years, specifically the lessons of Afghanistan, but also those from across the international relations scene.
First, the situation in Pakistan is very similar that that faced in Afghanistan. Both are marked by extremely remote, rugged areas, ruled by local tribal lords where the government is able to exert very little influence and terrorist organizations are able to operate almost unhindered. These are the same ails that the international coalition is struggling to diagnose and treat in Afghanistan. What makes Kagan suppose that the same actors would have any more success with what is essentially the same problem, one state to the east?
Second, Kagan foresees that this international force will help the Pakistani government save face. Yes, the Pakistani government's inability to halt the international terrorist organizations operating within their borders and the almost autonomous Afghan border region de-legitimizes President Zandari's control over the state. But, an internationalized response with boots on the ground, welcome or not, would severely undermine Zandari, far worse that the status quo. The presence of foreign forces in these regions would be perceived as an confession of inability to govern. Such an admittance would be far worse than the questions about the current span and power of the government. Increases in the perception that the government is weak and unable to govern effectively would only fuel terrorist and other non-state actors as they believe the government powerless against them.
Finally, it is highly unlikely that the international community would support such a venture, especially if it was spear-headed by the United States. Kagan himself admits that China and Russia, two kingpins on the United Nation's security council, would be unlikely to vote for such an venture. The U.S. sacrificed a significant amount of soft power with it's almost unilateral invasion of Iraq and it's multilateral, but less than successful, operations in Afghanistan. The international community is going to be unwilling, in the foreseeable future, to join the U.S. in the invasion of sovereign nations.
In the last seven years, the United State has learned many hard lessons about national building and the complications therein. We would be wise to study the recent lessons of history before embarking on, or even recommending, another similar venture.
First, the situation in Pakistan is very similar that that faced in Afghanistan. Both are marked by extremely remote, rugged areas, ruled by local tribal lords where the government is able to exert very little influence and terrorist organizations are able to operate almost unhindered. These are the same ails that the international coalition is struggling to diagnose and treat in Afghanistan. What makes Kagan suppose that the same actors would have any more success with what is essentially the same problem, one state to the east?
Second, Kagan foresees that this international force will help the Pakistani government save face. Yes, the Pakistani government's inability to halt the international terrorist organizations operating within their borders and the almost autonomous Afghan border region de-legitimizes President Zandari's control over the state. But, an internationalized response with boots on the ground, welcome or not, would severely undermine Zandari, far worse that the status quo. The presence of foreign forces in these regions would be perceived as an confession of inability to govern. Such an admittance would be far worse than the questions about the current span and power of the government. Increases in the perception that the government is weak and unable to govern effectively would only fuel terrorist and other non-state actors as they believe the government powerless against them.
Finally, it is highly unlikely that the international community would support such a venture, especially if it was spear-headed by the United States. Kagan himself admits that China and Russia, two kingpins on the United Nation's security council, would be unlikely to vote for such an venture. The U.S. sacrificed a significant amount of soft power with it's almost unilateral invasion of Iraq and it's multilateral, but less than successful, operations in Afghanistan. The international community is going to be unwilling, in the foreseeable future, to join the U.S. in the invasion of sovereign nations.
In the last seven years, the United State has learned many hard lessons about national building and the complications therein. We would be wise to study the recent lessons of history before embarking on, or even recommending, another similar venture.
02 December, 2008
Warrior Forge Changes
US Army Cadet Command has recently unveiled some very interesting changes to Warrior Forge (the culminating training/evaluation exercise for ROTC cadets). From an administrative standpoint, the exercise will be shortened by two days, from 33 to 31, and the cadet regiments will be double-stacked to allow for more cadets to be trained and evaluated in a shorter period of time. This should make life a little easier on the ROTC cadre, keeping them away from their families for a shorter period of time.
The changes to training are much more interesting. The amount of time spent in the field will increase from 11 nights to 14 nights. The increased emphasis on field training appears to be a good thing, but upon closer examinations, the changes appear more nuanced. Under the new plan, the number of nights spent in a patrol base will decrease from nine to two. Six of the seven nights formerly spent in a patrol base will now be spent in what Cadet Command is calling a tactical training base (read FOB). The balance of the nights in the field will be spent in assembly areas.
I'm not sure how much of a gain this is. One of the lessons we have learned in Iraq is "don't commute to work." In other words, living on a huge, highly fortified FOB and conducting patrols during the day is not a good way to provide population security. We also discovered the importance of combat outposts, which are really just urban patrol bases. So it puzzles me that Cadet Command is moving towards more "FOB" time and less "COP" time.
Spending more nights in assembly areas also does not seem to be much of a training advantage. As I recall, the assembly areas were simply non-tactical bivouac sites. No real gain in training there (except maybe making cadets tougher, "like they were when WE were cadets").
The evaluations and such remain largely the same, with the exception being that evaluating a casualty and performing first aid will now be evaluated. Presumably this will be a go/no go evaluation.
In short, I think the move towards more field training is a good one. Tactical operations is the foundation of what the Army does and is clearly the Army's most critical function. Preparing future officers to be successful in that environment ought to be a Cadet Command priority. However, the way in which they are increasing the amount of field training does not seem to offer many tangible benefits.
01 December, 2008
People are Key Terrain - How to Treat them as Such?
In reading Mao, Galula and the like, it is easy to become well versed in COIN theory and lose sight of the practical applications on the ground. In addition to this off-kilter perspective, it can be very difficult to determine just what the practical applications should be.
This article, written by CPT Coppock, who deployed as rifle PL, outlines a variety of TTP's for proactively addressing an insurgency at the SQ and PL level. His in-depth advice regarding the use of interpreters, familiarization with Arabic street names and important details that should be gathered about the AO and the people within serve to simplify what is a daunting task.
This article, written by CPT Coppock, who deployed as rifle PL, outlines a variety of TTP's for proactively addressing an insurgency at the SQ and PL level. His in-depth advice regarding the use of interpreters, familiarization with Arabic street names and important details that should be gathered about the AO and the people within serve to simplify what is a daunting task.
27 October, 2008
Arming Pakistani tribal militias
In an effort to root out the Taliban from Waziristan the Pakistani government, with US backing, has recently undertaken a renewed effort to arm tribal militias in the area:
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/19/washington/19policy.html
However, there are a number of big drawbacks. Despite the drawbacks, I think that it should be our main effort in dealing with Al-Qaeda's presence in the border area.
First, there are some parts of Waziristan where the tribal structures have already been thoroughly undermined by Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and where the strategy would be ineffective as a result. The Pakistani government had haphazardly followed a similar strategy in the past although they did not provide their tribal allies with enough support. As a result, many are distrustful of the commitment of the Pakistanis and rightfully so. Their are still elements of the Pakistani government supporting the Taliban (the ISI) despite how destructive that policy has been for Pakistan. Finally, arming tribal militias will further undermine the sovereignty of the Pakistani govenrment in the area and reduce the possibility of establishing good governance.
Despite these drawback I think they are our best hope for the border region. The historical context of Waziristan is important to consider. The people there have had a long--and successful--history of fighting outside influence. Generally, they want to be left alone to govern themselves the way they see fit. Given the hostility of the people of Waziristan, imposing security from the top down will probably not work.
The best strategy to follow is one similar to that discussed the classic Counterinsurgency theory and practice by David Galula. Basically, security should be built from the ground up. The way it is done is very important especially given the Pakistani's previous lackluster efforts. First, the areas where a tribal infrastructure remains should be the main effort. Tribal militias should be armed by unconventional units. The Pakistani conventional army needs to be in a position to provide support for them if the Taliban decide to make a large push against them. During this time, raids should be conducted in areas where the Taliban has a strong hold and where the tribal infrastructure has been diminished. Once these areas can resist Taliban influence on their own, the Army should move into remaining areas similar to how it was done at Tal Alfar in Iraq. First unsing indirect means, and then moving in preferabbly with maximum local militia participation.
It is very important that the effort not be half-hearted and that the Pakistani army is in a position to support the tribal militias. The people who volunteer to fight are assuming a huge amount of risk for themselves and the Taliban will be able to outgun them initially. Deploying it's forces in such manner will also require a greater assumption of risk by the Pakistanis which will mean political will must remain firm.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/19/washington/19policy.html
However, there are a number of big drawbacks. Despite the drawbacks, I think that it should be our main effort in dealing with Al-Qaeda's presence in the border area.
First, there are some parts of Waziristan where the tribal structures have already been thoroughly undermined by Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and where the strategy would be ineffective as a result. The Pakistani government had haphazardly followed a similar strategy in the past although they did not provide their tribal allies with enough support. As a result, many are distrustful of the commitment of the Pakistanis and rightfully so. Their are still elements of the Pakistani government supporting the Taliban (the ISI) despite how destructive that policy has been for Pakistan. Finally, arming tribal militias will further undermine the sovereignty of the Pakistani govenrment in the area and reduce the possibility of establishing good governance.
Despite these drawback I think they are our best hope for the border region. The historical context of Waziristan is important to consider. The people there have had a long--and successful--history of fighting outside influence. Generally, they want to be left alone to govern themselves the way they see fit. Given the hostility of the people of Waziristan, imposing security from the top down will probably not work.
The best strategy to follow is one similar to that discussed the classic Counterinsurgency theory and practice by David Galula. Basically, security should be built from the ground up. The way it is done is very important especially given the Pakistani's previous lackluster efforts. First, the areas where a tribal infrastructure remains should be the main effort. Tribal militias should be armed by unconventional units. The Pakistani conventional army needs to be in a position to provide support for them if the Taliban decide to make a large push against them. During this time, raids should be conducted in areas where the Taliban has a strong hold and where the tribal infrastructure has been diminished. Once these areas can resist Taliban influence on their own, the Army should move into remaining areas similar to how it was done at Tal Alfar in Iraq. First unsing indirect means, and then moving in preferabbly with maximum local militia participation.
It is very important that the effort not be half-hearted and that the Pakistani army is in a position to support the tribal militias. The people who volunteer to fight are assuming a huge amount of risk for themselves and the Taliban will be able to outgun them initially. Deploying it's forces in such manner will also require a greater assumption of risk by the Pakistanis which will mean political will must remain firm.
23 October, 2008
Petraeus and Odeirno not voting?
According to several recent CNN reports, neither General Petraeus nor General Odierno plan to vote in this election. Generally I think that all military members should vote. However, Petraeus and Odierno are an exception because of how politicized they have become. There move is a constructive one especially given the damage done lately to civil-military relations. Disclaimer: Peter Feaver and his Planet War blog brought this topic to my attention.
To the Republicans, Petraeus is their saviour since they would have no chance in the election without him. To the Democrats, Petraeus is often viewed as the spokesman for Bush administration policy they have worked vigorously opposed. The General Betray Us add (and the refusal of many Senators to condemn it) shows the extent to which Petraeus has been politicized. Odierno is seen as continuing Petraeus' legacy.
At the same time, there has been extensive damage done to civil military relations. Many former flags have lined up behind Obama mainly because of disenchantment with Bush's managing of the war and there have been some very partisan books written by retired officers.
By not voting, Odierno and Petraeus send a clear signal they are indifferent to the current race and thus are willing to work as a professional with whoever becomes president. I think that is an important stance given the damage that has been done to civil military relations lately. As a junior officer, it partially restores my confidence that the relationship between the next administration and the generals leading the war I will fight will be good.
To the Republicans, Petraeus is their saviour since they would have no chance in the election without him. To the Democrats, Petraeus is often viewed as the spokesman for Bush administration policy they have worked vigorously opposed. The General Betray Us add (and the refusal of many Senators to condemn it) shows the extent to which Petraeus has been politicized. Odierno is seen as continuing Petraeus' legacy.
At the same time, there has been extensive damage done to civil military relations. Many former flags have lined up behind Obama mainly because of disenchantment with Bush's managing of the war and there have been some very partisan books written by retired officers.
By not voting, Odierno and Petraeus send a clear signal they are indifferent to the current race and thus are willing to work as a professional with whoever becomes president. I think that is an important stance given the damage that has been done to civil military relations lately. As a junior officer, it partially restores my confidence that the relationship between the next administration and the generals leading the war I will fight will be good.
14 October, 2008
The Village, CAPs in Vietnam
I just finished reading the Village by Bing West. It illuminates several of the ideas Merkel picked up on.
The book is about one of the first Combined Action Platoons. A squad of twelve volunteer Marines went to live in a Hamlet of several thousand in the Vietnamese countryside along with about 25 Vietnamese Popular Forces, basically a militia. They conducted patrols every night in order to interdict Viet Cong operations and route out their infrastructure. The goal was to provide security for the local population and build trust. In the end they were very successful. After about two years of an American precense the hamlet was able to (almost) stand against the VC on its own.
One of the things that stuck out to me was the huge assumption of risk the CAPs entailed. In the end, of the 15 Marines that stayed there for a significant amount of time 8 died. Five of them were killed in a company level VC attack on their outpost. The casualties could have been mitigated if the unit that was supposed to provide assistance didn't end up being huge knuckleheads. Many of them did die but they also killed a lot of VC. More importantly, they provided security for the population and set the stage for enduring peace in the Hamlet.
One other thing that was clear from the book was how hostile the rest of the military was to them. The leaders of the Marine battalion near them constantly tryed to subvert them. He would send them company scrubs as volunteers and try and put stupid restrictions on them which made no sense at their level. The CAP Marines not only dressed out of uniform but they tended not to follow orders that did not make sense. For example, the VC planned a second company (possibly battalion) level attack on them. The conventional unit commander ordered them to abandon their post but they refused. The VC ended up not launching the attack at the last second becasue they realized the Marines knew they were attacking and had stayed. When an Army unit rotated in nearby the leader of the unit was very accomodating but the army as an insitution was not and was very ciritical of the CAPs.
If the CAPs had been applied on a larger scale and the focus of the war was more along those lines, it's very possible things could have ended up differently. While we were able to attrite the VC to a level where they were no longer effective we did not build up a solid alternative, which the CAP program could have done.
The book is about one of the first Combined Action Platoons. A squad of twelve volunteer Marines went to live in a Hamlet of several thousand in the Vietnamese countryside along with about 25 Vietnamese Popular Forces, basically a militia. They conducted patrols every night in order to interdict Viet Cong operations and route out their infrastructure. The goal was to provide security for the local population and build trust. In the end they were very successful. After about two years of an American precense the hamlet was able to (almost) stand against the VC on its own.
One of the things that stuck out to me was the huge assumption of risk the CAPs entailed. In the end, of the 15 Marines that stayed there for a significant amount of time 8 died. Five of them were killed in a company level VC attack on their outpost. The casualties could have been mitigated if the unit that was supposed to provide assistance didn't end up being huge knuckleheads. Many of them did die but they also killed a lot of VC. More importantly, they provided security for the population and set the stage for enduring peace in the Hamlet.
One other thing that was clear from the book was how hostile the rest of the military was to them. The leaders of the Marine battalion near them constantly tryed to subvert them. He would send them company scrubs as volunteers and try and put stupid restrictions on them which made no sense at their level. The CAP Marines not only dressed out of uniform but they tended not to follow orders that did not make sense. For example, the VC planned a second company (possibly battalion) level attack on them. The conventional unit commander ordered them to abandon their post but they refused. The VC ended up not launching the attack at the last second becasue they realized the Marines knew they were attacking and had stayed. When an Army unit rotated in nearby the leader of the unit was very accomodating but the army as an insitution was not and was very ciritical of the CAPs.
If the CAPs had been applied on a larger scale and the focus of the war was more along those lines, it's very possible things could have ended up differently. While we were able to attrite the VC to a level where they were no longer effective we did not build up a solid alternative, which the CAP program could have done.
29 September, 2008
Dispersion of Troops: Is the Army too Risk Adverse?
The Atlantic has been running some great pieces lately. The most recent discusses the continued problems in Afghanistan and the dispersion of troops - or lack thereof - throughout the country. To summarize the problem:
Large numbers of U.S. and NATO troops are now heavily concentrated in Kabul, Kandahar, and other major cities. Thousands of U.S. personnel are stationed at Bagram Air Force Base, for instance, which is complete with Burger King, Dairy Queen, and a shopping center, but is hundreds of miles from the heart of the insurgency. Meanwhile, the military’s contact with villagers in remote areas where the Taliban operate is rare, typically brief, and almost always limited to daylight hours.
The article goes on to recommend that the U.S. and NATO build compounds throughout the problematic districts of the country and emplace small numbers of troops there. The tactic of dispersing forces through out the host country allows Soldiers to get to know the culture better so that they can work within - not against - it, gain better intel from interactions with the people, and most importantly, provide security for the people. As the article points out, the people are not predisposed towards the Taliban, but they will not assist America at the risk of having a family member killed or losing their livelihood. This is 101 level COIN tactics and it begs the question, when any historical or theoretical work on COIN would list dispersing the troops to live among the population as a key part to fighting an insurgency, why has the U.S. not adopted this approach?
There are probably many reasonable answers to this question. Dispersion would be logistically difficult, there are a troops from a variety of different countries and they all do not agree on the appropriate steps to take in this situation, the list goes on. But I would argue that the most important contributing factor to the reticence for a widespread dispersion of troops is that the Army has become too risk adverse and is unwilling to take the risks that may be necessary for success in an insurgency.
I was not in the Army in the 1990's so I have little experience with the pre-9/11 Army (for that matter, I have little experience with the post-9/11 Army) but from what I have read and been told, the Army became highly risk adverse in the 1990's, especially after the Somalia debacle. Combined with the success of the first Gulf War, in which few lives were lost, and the Powell Doctrine which sought to continue in that mold, the Army began to increasingly deny it's ability to face risky situations.
For example, look at the historical measures of success in combat: During World Wars I and II, one of the most important measures of success was defined in land gained. With this goal as the backdrop, Soldiers and their leaders went into combat with the knowledge that some, even many of them, depending on the campaign, would not return. There were a variety of measures of success in Vietnam, and the criticism thereof could be another post, but one thing remains the same, there existed the knowledge that Soldiers would be killed. But how do many of today's leaders, especially at the company level and below define mission success? For many, it is returning from deployment without any WIA or KIA. A valid goal, no doubt, but will that goal produce success in an insurgency?
Upon this (oversimplified) background, the Army finds itself facing an insurgency. There are many paradoxes in fighting an insurgency, one of them being that you must face great short term risks in order to pursue long terms gains. Living in a super-FOB with an McDonald's within walking distance will prevent American Soldiers from getting killed. But at what cost? In the long term, will the risk adverse mindset result in a net loss if the situation in Afghanistan steadily grows worse, if combat operations are required for years? Ultimately, it may be better to accept the short terms risks, and better disperse troops throughout Afghanistan, than to continue in a half-hearted - but safer - solution that will only leave the Army facing the same problems for the foreseeable future.
Large numbers of U.S. and NATO troops are now heavily concentrated in Kabul, Kandahar, and other major cities. Thousands of U.S. personnel are stationed at Bagram Air Force Base, for instance, which is complete with Burger King, Dairy Queen, and a shopping center, but is hundreds of miles from the heart of the insurgency. Meanwhile, the military’s contact with villagers in remote areas where the Taliban operate is rare, typically brief, and almost always limited to daylight hours.
The article goes on to recommend that the U.S. and NATO build compounds throughout the problematic districts of the country and emplace small numbers of troops there. The tactic of dispersing forces through out the host country allows Soldiers to get to know the culture better so that they can work within - not against - it, gain better intel from interactions with the people, and most importantly, provide security for the people. As the article points out, the people are not predisposed towards the Taliban, but they will not assist America at the risk of having a family member killed or losing their livelihood. This is 101 level COIN tactics and it begs the question, when any historical or theoretical work on COIN would list dispersing the troops to live among the population as a key part to fighting an insurgency, why has the U.S. not adopted this approach?
There are probably many reasonable answers to this question. Dispersion would be logistically difficult, there are a troops from a variety of different countries and they all do not agree on the appropriate steps to take in this situation, the list goes on. But I would argue that the most important contributing factor to the reticence for a widespread dispersion of troops is that the Army has become too risk adverse and is unwilling to take the risks that may be necessary for success in an insurgency.
I was not in the Army in the 1990's so I have little experience with the pre-9/11 Army (for that matter, I have little experience with the post-9/11 Army) but from what I have read and been told, the Army became highly risk adverse in the 1990's, especially after the Somalia debacle. Combined with the success of the first Gulf War, in which few lives were lost, and the Powell Doctrine which sought to continue in that mold, the Army began to increasingly deny it's ability to face risky situations.
For example, look at the historical measures of success in combat: During World Wars I and II, one of the most important measures of success was defined in land gained. With this goal as the backdrop, Soldiers and their leaders went into combat with the knowledge that some, even many of them, depending on the campaign, would not return. There were a variety of measures of success in Vietnam, and the criticism thereof could be another post, but one thing remains the same, there existed the knowledge that Soldiers would be killed. But how do many of today's leaders, especially at the company level and below define mission success? For many, it is returning from deployment without any WIA or KIA. A valid goal, no doubt, but will that goal produce success in an insurgency?
Upon this (oversimplified) background, the Army finds itself facing an insurgency. There are many paradoxes in fighting an insurgency, one of them being that you must face great short term risks in order to pursue long terms gains. Living in a super-FOB with an McDonald's within walking distance will prevent American Soldiers from getting killed. But at what cost? In the long term, will the risk adverse mindset result in a net loss if the situation in Afghanistan steadily grows worse, if combat operations are required for years? Ultimately, it may be better to accept the short terms risks, and better disperse troops throughout Afghanistan, than to continue in a half-hearted - but safer - solution that will only leave the Army facing the same problems for the foreseeable future.
26 September, 2008
Chaos and Decentralization
One of the lines from the email Frank recently sent really struck me:
This really reminded me of my summer beach read, "We Were Soldiers Once... and Young." The biggest thing I took out of that book from a leadership standpoint was the importance of simple, intent-based orders and allowing subordinates to execute. The vivid descriptions made it very clear that any attempt to precisely command and maneuver units would have been totally ineffective in the chaotic and constantly changing combat environment. This is why it is important for Army officers to not only be conscious of this reality in combat, but to practice it in training and even in garrison to prepare our subordinates to take initiative and operate effectively with minimal guidance.
Historically, it is clear that combat is chaos and we depend on individuals and small units to carry the day. That means they must be well trained, capable of independent action and confident enough to exercise their judgement. Control and Powerpoints will die at the firstshot.
This really reminded me of my summer beach read, "We Were Soldiers Once... and Young." The biggest thing I took out of that book from a leadership standpoint was the importance of simple, intent-based orders and allowing subordinates to execute. The vivid descriptions made it very clear that any attempt to precisely command and maneuver units would have been totally ineffective in the chaotic and constantly changing combat environment. This is why it is important for Army officers to not only be conscious of this reality in combat, but to practice it in training and even in garrison to prepare our subordinates to take initiative and operate effectively with minimal guidance.
22 September, 2008
What do about Pakistan
ADM Mullen recent visit to Pakistan highlights one of the most important policy challenges for the next president. It is rumored he proposed sending American advisers to train local forces on counterinsurgency. Instability is on the rise in Pakistan as evidenced by the truck bomb at the Marriot. The new president is accused of being mentally ill. What's more a friend of mine has heard him openly talking about stealing money when you are in a position of power an encouraging a friend to do so.
Advisers on Pakistani soil will certainly be a political bomb shell. Will it be an effective strategy? What else is needed in order to shore up the nuclear armed country?
Advisers on Pakistani soil will certainly be a political bomb shell. Will it be an effective strategy? What else is needed in order to shore up the nuclear armed country?
Bacevich Article
I completely agree with what Frank wrote in his email, especially in regards to the need for adaptability. Developing adaptability, especially in the officer corps, is the only way to ensure that the Army will be prepared for the next war--whatever it may be. I do think that there is merit to the argument that the pendulum has swung too far towards stability ops and away from conventional warfighting capabilities, but COL Gentile's argument about whether this is even the Army's choice to make only underscores the importance of adaptability. Politicians come and go, but the Army--with its institutions, people, and culture--will remain. We need to be ready to confront whatever threat may appear because we have no way of knowing what future presidents will see our next threat as.
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