Dispersion of Troops: Is the Army too Risk Adverse?

The Atlantic has been running some great pieces lately. The most recent discusses the continued problems in Afghanistan and the dispersion of troops - or lack thereof - throughout the country. To summarize the problem:

Large numbers of U.S. and NATO troops are now heavily concentrated in Kabul, Kandahar, and other major cities. Thousands of U.S. personnel are stationed at Bagram Air Force Base, for instance, which is complete with Burger King, Dairy Queen, and a shopping center, but is hundreds of miles from the heart of the insurgency. Meanwhile, the military’s contact with villagers in remote areas where the Taliban operate is rare, typically brief, and almost always limited to daylight hours.

The article goes on to recommend that the U.S. and NATO build compounds throughout the problematic districts of the country and emplace small numbers of troops there. The tactic of dispersing forces through out the host country allows Soldiers to get to know the culture better so that they can work within - not against - it, gain better intel from interactions with the people, and most importantly, provide security for the people. As the article points out, the people are not predisposed towards the Taliban, but they will not assist America at the risk of having a family member killed or losing their livelihood. This is 101 level COIN tactics and it begs the question, when any historical or theoretical work on COIN would list dispersing the troops to live among the population as a key part to fighting an insurgency, why has the U.S. not adopted this approach?

There are probably many reasonable answers to this question. Dispersion would be logistically difficult, there are a troops from a variety of different countries and they all do not agree on the appropriate steps to take in this situation, the list goes on. But I would argue that the most important contributing factor to the reticence for a widespread dispersion of troops is that the Army has become too risk adverse and is unwilling to take the risks that may be necessary for success in an insurgency.

I was not in the Army in the 1990's so I have little experience with the pre-9/11 Army (for that matter, I have little experience with the post-9/11 Army) but from what I have read and been told, the Army became highly risk adverse in the 1990's, especially after the Somalia debacle. Combined with the success of the first Gulf War, in which few lives were lost, and the Powell Doctrine which sought to continue in that mold, the Army began to increasingly deny it's ability to face risky situations.

For example, look at the historical measures of success in combat: During World Wars I and II, one of the most important measures of success was defined in land gained. With this goal as the backdrop, Soldiers and their leaders went into combat with the knowledge that some, even many of them, depending on the campaign, would not return. There were a variety of measures of success in Vietnam, and the criticism thereof could be another post, but one thing remains the same, there existed the knowledge that Soldiers would be killed. But how do many of today's leaders, especially at the company level and below define mission success? For many, it is returning from deployment without any WIA or KIA. A valid goal, no doubt, but will that goal produce success in an insurgency?

Upon this (oversimplified) background, the Army finds itself facing an insurgency. There are many paradoxes in fighting an insurgency, one of them being that you must face great short term risks in order to pursue long terms gains. Living in a super-FOB with an McDonald's within walking distance will prevent American Soldiers from getting killed. But at what cost? In the long term, will the risk adverse mindset result in a net loss if the situation in Afghanistan steadily grows worse, if combat operations are required for years? Ultimately, it may be better to accept the short terms risks, and better disperse troops throughout Afghanistan, than to continue in a half-hearted - but safer - solution that will only leave the Army facing the same problems for the foreseeable future.

Chaos and Decentralization

One of the lines from the email Frank recently sent really struck me:

Historically, it is clear that combat is chaos and we depend on individuals and small units to carry the day. That means they must be well trained, capable of independent action and confident enough to exercise their judgement. Control and Powerpoints will die at the firstshot.

This really reminded me of my summer beach read, "We Were Soldiers Once... and Young." The biggest thing I took out of that book from a leadership standpoint was the importance of simple, intent-based orders and allowing subordinates to execute. The vivid descriptions made it very clear that any attempt to precisely command and maneuver units would have been totally ineffective in the chaotic and constantly changing combat environment. This is why it is important for Army officers to not only be conscious of this reality in combat, but to practice it in training and even in garrison to prepare our subordinates to take initiative and operate effectively with minimal guidance.

What do about Pakistan

ADM Mullen recent visit to Pakistan highlights one of the most important policy challenges for the next president. It is rumored he proposed sending American advisers to train local forces on counterinsurgency. Instability is on the rise in Pakistan as evidenced by the truck bomb at the Marriot. The new president is accused of being mentally ill. What's more a friend of mine has heard him openly talking about stealing money when you are in a position of power an encouraging a friend to do so.

Advisers on Pakistani soil will certainly be a political bomb shell. Will it be an effective strategy? What else is needed in order to shore up the nuclear armed country?

Bacevich Article

I completely agree with what Frank wrote in his email, especially in regards to the need for adaptability. Developing adaptability, especially in the officer corps, is the only way to ensure that the Army will be prepared for the next war--whatever it may be. I do think that there is merit to the argument that the pendulum has swung too far towards stability ops and away from conventional warfighting capabilities, but COL Gentile's argument about whether this is even the Army's choice to make only underscores the importance of adaptability. Politicians come and go, but the Army--with its institutions, people, and culture--will remain. We need to be ready to confront whatever threat may appear because we have no way of knowing what future presidents will see our next threat as.