The excellent column in Foreign Policy This week at war talks about this week the capture--or possible defection--of a prominent Taliban leader. It goes on discuss how this guy might be able to broker a truce with certain elements of the Taliban. It's possible this guy might be able to peel away certain elements of the Taliban but not in the way the article discusses. It makes the mistake--although to a lesser extent--that the press has been making when discussing negotiations with the Taliban. It assumes that they have similar values to us and operate the same way.
We made a similar assumption in Vietnam. We figured we could pressure the North Vietnamese into giving up their support for the Viet Cong through bombing. We would apply a certain amount of pressure, they would do a cost benefit analysis, we would open negotiations through a back door channel, and then we would negotiate and end to the war. We failed to appreciate that that kind of calculus is not how they approach to the world. The might have the capacity to do it, but it's not the primary way in which they approach things. We learned the hard way they had an absolutistic way of looking at things that precluded giving up on their goals. It's difficult for someone who has grown up in out rational, achiever society to think like them.
With the Taliban, we're never going to be able to broker a legitimate deal with the leaders, because they think in the same absolutistic way. However, most of the insurgency are motivated more by situational factors. For them though, a rational cost benefit analysis won't determine who they side with but rather a spontaneous determination of who has the most respect and power at the moment. If the Taliban leader that defected has a lot of respect and face, he may be able to peel away certain elements based on that, but he won't be able to change the environment much by himself.
22 February, 2010
30 January, 2010
Negotiate with the Taliban?
I would disagree with Johnson that Afghanistan is sure to fail. The Afghan government has a lot of weaknesses but so does the Taliban. They are very fractured, have little ability for coherent action, but above all have very little appeal politically. They have failed to develop a good narrative. There claims to be fighting for Islam are undermined by there reliance on poppy as their most important cash source. The have some legitimacy fighting the foreign invader but we have done a good job of ensuring the Afghans government is everywhere we are.
That being said, our odds of success there are less than Iraq for the reasons you highlighted. Afghanistan is simply a very tough nut to crack. What Obama has done is hedged his bets. He has the right people in place, now we'll see if upping the resources available will accomplish anything.
I think the stories recently making a big deal about negotiating with Taliban miss the point and are dangerous. Getting members of the insurgency to defect or stop fighting rather than killing them has always been a part of any counter-insurgency strategy. Most of the Taliban, as with any insurgency, fight for situational reasons and it is possible to turn them. However, because they fight for situational reasons, you have to change those situational factors before you can accomplish anything. That means providing better security, effective political enfranchisement, economic development, and governance development. They won't switch sides if you simply talk to them.
Negotiating with the leaders of the Taliban, the hardcore minority, will accomplish nothing. Just ask the Pakistanis who have struck deal after the deal with the Taliban in Pakistan only to have fighting break out again and again. All they have accomplished is strengthening the grip of the hardcore minority over the rest of the insurgency. By sitting down and negotiating with them as equals, they have appeared weak and enhanced the prestige and respect due to the hardcore minority.
That being said, our odds of success there are less than Iraq for the reasons you highlighted. Afghanistan is simply a very tough nut to crack. What Obama has done is hedged his bets. He has the right people in place, now we'll see if upping the resources available will accomplish anything.
I think the stories recently making a big deal about negotiating with Taliban miss the point and are dangerous. Getting members of the insurgency to defect or stop fighting rather than killing them has always been a part of any counter-insurgency strategy. Most of the Taliban, as with any insurgency, fight for situational reasons and it is possible to turn them. However, because they fight for situational reasons, you have to change those situational factors before you can accomplish anything. That means providing better security, effective political enfranchisement, economic development, and governance development. They won't switch sides if you simply talk to them.
Negotiating with the leaders of the Taliban, the hardcore minority, will accomplish nothing. Just ask the Pakistanis who have struck deal after the deal with the Taliban in Pakistan only to have fighting break out again and again. All they have accomplished is strengthening the grip of the hardcore minority over the rest of the insurgency. By sitting down and negotiating with them as equals, they have appeared weak and enhanced the prestige and respect due to the hardcore minority.
26 January, 2010
If It's In Time Magazine Then Truly Everyone Knows It
Time Magazine is not a very good publication (I would submit to you as evidence the picture at the beginning of the article I am about to link to which claims to show a US soldier "tak[ing] aim at a suspected Taliban hideout in the woods of Oshaky, Afghanistan" when he is clearly using his ACOG for the purpose of magnification, not target acquisition) so if they know that the US believes that a political settlement including the Taliban is the eventual outcome in Afghanistan, then pretty much all the cards are on the table. US leaders know we cannot be in Afghanistan for too much longer, the Taliban knows that we know it, and we know that the Taliban knows that we know. The point of all this knowing is that we cannot hope to achieve much of anything with the current surge.
The fact of the matter is that the Taliban can simply wait a year or two until we start to draw down before they go back on the offensive and they know it. And although I am very reluctant to draw historical analogies (especially ones that involve Vietnam as it has become cliche) I can't help but think that this surge is simply Obama's Christmas Bombing. So why waste time with a surge that the Taliban know they can wait out, that we know that the Taliban can wait out, and that the Taliban know that we know that they can wait out?
So what does this say about counterinsurgency more generally? That a foreign army cannot fake resolve. A legitimate and capable host nation partner is absolutely essential. Which brings us to the real problem for the US in Afghanistan. No Afghani institution(s) have the ability to resist the Taliban in the Pashtun parts of the country and this is a fundamental that will not change in a year or 18 months.
The fact of the matter is that the Taliban can simply wait a year or two until we start to draw down before they go back on the offensive and they know it. And although I am very reluctant to draw historical analogies (especially ones that involve Vietnam as it has become cliche) I can't help but think that this surge is simply Obama's Christmas Bombing. So why waste time with a surge that the Taliban know they can wait out, that we know that the Taliban can wait out, and that the Taliban know that we know that they can wait out?
So what does this say about counterinsurgency more generally? That a foreign army cannot fake resolve. A legitimate and capable host nation partner is absolutely essential. Which brings us to the real problem for the US in Afghanistan. No Afghani institution(s) have the ability to resist the Taliban in the Pashtun parts of the country and this is a fundamental that will not change in a year or 18 months.
09 December, 2009
The Death of Initiative
This article from the NY Times is an informative read from a Army officer whose experience in Afghanistan was marked by the dismal effects the ever-growing military bureaucracy has on initiative in combat operations. Essentially, this captain argues that many opportunities to capture or kill key AAF leaders were lost because of the numerous levels of red taped that must be fought before the actual fight ever begins. By the time approval was gained for the operations, the target had long departed. Consequently, the local populace and Afghan forces were frustrated at the military’s lack of action on convenient targets.
I would guess that the origin of this bureaucratic nonsense (aside from being typical of any large governmental organization) is in another tenant of counterinsurgency: minimize civilian casualties. But in this quest (which I am by no means denigrating) to avoid civilian casualties, the level of approval for combat operations had climbed higher and higher, to the point where initiative is completely squelched. The ever-increasing technology available to commanders further allows micromanagement of troops on the ground, a mishandling of an asset intended to enable initiative.
Many a counterinsurgency expert (such as Kilcullen in his “28 Articles”) has emphasized the importance of initiative at the company level and below. This should not be a new concept to anyone even remotely familiar with COIN. But the military has forgotten to balance the avoidance of civilian casualties with encouraging initiative in lower level commanders. Pursuing extreme measures in support of one counterinsurgency guideline (ie. avoid civilian casualties) will not create success if it is only at the expense of other COIN lessons learned.
The discussion up until now is only scratching the surface of what is a deeper – and more complex – problem. Clearly, Commanders at BCT, DIV and above believe that BN and CO level commanders are not fit to make these types of decisions. Why is that? Is it the “fog of war”? The additional knowledge that is available at the TOC (Rivet Joint feed, UAS Feed etc) but not to those on the ground? Is the education level of CO Commanders simply incomplete?
If this cumbersome decision making process is not streamlined and decision making returned to BN and CO levels, the benefits available from the recently-announced troop increases may be limited at best.
I would guess that the origin of this bureaucratic nonsense (aside from being typical of any large governmental organization) is in another tenant of counterinsurgency: minimize civilian casualties. But in this quest (which I am by no means denigrating) to avoid civilian casualties, the level of approval for combat operations had climbed higher and higher, to the point where initiative is completely squelched. The ever-increasing technology available to commanders further allows micromanagement of troops on the ground, a mishandling of an asset intended to enable initiative.
Many a counterinsurgency expert (such as Kilcullen in his “28 Articles”) has emphasized the importance of initiative at the company level and below. This should not be a new concept to anyone even remotely familiar with COIN. But the military has forgotten to balance the avoidance of civilian casualties with encouraging initiative in lower level commanders. Pursuing extreme measures in support of one counterinsurgency guideline (ie. avoid civilian casualties) will not create success if it is only at the expense of other COIN lessons learned.
The discussion up until now is only scratching the surface of what is a deeper – and more complex – problem. Clearly, Commanders at BCT, DIV and above believe that BN and CO level commanders are not fit to make these types of decisions. Why is that? Is it the “fog of war”? The additional knowledge that is available at the TOC (Rivet Joint feed, UAS Feed etc) but not to those on the ground? Is the education level of CO Commanders simply incomplete?
If this cumbersome decision making process is not streamlined and decision making returned to BN and CO levels, the benefits available from the recently-announced troop increases may be limited at best.
16 September, 2009
Esquire Article
This article in Esquire was recommended to me by my Uncle and I diligently read it on a recent airplane trip. A few things jumped out at me. A reinforced Infantry company conducts a sweep of a ridgeline, searching for arms caches and insurgents. They tramp up and then down the ridgeline for two days, through dense underbrush, find no insurgents or weapons caches, but sustain a handful of injuries from exhaustion, dehydration, and sprained ankles. Am I describing a mission in Afghanistan or Vietnam?
Next:
Finally, the role of Haji Matin in the insurgency was what really confounded me. His sawmill was idled by a government decree that prohibited most logging. This left Matin, his mill workers, and the loggers out of jobs and pushed them into the arms of the insurgency. The author points out that the desire to expel the American invaders from their valley was also a motivating factor for the insurgency, but the Afghan governments logging prohibition is important for two reasons.
First, it presents an opportunity for the Afghan government and the American forces to disaggregate the insurgency. Let them log! If we can peel off even some of the insurgents by allowing them to resume their former occupations with a simple concession like allowing them to log then why not?
Second, this smacks of the US inserting itself on one side in a minor, perhaps ethnically motivated, conflict. This results in American forces becoming part of the conflict, and unable to function as a neutral arbiter working to resolve the problem. Yes, American forces need to support the Afghan government. But if they are seen as the Karzai faction's attack dog, we will never be able to effectively promote the reconciliation required to achieve a long term solution in Afghanistan.
Next:
One of the organizing ideas behind [the operation] had been to get the Afghan army, which has been improving in skill in recent years, to search an important village and try to trip up, or even catch, Haji Matin [a local insurgent leader], the owner of the valley's idled sawmill.
...[the operation] was meant to disrupt these locals by placing an American company on the insurgents' ridge and simultaneously placing an Afghan company in position to sweep a village Haji Matin frequented. The battalion had planned it this way, and briefed it this way, and then, the day before the mission began, word came from Kabul that the village search was canceled.And yet the mission went ahead. This strikes me as sticking to a plan, even when the facts on the ground have changed.
Finally, the role of Haji Matin in the insurgency was what really confounded me. His sawmill was idled by a government decree that prohibited most logging. This left Matin, his mill workers, and the loggers out of jobs and pushed them into the arms of the insurgency. The author points out that the desire to expel the American invaders from their valley was also a motivating factor for the insurgency, but the Afghan governments logging prohibition is important for two reasons.
First, it presents an opportunity for the Afghan government and the American forces to disaggregate the insurgency. Let them log! If we can peel off even some of the insurgents by allowing them to resume their former occupations with a simple concession like allowing them to log then why not?
Second, this smacks of the US inserting itself on one side in a minor, perhaps ethnically motivated, conflict. This results in American forces becoming part of the conflict, and unable to function as a neutral arbiter working to resolve the problem. Yes, American forces need to support the Afghan government. But if they are seen as the Karzai faction's attack dog, we will never be able to effectively promote the reconciliation required to achieve a long term solution in Afghanistan.
06 September, 2009
Undermining the "Strategic Corporal"
I've never spent much time pondering the NCO promotion system, and why should I? It had never affected me before. But now, as a PL, one of my responsibilities is promoting talented Soldiers, or preventing promotions, as the case may be.
My PSG and I sent an E5 to the E6 board last month. This E5 is everything one could ask for in a young NCO and more. Anything I ask for will be done to the utmost of his ability. He is conscientious about developing his Soldiers, he is impressively knowledgeable about Afghanistan, he is tactically and technically competent, he spends his personal time thinking about the mission at hand and how to accomplish it, ultimately, he is the most competent person in my platoon. He is one of those NCOs that our Cadre were talking about when they said to naive Cadets "Don't worry, your NCOs will teach you all that you need to know." (Unfortunately, they never mentioned the 50% of NCOs that don't know enough - and don't care to - square a young officer away, but I digress). If any NCO should make E6, this is the one.
But I misjudged - and failed to understand - the NCO promotion system. Professional competency doesn't seem to really matter. Development of subordinates, not too important, personal development towards understanding Afghanistan - overrated. 1SGs and CSMs really only care to promote NCOs who remember an insignificant detail of the morning news, who have spent time memorizing the minutia of Drill and Ceremony (time that could have been spent on the Pashtunwali).
Yes, NCOs are responsible for studying for the board. But in the case of this NCO, he transferred over from the Navy less than 2 years ago. Some of the regulation-based knowledge that Soldiers pick up along the way was lost upon him. Because he wasn't well schooled in nonsense that is easily looked up, he failed to make E6.
Much as been made of the "strategic corporal" or the importance of decentralized decisions made by junior NCOs on the ground. However, the NCO promotion boards must be redirected from the simple memorization of regulation minutia - metric that absolutely fails at indicating leadership potential, and refocused on questions regarding technical competency, knowledge of the deployment AO and situational leadership challenges. Furthermore, boards should not be the determining promotion factor, and should be subjugated to evaluations written by the NCOs chain of command. Only when the NCO promotion system has been altered to reflect this new focus will the Army see the greatest gains from the "strategic corporal."
My PSG and I sent an E5 to the E6 board last month. This E5 is everything one could ask for in a young NCO and more. Anything I ask for will be done to the utmost of his ability. He is conscientious about developing his Soldiers, he is impressively knowledgeable about Afghanistan, he is tactically and technically competent, he spends his personal time thinking about the mission at hand and how to accomplish it, ultimately, he is the most competent person in my platoon. He is one of those NCOs that our Cadre were talking about when they said to naive Cadets "Don't worry, your NCOs will teach you all that you need to know." (Unfortunately, they never mentioned the 50% of NCOs that don't know enough - and don't care to - square a young officer away, but I digress). If any NCO should make E6, this is the one.
But I misjudged - and failed to understand - the NCO promotion system. Professional competency doesn't seem to really matter. Development of subordinates, not too important, personal development towards understanding Afghanistan - overrated. 1SGs and CSMs really only care to promote NCOs who remember an insignificant detail of the morning news, who have spent time memorizing the minutia of Drill and Ceremony (time that could have been spent on the Pashtunwali).
Yes, NCOs are responsible for studying for the board. But in the case of this NCO, he transferred over from the Navy less than 2 years ago. Some of the regulation-based knowledge that Soldiers pick up along the way was lost upon him. Because he wasn't well schooled in nonsense that is easily looked up, he failed to make E6.
Much as been made of the "strategic corporal" or the importance of decentralized decisions made by junior NCOs on the ground. However, the NCO promotion boards must be redirected from the simple memorization of regulation minutia - metric that absolutely fails at indicating leadership potential, and refocused on questions regarding technical competency, knowledge of the deployment AO and situational leadership challenges. Furthermore, boards should not be the determining promotion factor, and should be subjugated to evaluations written by the NCOs chain of command. Only when the NCO promotion system has been altered to reflect this new focus will the Army see the greatest gains from the "strategic corporal."
01 September, 2009
Infantry Basic Officer Leadership, good prep?
Infantry Basic Officer Leadership Course (IBOLC) is over. Overall, it was a good course at giving me technical tools but it was not a good course for creating a good mindset.
The Turkish international student in our platoon, Ferhat, was named the international honor graduate and had some especially cogent criticisms. He said that the situations we face were mostly canned and did not correlate to what we will be facing when we deploy. Every time we do a mission we go in knowing the exact enemy situation. We know where he is, what he will do, and how many people he has. He behaved like a conventional opponent every time. Whenever we attacked he would stay and fight when an irregular opponent would have broken contact. Also, we initiated almost all of our engagements, whereas in reality the insurgent initiates the vast majority.
He did say our training was very good on the whole. I did learn a lot about things like how to think about security in all environments and how to employ machine guns well. I also got good feedback from the cadre on how to communicate orders better and delegate to make my life easier.
At the same time, his criticisms were definitely valid. IBOLC did not help prepare us for the ambiguity that we will face having to react to a daring an crafty enemy who hits us at our weakest points. Also, it was very process oriented. We went into a situation we knew and had faced before, and just had to follow a process to get the job done. If they had taught the classes in a way that asked more questions and put us in unfamiliar situations we would have had a different experience.
The Turkish international student in our platoon, Ferhat, was named the international honor graduate and had some especially cogent criticisms. He said that the situations we face were mostly canned and did not correlate to what we will be facing when we deploy. Every time we do a mission we go in knowing the exact enemy situation. We know where he is, what he will do, and how many people he has. He behaved like a conventional opponent every time. Whenever we attacked he would stay and fight when an irregular opponent would have broken contact. Also, we initiated almost all of our engagements, whereas in reality the insurgent initiates the vast majority.
He did say our training was very good on the whole. I did learn a lot about things like how to think about security in all environments and how to employ machine guns well. I also got good feedback from the cadre on how to communicate orders better and delegate to make my life easier.
At the same time, his criticisms were definitely valid. IBOLC did not help prepare us for the ambiguity that we will face having to react to a daring an crafty enemy who hits us at our weakest points. Also, it was very process oriented. We went into a situation we knew and had faced before, and just had to follow a process to get the job done. If they had taught the classes in a way that asked more questions and put us in unfamiliar situations we would have had a different experience.
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