In an effort to root out the Taliban from Waziristan the Pakistani government, with US backing, has recently undertaken a renewed effort to arm tribal militias in the area:
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/19/washington/19policy.html
However, there are a number of big drawbacks. Despite the drawbacks, I think that it should be our main effort in dealing with Al-Qaeda's presence in the border area.
First, there are some parts of Waziristan where the tribal structures have already been thoroughly undermined by Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and where the strategy would be ineffective as a result. The Pakistani government had haphazardly followed a similar strategy in the past although they did not provide their tribal allies with enough support. As a result, many are distrustful of the commitment of the Pakistanis and rightfully so. Their are still elements of the Pakistani government supporting the Taliban (the ISI) despite how destructive that policy has been for Pakistan. Finally, arming tribal militias will further undermine the sovereignty of the Pakistani govenrment in the area and reduce the possibility of establishing good governance.
Despite these drawback I think they are our best hope for the border region. The historical context of Waziristan is important to consider. The people there have had a long--and successful--history of fighting outside influence. Generally, they want to be left alone to govern themselves the way they see fit. Given the hostility of the people of Waziristan, imposing security from the top down will probably not work.
The best strategy to follow is one similar to that discussed the classic Counterinsurgency theory and practice by David Galula. Basically, security should be built from the ground up. The way it is done is very important especially given the Pakistani's previous lackluster efforts. First, the areas where a tribal infrastructure remains should be the main effort. Tribal militias should be armed by unconventional units. The Pakistani conventional army needs to be in a position to provide support for them if the Taliban decide to make a large push against them. During this time, raids should be conducted in areas where the Taliban has a strong hold and where the tribal infrastructure has been diminished. Once these areas can resist Taliban influence on their own, the Army should move into remaining areas similar to how it was done at Tal Alfar in Iraq. First unsing indirect means, and then moving in preferabbly with maximum local militia participation.
It is very important that the effort not be half-hearted and that the Pakistani army is in a position to support the tribal militias. The people who volunteer to fight are assuming a huge amount of risk for themselves and the Taliban will be able to outgun them initially. Deploying it's forces in such manner will also require a greater assumption of risk by the Pakistanis which will mean political will must remain firm.
27 October, 2008
23 October, 2008
Petraeus and Odeirno not voting?
According to several recent CNN reports, neither General Petraeus nor General Odierno plan to vote in this election. Generally I think that all military members should vote. However, Petraeus and Odierno are an exception because of how politicized they have become. There move is a constructive one especially given the damage done lately to civil-military relations. Disclaimer: Peter Feaver and his Planet War blog brought this topic to my attention.
To the Republicans, Petraeus is their saviour since they would have no chance in the election without him. To the Democrats, Petraeus is often viewed as the spokesman for Bush administration policy they have worked vigorously opposed. The General Betray Us add (and the refusal of many Senators to condemn it) shows the extent to which Petraeus has been politicized. Odierno is seen as continuing Petraeus' legacy.
At the same time, there has been extensive damage done to civil military relations. Many former flags have lined up behind Obama mainly because of disenchantment with Bush's managing of the war and there have been some very partisan books written by retired officers.
By not voting, Odierno and Petraeus send a clear signal they are indifferent to the current race and thus are willing to work as a professional with whoever becomes president. I think that is an important stance given the damage that has been done to civil military relations lately. As a junior officer, it partially restores my confidence that the relationship between the next administration and the generals leading the war I will fight will be good.
To the Republicans, Petraeus is their saviour since they would have no chance in the election without him. To the Democrats, Petraeus is often viewed as the spokesman for Bush administration policy they have worked vigorously opposed. The General Betray Us add (and the refusal of many Senators to condemn it) shows the extent to which Petraeus has been politicized. Odierno is seen as continuing Petraeus' legacy.
At the same time, there has been extensive damage done to civil military relations. Many former flags have lined up behind Obama mainly because of disenchantment with Bush's managing of the war and there have been some very partisan books written by retired officers.
By not voting, Odierno and Petraeus send a clear signal they are indifferent to the current race and thus are willing to work as a professional with whoever becomes president. I think that is an important stance given the damage that has been done to civil military relations lately. As a junior officer, it partially restores my confidence that the relationship between the next administration and the generals leading the war I will fight will be good.
14 October, 2008
The Village, CAPs in Vietnam
I just finished reading the Village by Bing West. It illuminates several of the ideas Merkel picked up on.
The book is about one of the first Combined Action Platoons. A squad of twelve volunteer Marines went to live in a Hamlet of several thousand in the Vietnamese countryside along with about 25 Vietnamese Popular Forces, basically a militia. They conducted patrols every night in order to interdict Viet Cong operations and route out their infrastructure. The goal was to provide security for the local population and build trust. In the end they were very successful. After about two years of an American precense the hamlet was able to (almost) stand against the VC on its own.
One of the things that stuck out to me was the huge assumption of risk the CAPs entailed. In the end, of the 15 Marines that stayed there for a significant amount of time 8 died. Five of them were killed in a company level VC attack on their outpost. The casualties could have been mitigated if the unit that was supposed to provide assistance didn't end up being huge knuckleheads. Many of them did die but they also killed a lot of VC. More importantly, they provided security for the population and set the stage for enduring peace in the Hamlet.
One other thing that was clear from the book was how hostile the rest of the military was to them. The leaders of the Marine battalion near them constantly tryed to subvert them. He would send them company scrubs as volunteers and try and put stupid restrictions on them which made no sense at their level. The CAP Marines not only dressed out of uniform but they tended not to follow orders that did not make sense. For example, the VC planned a second company (possibly battalion) level attack on them. The conventional unit commander ordered them to abandon their post but they refused. The VC ended up not launching the attack at the last second becasue they realized the Marines knew they were attacking and had stayed. When an Army unit rotated in nearby the leader of the unit was very accomodating but the army as an insitution was not and was very ciritical of the CAPs.
If the CAPs had been applied on a larger scale and the focus of the war was more along those lines, it's very possible things could have ended up differently. While we were able to attrite the VC to a level where they were no longer effective we did not build up a solid alternative, which the CAP program could have done.
The book is about one of the first Combined Action Platoons. A squad of twelve volunteer Marines went to live in a Hamlet of several thousand in the Vietnamese countryside along with about 25 Vietnamese Popular Forces, basically a militia. They conducted patrols every night in order to interdict Viet Cong operations and route out their infrastructure. The goal was to provide security for the local population and build trust. In the end they were very successful. After about two years of an American precense the hamlet was able to (almost) stand against the VC on its own.
One of the things that stuck out to me was the huge assumption of risk the CAPs entailed. In the end, of the 15 Marines that stayed there for a significant amount of time 8 died. Five of them were killed in a company level VC attack on their outpost. The casualties could have been mitigated if the unit that was supposed to provide assistance didn't end up being huge knuckleheads. Many of them did die but they also killed a lot of VC. More importantly, they provided security for the population and set the stage for enduring peace in the Hamlet.
One other thing that was clear from the book was how hostile the rest of the military was to them. The leaders of the Marine battalion near them constantly tryed to subvert them. He would send them company scrubs as volunteers and try and put stupid restrictions on them which made no sense at their level. The CAP Marines not only dressed out of uniform but they tended not to follow orders that did not make sense. For example, the VC planned a second company (possibly battalion) level attack on them. The conventional unit commander ordered them to abandon their post but they refused. The VC ended up not launching the attack at the last second becasue they realized the Marines knew they were attacking and had stayed. When an Army unit rotated in nearby the leader of the unit was very accomodating but the army as an insitution was not and was very ciritical of the CAPs.
If the CAPs had been applied on a larger scale and the focus of the war was more along those lines, it's very possible things could have ended up differently. While we were able to attrite the VC to a level where they were no longer effective we did not build up a solid alternative, which the CAP program could have done.
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