I began responding to the post below in the comments section, but it quickly became so long that I decided that I would write a post of my own in response:
I like the fact that Gentile is willing to engage with the people that counter him. I've seen a lot of his comments and such on SWJ and Abu Muqawama. But I agree with you, Alex, in that his arguments are flawed.
I think the issue of troop vulnerability and exposure to danger is hard wired into the heads of many an older officer who grew accustom to the relative safety of the 1990's and are unwilling to take the risks demanded in a COIN environment. I actually blogged on that very issue here
The argument that killing is necessary for Soldier's morale raises many questions, and if it is true (and I would argue that it is not) it sets a very dangerous precedent and raises numerous questions about the ways in which Soldiers are conditioned and trained. How are Commanders building espirit de corps and morale if killing is necessary? Furthermore, many units have been conducting tradition COIN operations without the emphasis on killing and I have not seen any reports on the resulting lack of morale.
The idea of relying on more air power and non HUMINT intel in a COIN environment is so illogical, so laughable, I don't even know how to respond.
One of Gentile's other arguments that you did not touch on below is the effect that this new concentration on COIN ops is having on our traditional capabilities. This, I believe, is actually his strongest argument. From conversations I have has with those in the artillery/armor world, we have greatly neglected these very technical skills in our focus on COIN and stability and support ops. This is cause for concern. While there is reason to believe that we will continue to fight in low intensity conflicts in the years to come (See Sec. Gates article in Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2009 for a good article on expectations for the early 21st century) we can never know what the future will hold. On Sept 10, 2001, no one would have foreseen the invasion of Afghanistan in the near future. With the increasing aggression from North Korea and Iran (which would, admittedly, not fight an altogether traditional war) there is merit to Gentile's insistence that our traditional military capabilities cannot be completely forgotten.
But there will never be enough time or money for the Military to train for 2 very different types of war. Many units are understrength and are facing an incredible fast operations tempo as it is. While I understand Gentile's argument, we cannot ignore training for the current and definite conflict in order to train for something that may happen in the future.
There is, however, a partial solution. The Army must recognize the ever changing face of warfare and instill innovation and initiative within it's officers and NCOs. Those in the Army may well face a war unlike the one for which they trained. But if the Army alters and expands its training focus to emphasize innovation and initiative to leaders, especially junior leader, it will be well on it's way to being prepared, no matter the type of war it is facing.
Showing posts with label Nagl. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Nagl. Show all posts
07 April, 2009
30 March, 2009
The Gentile-Nagl debate
Lately I have been reading more of Gentile’s writings and pieces he has endorsed. I have become more and more convinced that the debate between him and Nagl has not been framed well and that Gentile’s arguments are much weaker than they are portrayed.
His central debate with Nagl is about the effectiveness of population centric COIN versus enemy centric. His reasoning seems to be that when you kill the enemy, you maintain the initiative. Once you build up enough momentum, you can virtually destroy the enemy so he is no longer effective. He also says here that killing the enemy is very important for soldier morale: “Putting a bullet through the head of an insurgent emplacing an IED indicates fundamental success to the combat soldier.”
Moreover, securing the population is too dangerous without a huge troop commitment. When you shift forces out into isolated combat outposts, they become more vulnerable. The supply route to these outposts also becomes very vulnerable. With the current amount of soldier the US can deploy, we will never be able to effectively secure the population.
Finally, he argues that a population centric approach COIN does not necessarily address the fundamental problems we face. He says: “Arguably, our current operational approach is too little and too late. It does not take into account the reality of conditions on the ground in Baghdad, the fact that there is civil war occurring, and those 25,000 additional combat troops simply are not enough to solve militarily what is essentially a political problem.”
A piece he endorsed written by an Air Force general took the argument further. MGN Dunlap argued that because ground forces sometimes cause a significant amount of collateral damage and Iraqis have an inherent distrust of us, we should have a more hands off approach with our ground forces and rely more on precise airpower. He also argued that human intelligence is not as important as that derived from technical means. To me this argument is akin to saying since 99% of accidents happen on the road we should drive on the sidewalk.
Gentile uses various evidence to support his arguments. He claims that the drop in violence that followed the surge was mostly due to the Sunni Awakening and Sadr’s decision to have a cease fire. He also says that what Petraeus and Odierno implemented was not that new and American forces had been applying sound COIN principles before they took charge.
I have many problems with Gentile’s arguments and many people have pointed out holes in it. The biggest one is that an enemy centric focus does not actually solve the problem and my even create more. David Killcullen’s Accidental Guerilla has an excellent discussion about how people become co-opted into insurgencies. When you commute to the battle and focus on seeking out engagements with the insurgents, then the population will tend to develop a view of you as an aggressor who is not helping them and not effectively dealing with the insurgency. Many people will then join the insurgency for defensive reasons.
The second big flaw with his argument which Thomas Ricks also shares in his new book is he takes too narrow a view of the surge and how it changed things. His critiques are mostly aimed at the tactical and operational levels, but the strategic level is very important to. The strategic level is where the political problems are identified, metrics to read the environment and measure its change are developed, actions are prioritized, and resources expenditure is decided upon. In the case of Iraq, Petraeus strategic assessment team identified Sunni insurgency against the new order, inter-communal conflict, and trans-national terrorism as the three important dynamics. He then developed a strategy that shaped the tactical and operational changes, some of which Odierno had already implemented. Population centric security was just one tactical and operational method to achieve a desired political result. The strategy developed by Petraeus also helped to encourage a Sunni uprising and marginalize Sadr. Thus, the two other factors Gentile mentions in the reduction of violence should not be considered as independent of the Surge strategy.
There are many other flaws I can see but these I think are the most important. One other one that deserves a lot of attention is his argument that killing the enemy leads to good morale. I would think a soldier feels better about what he did if the population cheers him and sings songs about him when he leaves rather than throwing him hateful looks.
His central debate with Nagl is about the effectiveness of population centric COIN versus enemy centric. His reasoning seems to be that when you kill the enemy, you maintain the initiative. Once you build up enough momentum, you can virtually destroy the enemy so he is no longer effective. He also says here that killing the enemy is very important for soldier morale: “Putting a bullet through the head of an insurgent emplacing an IED indicates fundamental success to the combat soldier.”
Moreover, securing the population is too dangerous without a huge troop commitment. When you shift forces out into isolated combat outposts, they become more vulnerable. The supply route to these outposts also becomes very vulnerable. With the current amount of soldier the US can deploy, we will never be able to effectively secure the population.
Finally, he argues that a population centric approach COIN does not necessarily address the fundamental problems we face. He says: “Arguably, our current operational approach is too little and too late. It does not take into account the reality of conditions on the ground in Baghdad, the fact that there is civil war occurring, and those 25,000 additional combat troops simply are not enough to solve militarily what is essentially a political problem.”
A piece he endorsed written by an Air Force general took the argument further. MGN Dunlap argued that because ground forces sometimes cause a significant amount of collateral damage and Iraqis have an inherent distrust of us, we should have a more hands off approach with our ground forces and rely more on precise airpower. He also argued that human intelligence is not as important as that derived from technical means. To me this argument is akin to saying since 99% of accidents happen on the road we should drive on the sidewalk.
Gentile uses various evidence to support his arguments. He claims that the drop in violence that followed the surge was mostly due to the Sunni Awakening and Sadr’s decision to have a cease fire. He also says that what Petraeus and Odierno implemented was not that new and American forces had been applying sound COIN principles before they took charge.
I have many problems with Gentile’s arguments and many people have pointed out holes in it. The biggest one is that an enemy centric focus does not actually solve the problem and my even create more. David Killcullen’s Accidental Guerilla has an excellent discussion about how people become co-opted into insurgencies. When you commute to the battle and focus on seeking out engagements with the insurgents, then the population will tend to develop a view of you as an aggressor who is not helping them and not effectively dealing with the insurgency. Many people will then join the insurgency for defensive reasons.
The second big flaw with his argument which Thomas Ricks also shares in his new book is he takes too narrow a view of the surge and how it changed things. His critiques are mostly aimed at the tactical and operational levels, but the strategic level is very important to. The strategic level is where the political problems are identified, metrics to read the environment and measure its change are developed, actions are prioritized, and resources expenditure is decided upon. In the case of Iraq, Petraeus strategic assessment team identified Sunni insurgency against the new order, inter-communal conflict, and trans-national terrorism as the three important dynamics. He then developed a strategy that shaped the tactical and operational changes, some of which Odierno had already implemented. Population centric security was just one tactical and operational method to achieve a desired political result. The strategy developed by Petraeus also helped to encourage a Sunni uprising and marginalize Sadr. Thus, the two other factors Gentile mentions in the reduction of violence should not be considered as independent of the Surge strategy.
There are many other flaws I can see but these I think are the most important. One other one that deserves a lot of attention is his argument that killing the enemy leads to good morale. I would think a soldier feels better about what he did if the population cheers him and sings songs about him when he leaves rather than throwing him hateful looks.
14 February, 2009
Nagl Criticized at MIBOLC
My class here at MIBOLC was assigned to read several chapters of "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife" as part of our COIN curriculum. While I think it would have behooved us to read the entire book (easy for me to say, since I've already read it)I have overall been impressed with the importance places on COIN/Stability and Support/Low Intensity Conflict throughout this course.
But the chapters they assigned us to read were not really about COIN, they focused on the organization culture of the American and British Armies during the insurgencies in Malaya and Vietnam (Chapters 8-9). Valid information, of course, but not as COIN oriented as one would expect in a module on COIN.
After reading the chapters, we were expected to have a class discussion on the concepts. The instructor began the discussion by claiming that Nagl is inherently unfair to the U.S. Army throughout the book by comparing it to the British Army. This, in my opinion, is a grave error that undermines all that there is to be learned from the book.
Nagl does not claim that the two conflict were similar - that would be an unfair conjecture as there are vast difference between Malaya and Vietnam that contributed to the success of the UK and lack thereof by the US. But to compare the two organization cultures that contributed to success or failure in two COIN situations is not illegitimate. My instructor's argument was that the UK had a history of colonialism that contributed to its success in limited wars with political goals and the United States did not, thus it was unfair to compare the two.
This focus on "fairness" misses the point of Nagl's study and such an attitude hinders learning from the lessons of history. Yes, the UK did have an organizational advantage over the United States, but a refusal to learn from the UK's success simply because our histories were dissimilar is a grave mistake born of an narrow minded ideal of the supremacy of the U.S. Armed forces. A humble willingness to learn from other nation's success would behoove the U.S. Army, scrambling to excuse our mistakes due to historical differences will not.
But the chapters they assigned us to read were not really about COIN, they focused on the organization culture of the American and British Armies during the insurgencies in Malaya and Vietnam (Chapters 8-9). Valid information, of course, but not as COIN oriented as one would expect in a module on COIN.
After reading the chapters, we were expected to have a class discussion on the concepts. The instructor began the discussion by claiming that Nagl is inherently unfair to the U.S. Army throughout the book by comparing it to the British Army. This, in my opinion, is a grave error that undermines all that there is to be learned from the book.
Nagl does not claim that the two conflict were similar - that would be an unfair conjecture as there are vast difference between Malaya and Vietnam that contributed to the success of the UK and lack thereof by the US. But to compare the two organization cultures that contributed to success or failure in two COIN situations is not illegitimate. My instructor's argument was that the UK had a history of colonialism that contributed to its success in limited wars with political goals and the United States did not, thus it was unfair to compare the two.
This focus on "fairness" misses the point of Nagl's study and such an attitude hinders learning from the lessons of history. Yes, the UK did have an organizational advantage over the United States, but a refusal to learn from the UK's success simply because our histories were dissimilar is a grave mistake born of an narrow minded ideal of the supremacy of the U.S. Armed forces. A humble willingness to learn from other nation's success would behoove the U.S. Army, scrambling to excuse our mistakes due to historical differences will not.
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