How broad based is the Taliban

I have been tracking the debate about what we should do in Afghanistan recently. There are very strong arguments that the conflict is intractable and unwinnable. Obama’s NSC team seemed to come to that conclusion. I recently had a e-mail exchange with George Friedman, the founder of Stratfor who had come to the same conclusion. On the other side of the debate, some have been arguing for a shift in strategy focused on building local governance. A recent article in Small Wars Journal laid out that strategy very well. Following that path will require time and patience, given the amount of resources we are able to commit, and is certainly not worth following without a significant hope of success. I apologize in advance for the length of this post, but it is a very complex issue and this is my only post for the month.

The central issue in the debate in my view is the extent to which the Taliban has a broad base of support. It will be next to impossible to build local governance if the Taliban have a strong base in an area because once we empower the locals and arm them they will simply subvert us and work with the Taliban. That happened in Iraq to some extent because we empowered the Iraqis without addressing the fundamental political issues driving the conflict and as a result the security forces in many areas subverted our actions by aiding the insurgency or degenerating into sectarian death squads.

The argument of those who think Afghanistan is intractable can be summed up by what George Friedman said in an e-mail to me:

“Remember, they won the civil war in the 1990s against all comers. There was a reason for that, and that was because they really did have support. I am not comfortable with the assessments on Taliban support I hear, because they rarely take into account why such a marginal group should have won the civil war.”

From various readings, I get the impression that Afghani politics are in large part driven by personalities than by an actual coherent structure. The only level where any kind of structures exist is at the most basic community level where individuals live in close proximity and know one another. Anything above that and coalitions tend to be driven by a personalities such as Massoud, Doustum, or one of the other warlords. Thus, relations between these factions will be anarchic, only mildly influenced by ideology or ethnicity, and based on impulsive personal gain. Leaders are constantly striving for heroic status, power, glory, and revenge. They accomplish this by aligning with power and taking what they want when they want it.

The Taliban presented an immense departure from this form of politics when it first emerged because it imposed a rigid system of laws and represented something other than just the people in it. Its foot soldiers felt they were fighting for something rather than just for a person. Afghans I have talked to reminisce about the Taliban because even if it was brutal, it brought stability. It represented something cohesive rather than arbitrary. You might get shot or your hand chopped off because you violated some consistent rule rather than arbitrarily, as would happen under rule from a warlord.

That gave it a tremendous amount of strength during the anarchic civil war. Because Afghan politics is mostly ego driven, once the Taliban gained a certain amount of momentum, there were mass defections to its side. The various personal Afghan factions and groups realized that their interests were best served by siding with these new powerful forces that brought with them a completely different political structure. The Taliban succeeded in taking much of Afghanistan as a result.

The subsequent American success can almost be described in the same terms. The Americans came with Special Operations Forces soldiers and air power, and after a small amount of momentum, the various factions realized their interests were best served by siding with the new powerful force and their were mass defections and a huge swing in momentum. There were parts of the Taliban that melted away in order to start a guerilla war, but these elements were only a small fraction. They were unable to influence events initially because of their lack in strength.

The parallel between the American success and Taliban success demonstrates that the fundamental nature of Afghan national politics has not changed significantly. Communal feelings only existed at a very low level and not at the national level. The Taliban never succeeded in creating a strong political base. The politics in Afghanistan remained driven by opportunism and personality rather than any belief in the national system the Taliban created.

The resurgence in the insurgency has occurred recently because the Karzai government has proven itself ineffectual. There is widespread corruption and cynicism amongst Afghans about its ability to govern and retain power. The national police pushed out from Kabul are often corrupt and ineffectual. As a result, Afghans have started to lend support to the Taliban primarily out of opportunism. They view the Karzai government as ineffectual and the Taliban as more likely to win. The foreign invaders will one day leave just as every foreign invader has.

Recent polling data in Afghanistan supports this view. Data from the polls shows that Afghans are losing confidence in the Karzai government. When queried about whom they would like to see running Afghanistan, however, only 4% said they would like to see the Taliban back in power. Admittedly, the polling data is probably flawed since the pollsters would not have access to areas were Taliban support was greatest, but the dearth of support for the Taliban in still significant.

Since the Taliban does not have a broad base, a strategy of building governance from the bottom up should prove effective. That kind of counter-insurgent strategy attacks the political situation at the only level where any kind of communal feeling exists. Thus, it is the only way to fundamentally alter the Afghan political landscape.

War Poetry

I stumbled across this poem the other day and found it hauntingly poignant. Thought I would share:

If you are able,
save them a place
inside of you
and save one backward glance
when you are leaving
for the places they can
no longer go.

Be not ashamed to say
you loved them,
though you may
or may not have always.

Take what they have left
and what they have taught you
with their dying
and keep it with your own.

And in that time
when men decide and feel safe
to call the war insane,
take one moment to embrace
those gentle heroes
you left behind.

Major Michael Davis O'Donnell
1 January 1970
Dak To, Vietnam

Nagl Criticized at MIBOLC

My class here at MIBOLC was assigned to read several chapters of "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife" as part of our COIN curriculum. While I think it would have behooved us to read the entire book (easy for me to say, since I've already read it)I have overall been impressed with the importance places on COIN/Stability and Support/Low Intensity Conflict throughout this course.

But the chapters they assigned us to read were not really about COIN, they focused on the organization culture of the American and British Armies during the insurgencies in Malaya and Vietnam (Chapters 8-9). Valid information, of course, but not as COIN oriented as one would expect in a module on COIN.

After reading the chapters, we were expected to have a class discussion on the concepts. The instructor began the discussion by claiming that Nagl is inherently unfair to the U.S. Army throughout the book by comparing it to the British Army. This, in my opinion, is a grave error that undermines all that there is to be learned from the book.

Nagl does not claim that the two conflict were similar - that would be an unfair conjecture as there are vast difference between Malaya and Vietnam that contributed to the success of the UK and lack thereof by the US. But to compare the two organization cultures that contributed to success or failure in two COIN situations is not illegitimate. My instructor's argument was that the UK had a history of colonialism that contributed to its success in limited wars with political goals and the United States did not, thus it was unfair to compare the two.

This focus on "fairness" misses the point of Nagl's study and such an attitude hinders learning from the lessons of history. Yes, the UK did have an organizational advantage over the United States, but a refusal to learn from the UK's success simply because our histories were dissimilar is a grave mistake born of an narrow minded ideal of the supremacy of the U.S. Armed forces. A humble willingness to learn from other nation's success would behoove the U.S. Army, scrambling to excuse our mistakes due to historical differences will not.

Quote of the Week

Historian Brian Linn weighs in on the waging debate between COIN proponent John Nagl and the more traditionalist Gian Gentile in an article here.

Linn's take on the Army's doctrine, be it traditional or COIN oriented was particularly insightful and gives clarity to the doctrinal debate the Army is facing:

I think there is a danger of seeing doctrine as an end to itself. That is, doctrine is the foundation, i.e. the first place to look for not only how an Army intends to fight but also its central concepts ... But doctrine should be seen as an ideal–it may not accurately reflect how military forces actually conduct operations.

Ultimately Linn arrives at this conclusion:

The Army is unlikely to win a particular war, much less all wars, unless it starts thinking a lot more seriously about war and a little less about process and procedure.