Podcast Source

Some good podcasts here at at the Pritzker Military Library in my home of Chicago. The podcast with Kilcullen in June was fantastic as was the one with Steve Coll (although the later was a little out of date).

Fall of the Warrior King part II?

Very interesting article in last week's New Yorker about 3rd BDE, 101st ABN in Iraq in 2005-2006. It focuses on Operation Iron Triangle in May 2006, but also deals with the commander, COL Michael Steele, and the command climate he established. The article falls short in not exploring this element of the story in enough detail, but still provides us with some noteworthy insights. Unfortunately, the article is not yet available to those who do not have a subscription to the New Yorker, but hopefully you all will find a way to read it.
Many elements of the article are worthy of discussion, but as the argument against killing detainees is pretty well tread ground, I'll look to something a little more thoughprovoking.
If the name Michael Steele rings a bell it is because he was the Ranger company commander in Mark Bowden's book, Black Hawk Down. The author of the article comments more than once about the effect that losing 18 men that day in Mogadishu had on Steele. Perhaps this is just armchair psychology, but there does seem to be a basis in the author's interviews with and observations of Steele.
Which brings me to my point. In war, people die. It is the nature of the business. It doesn't make it any easier to lose a friend, colleague, or loved one, but it is a fact, and we ought to expect it to occur. This obviously does not mean we should be reckless with Soldier's lives, but we must remember that our job as Army leaders is to accomplish the mission. If the Army's mission was to aviod casualties, then we shouldn't even get out of bed. COL Steele seemed to become so preoccupied with avoiding casualties that it had a significant negative impact on mission accomplishment.

Look back at McNamara and Vietnam

McNamara's death brings to the forefront the legacy our involvement in Vietnam. The issue is especially relevant considering the debate over what we should do in Afghanistan today. Check out this Washington Post oped.

There has been a lot written about the mistakes we made in Vietnam. Those don't need to be rehashed here, but it is heartening to note how different the debate is. Talking to people who were alive then, they note that there was much less knowledge and debate about potential strategies for dealing with the situation. All of the debate was about whether we should stay or not. Today, there is a lot of constructive debate about Afghanistan and ways to deal with it.

The other important thing to consider about McNamara's legacy is his later stated belief that the war was unwinnable but he still continued to send troops there. I could never accept anyone doing something like that. You are putting other men and women in harms way because of a lack of political courage.

The same issue arises for Afghanistan. The Administrations plan for dealing with it is-on the whole-nothing too new but it is a good plan and gives me courage that the administration believes they can succeed and is sending us there for good reason. I have heard some talk of reducing our objective in Afghanistan to more just kill capture to take out senior Al-Qaeda leadership so that there can be some plausible success. It would be a huge mistake to do so, because it would not solve the problem and would only strengthen the hardcore Islamic militant leadership of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. This solution is mostly political in my mind, and would be akin to McNamara's sending soldiers to Vietnam even when he knew the war was unwinnable for political reasons. For me, if I am standing in front of my men in a year explaining to them why I am dragging them across the world away from their loved one to possibly die, I want to have confidence it is for the right reasons.

The "Weaker" Sex: A Unique Role in COIN?

Foreign Policy writes:

"In light of the Lionesses success, perhaps the Pentagon should consider forming large all-female infantry units to support its counterinsurgency campaigns."

Nature vs. Nurture, COIN-style!

Just finished reading The Village. Great story with useful and interesting details on small unit COIN. The CAP seemed to have very successfully countered the Viet Cong's efforts to control Binh Nghia and use it to logistically support their efforts in the greater area.
But there was a very interesting paragraph--almost a throw-away paragraph--about half-way through the book:

Luong offered a partial explanation for Binh Nghia's lukewarm attitude towards the Viet Cong. The local Communist movement, he said, had originated across the river in the Phu Longs, and hostility between the Phu Longs and Binh Nghia was generations old, focused on a feud over fishing rights.

The first thing I thought of was the parallel to Malaya. Similar to Binh Nghia, the ethnic Malay population had never been very close with the ethnic Chinese insurgents. In terms of animosity, it was more ethnic Chinese towards ethnic Malays (as opposed to mutual) because of British preferential treatment for the Malays, but nonetheless, the Malay majority had little reason to support the Chinese insurgents.
What does this say about our ability to succeed in COIN? Is the fundamental "nature" (pun intended) of the conflict the deciding factor? Are we as counterinsurgents largely at the mercy of the circumstances we are thrust into? In short, can we only succeed when the deck is stacked in our favor?

If it is possible to "nurture" a dislike of the insurgents in the population, then the example of Binh Nghia is a reminder of the famous Tip O'Neil quote, "All politics is local." We can also put another check in Dave Kilcullen's column. As he argued in his 2005 article, "Countering Global Insurgency," disaggregating insurgents is our best hope for success. The case of Binh Nghia seems to suggest that disaggregation is possible and effective even on the micro level.
Let's just hope it's not a question of nature after all.

New Blog - Check it Out

I discovered this blog on lessons learned in Afghanistan (it is not affiliated with CALL). I haven't read as much as I would like, but it seemed like something that y'all would enjoy.

Torture Continued

The recent posts on torture have had me thinking about the subject lately. In particular, this sentence, in the historical context of 20th century wars has been on my mind:

The use of racial and ethnic epithets--to include the most common term, hadji--must be banned by junior leaders and that ban must be enforced and its rationale explained. Furthermore, junior leaders must emphasize the common humanity between soldiers and the people of Iraq and Afghanistan

Racism can be a lens through which Soldiers view the war they are facing. Their level of racism - or lack thereof - is a huge factor is the likelihood of abuse, torture and war crimes. At its most "innocuous" level, racism is little more than calling Iraqis or Afghans "hadjis." This is extremely common among all the Soldiers I have encountered, no one thinks anything about it. Yet is it also the insidious underpinning upon which a My Lai or Abu Graib can be built. This sounds like an overly harsh statement, and I do not mean that anyone who uses the pejorative "hadji" likely to commit a war crime. But a racism dehumanizes the enemy, and in its most extreme cases, provides the transformation that can allow a Soldier to commit abuses.

A cursory overview of wars in the 20th century supports the racism - abuse link. What allowed Soldiers fighting in Europe to converse, even play football with the enemy, during lulls in combat? This would have been unthinkable on the Pacific front, or in Vietnam. While the nature of these wars were different (especially with regards to the guerrilla aspect of Viet Nam) and the brutality of the enemy was certainly a factor, race, ethnicity and the resulting lack of a common humanity were a significant factor. Enemy combatants in Europe looked like Americans, there were cultural similarities due to America's immigrant population. It is hard to dehumanize the enemy when he looks a lot like you. There were no such limitations in Asia/the Pacific. When the enemy has a different skin color, when he is rice farmer in Vietman, or a Pashto herdsman, when the common humanity is not as obvious, racism comes easier. And racism, if encouraged or unchecked can ultimately contribute to the war crimes that stain the military's history.