How to do Company Level COIN

Here is another excellent account of COIN done right on a low level. Part 1 is here and Part 2 is here. An account written by one of the Platoon leaders can also be found on pages 12-22 of the PLs in OIF handbook from platoonleader.army.mil.

This unit did almost everything right. They faced a tough enemy and were able to "win." One thing that jumped out at me was the sense of accomplishment and purpose that the soldiers clearly felt. In any counter-insurgency, if you fight the enemy using mostly search and destroy than its not easy to see the purpose of what you are doing. You are killing the bad guys but what are you really accomplishing. In this account, his company had a sector that it owned and the CO delegated a lot of the key tasks as far down as he could. The contrast is also evident in the Village, where the Marines had a hamlet they owned and were responsible for. The leadership climate was much better as a result. The soldiers put peer pressure on one another to get the job done and functioned more as a team.

Another thing I got from the PLs account was a better of understanding of what David Killculen meant when he wrote "Fight the enemy’s strategy, not his forces" in his 28 fundamentals of Counter-insurgency. Here is one application of that:

"On one occasion, when the rift between AQI and locals was greatest, my Platoon Sergeant’s patrol was engaged with insurgents despite heavy civilian presence. A round had struck a child, and instead of returning fire, risking further local casualties and delaying her treatment time, my Platoon Sergeant grabbed her and evacuated her to the hospital in the green zone. An informant later reported the incident as a large turning point towards winning the people of our neighborhood."

Thus, Al-Qaeda's strategy was to diminish civilian support by getting to Americans to accidentally shoot civilians. By treating the girl rather than killing the enemy, the Americans attacked their strategy.

Recent Lessons of History, Anyone?

In response to the recent violence in India, most likely perpetrated by Pakistani terrorist, Robert Kagan argues that an international force should invade the Kashmir/Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) to halt the terrorist problems in the region. But this argument reflects a deliberate avoidance of the lessons of the last seven years, specifically the lessons of Afghanistan, but also those from across the international relations scene.

First, the situation in Pakistan is very similar that that faced in Afghanistan. Both are marked by extremely remote, rugged areas, ruled by local tribal lords where the government is able to exert very little influence and terrorist organizations are able to operate almost unhindered. These are the same ails that the international coalition is struggling to diagnose and treat in Afghanistan. What makes Kagan suppose that the same actors would have any more success with what is essentially the same problem, one state to the east?

Second, Kagan foresees that this international force will help the Pakistani government save face. Yes, the Pakistani government's inability to halt the international terrorist organizations operating within their borders and the almost autonomous Afghan border region de-legitimizes President Zandari's control over the state. But, an internationalized response with boots on the ground, welcome or not, would severely undermine Zandari, far worse that the status quo. The presence of foreign forces in these regions would be perceived as an confession of inability to govern. Such an admittance would be far worse than the questions about the current span and power of the government. Increases in the perception that the government is weak and unable to govern effectively would only fuel terrorist and other non-state actors as they believe the government powerless against them.

Finally, it is highly unlikely that the international community would support such a venture, especially if it was spear-headed by the United States. Kagan himself admits that China and Russia, two kingpins on the United Nation's security council, would be unlikely to vote for such an venture. The U.S. sacrificed a significant amount of soft power with it's almost unilateral invasion of Iraq and it's multilateral, but less than successful, operations in Afghanistan. The international community is going to be unwilling, in the foreseeable future, to join the U.S. in the invasion of sovereign nations.

In the last seven years, the United State has learned many hard lessons about national building and the complications therein. We would be wise to study the recent lessons of history before embarking on, or even recommending, another similar venture.

Warrior Forge Changes

US Army Cadet Command has recently unveiled some very interesting changes to Warrior Forge (the culminating training/evaluation exercise for ROTC cadets). From an administrative standpoint, the exercise will be shortened by two days, from 33 to 31, and the cadet regiments will be double-stacked to allow for more cadets to be trained and evaluated in a shorter period of time. This should make life a little easier on the ROTC cadre, keeping them away from their families for a shorter period of time.

The changes to training are much more interesting. The amount of time spent in the field will increase from 11 nights to 14 nights. The increased emphasis on field training appears to be a good thing, but upon closer examinations, the changes appear more nuanced. Under the new plan, the number of nights spent in a patrol base will decrease from nine to two. Six of the seven nights formerly spent in a patrol base will now be spent in what Cadet Command is calling a tactical training base (read FOB). The balance of the nights in the field will be spent in assembly areas.

I'm not sure how much of a gain this is. One of the lessons we have learned in Iraq is "don't commute to work." In other words, living on a huge, highly fortified FOB and conducting patrols during the day is not a good way to provide population security. We also discovered the importance of combat outposts, which are really just urban patrol bases. So it puzzles me that Cadet Command is moving towards more "FOB" time and less "COP" time.

Spending more nights in assembly areas also does not seem to be much of a training advantage. As I recall, the assembly areas were simply non-tactical bivouac sites. No real gain in training there (except maybe making cadets tougher, "like they were when WE were cadets").

The evaluations and such remain largely the same, with the exception being that evaluating a casualty and performing first aid will now be evaluated. Presumably this will be a go/no go evaluation.

In short, I think the move towards more field training is a good one. Tactical operations is the foundation of what the Army does and is clearly the Army's most critical function. Preparing future officers to be successful in that environment ought to be a Cadet Command priority. However, the way in which they are increasing the amount of field training does not seem to offer many tangible benefits.

People are Key Terrain - How to Treat them as Such?

In reading Mao, Galula and the like, it is easy to become well versed in COIN theory and lose sight of the practical applications on the ground. In addition to this off-kilter perspective, it can be very difficult to determine just what the practical applications should be.

This article, written by CPT Coppock, who deployed as rifle PL, outlines a variety of TTP's for proactively addressing an insurgency at the SQ and PL level. His in-depth advice regarding the use of interpreters, familiarization with Arabic street names and important details that should be gathered about the AO and the people within serve to simplify what is a daunting task.

Arming Pakistani tribal militias

In an effort to root out the Taliban from Waziristan the Pakistani government, with US backing, has recently undertaken a renewed effort to arm tribal militias in the area:
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/19/washington/19policy.html
However, there are a number of big drawbacks. Despite the drawbacks, I think that it should be our main effort in dealing with Al-Qaeda's presence in the border area.

First, there are some parts of Waziristan where the tribal structures have already been thoroughly undermined by Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and where the strategy would be ineffective as a result. The Pakistani government had haphazardly followed a similar strategy in the past although they did not provide their tribal allies with enough support. As a result, many are distrustful of the commitment of the Pakistanis and rightfully so. Their are still elements of the Pakistani government supporting the Taliban (the ISI) despite how destructive that policy has been for Pakistan. Finally, arming tribal militias will further undermine the sovereignty of the Pakistani govenrment in the area and reduce the possibility of establishing good governance.

Despite these drawback I think they are our best hope for the border region. The historical context of Waziristan is important to consider. The people there have had a long--and successful--history of fighting outside influence. Generally, they want to be left alone to govern themselves the way they see fit. Given the hostility of the people of Waziristan, imposing security from the top down will probably not work.

The best strategy to follow is one similar to that discussed the classic Counterinsurgency theory and practice by David Galula. Basically, security should be built from the ground up. The way it is done is very important especially given the Pakistani's previous lackluster efforts. First, the areas where a tribal infrastructure remains should be the main effort. Tribal militias should be armed by unconventional units. The Pakistani conventional army needs to be in a position to provide support for them if the Taliban decide to make a large push against them. During this time, raids should be conducted in areas where the Taliban has a strong hold and where the tribal infrastructure has been diminished. Once these areas can resist Taliban influence on their own, the Army should move into remaining areas similar to how it was done at Tal Alfar in Iraq. First unsing indirect means, and then moving in preferabbly with maximum local militia participation.

It is very important that the effort not be half-hearted and that the Pakistani army is in a position to support the tribal militias. The people who volunteer to fight are assuming a huge amount of risk for themselves and the Taliban will be able to outgun them initially. Deploying it's forces in such manner will also require a greater assumption of risk by the Pakistanis which will mean political will must remain firm.

Petraeus and Odeirno not voting?

According to several recent CNN reports, neither General Petraeus nor General Odierno plan to vote in this election. Generally I think that all military members should vote. However, Petraeus and Odierno are an exception because of how politicized they have become. There move is a constructive one especially given the damage done lately to civil-military relations. Disclaimer: Peter Feaver and his Planet War blog brought this topic to my attention.

To the Republicans, Petraeus is their saviour since they would have no chance in the election without him. To the Democrats, Petraeus is often viewed as the spokesman for Bush administration policy they have worked vigorously opposed. The General Betray Us add (and the refusal of many Senators to condemn it) shows the extent to which Petraeus has been politicized. Odierno is seen as continuing Petraeus' legacy.

At the same time, there has been extensive damage done to civil military relations. Many former flags have lined up behind Obama mainly because of disenchantment with Bush's managing of the war and there have been some very partisan books written by retired officers.

By not voting, Odierno and Petraeus send a clear signal they are indifferent to the current race and thus are willing to work as a professional with whoever becomes president. I think that is an important stance given the damage that has been done to civil military relations lately. As a junior officer, it partially restores my confidence that the relationship between the next administration and the generals leading the war I will fight will be good.

The Village, CAPs in Vietnam

I just finished reading the Village by Bing West. It illuminates several of the ideas Merkel picked up on.

The book is about one of the first Combined Action Platoons. A squad of twelve volunteer Marines went to live in a Hamlet of several thousand in the Vietnamese countryside along with about 25 Vietnamese Popular Forces, basically a militia. They conducted patrols every night in order to interdict Viet Cong operations and route out their infrastructure. The goal was to provide security for the local population and build trust. In the end they were very successful. After about two years of an American precense the hamlet was able to (almost) stand against the VC on its own.

One of the things that stuck out to me was the huge assumption of risk the CAPs entailed. In the end, of the 15 Marines that stayed there for a significant amount of time 8 died. Five of them were killed in a company level VC attack on their outpost. The casualties could have been mitigated if the unit that was supposed to provide assistance didn't end up being huge knuckleheads. Many of them did die but they also killed a lot of VC. More importantly, they provided security for the population and set the stage for enduring peace in the Hamlet.

One other thing that was clear from the book was how hostile the rest of the military was to them. The leaders of the Marine battalion near them constantly tryed to subvert them. He would send them company scrubs as volunteers and try and put stupid restrictions on them which made no sense at their level. The CAP Marines not only dressed out of uniform but they tended not to follow orders that did not make sense. For example, the VC planned a second company (possibly battalion) level attack on them. The conventional unit commander ordered them to abandon their post but they refused. The VC ended up not launching the attack at the last second becasue they realized the Marines knew they were attacking and had stayed. When an Army unit rotated in nearby the leader of the unit was very accomodating but the army as an insitution was not and was very ciritical of the CAPs.

If the CAPs had been applied on a larger scale and the focus of the war was more along those lines, it's very possible things could have ended up differently. While we were able to attrite the VC to a level where they were no longer effective we did not build up a solid alternative, which the CAP program could have done.