The Gentile-Nagl Debate, Part II

I began responding to the post below in the comments section, but it quickly became so long that I decided that I would write a post of my own in response:

I like the fact that Gentile is willing to engage with the people that counter him. I've seen a lot of his comments and such on SWJ and Abu Muqawama. But I agree with you, Alex, in that his arguments are flawed.

I think the issue of troop vulnerability and exposure to danger is hard wired into the heads of many an older officer who grew accustom to the relative safety of the 1990's and are unwilling to take the risks demanded in a COIN environment. I actually blogged on that very issue here

The argument that killing is necessary for Soldier's morale raises many questions, and if it is true (and I would argue that it is not) it sets a very dangerous precedent and raises numerous questions about the ways in which Soldiers are conditioned and trained. How are Commanders building espirit de corps and morale if killing is necessary? Furthermore, many units have been conducting tradition COIN operations without the emphasis on killing and I have not seen any reports on the resulting lack of morale.

The idea of relying on more air power and non HUMINT intel in a COIN environment is so illogical, so laughable, I don't even know how to respond.

One of Gentile's other arguments that you did not touch on below is the effect that this new concentration on COIN ops is having on our traditional capabilities. This, I believe, is actually his strongest argument. From conversations I have has with those in the artillery/armor world, we have greatly neglected these very technical skills in our focus on COIN and stability and support ops. This is cause for concern. While there is reason to believe that we will continue to fight in low intensity conflicts in the years to come (See Sec. Gates article in Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2009 for a good article on expectations for the early 21st century) we can never know what the future will hold. On Sept 10, 2001, no one would have foreseen the invasion of Afghanistan in the near future. With the increasing aggression from North Korea and Iran (which would, admittedly, not fight an altogether traditional war) there is merit to Gentile's insistence that our traditional military capabilities cannot be completely forgotten.

But there will never be enough time or money for the Military to train for 2 very different types of war. Many units are understrength and are facing an incredible fast operations tempo as it is. While I understand Gentile's argument, we cannot ignore training for the current and definite conflict in order to train for something that may happen in the future.

There is, however, a partial solution. The Army must recognize the ever changing face of warfare and instill innovation and initiative within it's officers and NCOs. Those in the Army may well face a war unlike the one for which they trained. But if the Army alters and expands its training focus to emphasize innovation and initiative to leaders, especially junior leader, it will be well on it's way to being prepared, no matter the type of war it is facing.

Quote of the Week

Historian Brian Linn weighs in on the waging debate between COIN proponent John Nagl and the more traditionalist Gian Gentile in an article here.

Linn's take on the Army's doctrine, be it traditional or COIN oriented was particularly insightful and gives clarity to the doctrinal debate the Army is facing:

I think there is a danger of seeing doctrine as an end to itself. That is, doctrine is the foundation, i.e. the first place to look for not only how an Army intends to fight but also its central concepts ... But doctrine should be seen as an ideal–it may not accurately reflect how military forces actually conduct operations.

Ultimately Linn arrives at this conclusion:

The Army is unlikely to win a particular war, much less all wars, unless it starts thinking a lot more seriously about war and a little less about process and procedure.

Violence in Iraq and and army to focused on COIN?

I just finished reading Linda Robinson's Tell me how this Ends about Petraeus in Iraq. I also just read an interesting question and answer with COL Gentile. He makes several interesting arguments. The first is the the military is overly focused on COIN, the second is what Petraeus implemented wasn't actually that much different than what was happening before and thus other factors that led to the drop in violence. He also claims achieving victory in Afghanistan is impossible.

His first argument holds some water with me but the truth far more nuanced than that. The military probably is too focused on COIN training and most junior and mid level officers know it best. The important thing for the Army as a whole is not whether we are focused on fighting COIN or conventional, but whether we have the flexibility to learn and adapt quickly to whatever kind of war our civilian masters and the enemy throw at us. We usually start with an army ill suited for fighting the war we find ourselves in. Once we have reduced our presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, we should definitely build up our conventional capacity since we are unlikely to be fighting any large scale counterinsurgencies.

After reading Linda Robinson's book, I am certain his argument that Petraeus didn't change much is weak. Most of the military early on had the belief that not enough of the Sunni officer corp and Ba'ath party had been taken care of in the initial invasion. As such, no one addressed the fundamental political problems driving the insurgency. The most significant one was the Sunnis feeling like they had no place in the new Iraq.

What Petraeus did with Crocker was to craft a strategy that addressed the fundamental political issues. Petraeus focused on creating reconciliation from the bottom up while Crocker with Petraeus help promoted reconciliation from the top down. Reconciliation meant providing security for the population against sectarian attacks, getting reconcilables to stop fighting or switch sides, and then marginalizing the irreconcilables. This included both Sadr's men and the Sunni insurgency.

His third argument holds some water but at the same time, he seems to be thinking to narrowly. He says:

"Does anybody really think that Afghanistan, a ravaged, ethnically divided country of 25 million with 72 percent illiteracy and little history of centralized rule, can be turned into a real state any time soon, on a budget that US. taxpayers can support?"

The first criticism I have is that Afghanistan's ethnic divisions are not nearly as significant as those in Iraq. There isn't as much of I'm going to kill you because you are different. Second, he is setting the bar to high when he says "real state." Victory in counterinsurgency usually means reducing levels of violence to acceptable societal levels on terms favorable to security forces. In Afghanistan, it is clear we are not going to create a Jeffersonian democracy, Afghan standards are not very high. As one of my friends jokingly said "As long as they have fire they're well off." Thus, as long as we are able to create local security with a central government only strong enough to prevent ethnic or tribal conflicts, we can go home.